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Abstract 
THE INDUSTRIAL COURT: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF ITS 
CONTRIBUTION TO 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN 
BOTSWANA 
PEARL KUPE-KALONDA 
An effective and practical dispute settlement machinery which deals with disputes 
between workers and employers is fundamental to achieving sound labour 
relations and industrial peace and harmony. The ideal dispute settlement 
machinery should not only be founded on tenets of industrial democracy, but 
should also allow the active participation of the parties.1 
In many countries dispute resolution is dominated by tl1e State through the 
conciliation and mediation services provided by the Ministry of Labour.2 This fact 
was readily acknowledged by the former Minister of Labour and Home Affairs 
(Botswana), P Balopi, who stated the following: 
1 Bendix S Industrial Relations in South Africa, 2nd ed, Juta & Co. (1992), p129 
2 Christie S. & Madhuku L. Labour Dispflte Resolution in SOlltbern Ajircal st ed., Friedrich Ebert Stiftung & the 
Institute of Development and Labour Law, University of Cape Town, p 7 
"Our policy in the past has been to intervene administratively in disputes 
through the offices of the Commissioner of Labour."3 
The Minister further acknowledged the inadequacy of the existing labour 
legislation and dispute settlement machinery in Botswana by stating the following: 
"Although the Trade Disputes Act does provide for arbitration and 
conciliation, the legislation has not become a central institution in the 
settlement of disp'utes, and both employers and workers inevitably 
continue to turn to Government A similar problem exists when it comes 
to individual grievances and in particular the very emotional issue of 
dismissals. As with collective disputes, there is a danger of. ........... the 
settlement of a grievance being dependant upon access to tl1e corridors of 
Government. 
I am strongly of the view that Government cannot continue to play this 
role and as in collective disputes, the time has come to establish 
independent institutions, free of Government, to which both employees 
and employers can turn to if they are unable to settle their differences 
internally."4 
The Ministers speech reflected a major change in government policy with 
regard to the handling of labour disputes. One of the primary 
3 Balopi P.K, Opening Speech try the Minister of Labour & Home Affair:!, Seminar on dIe Revision of ilie 
Employment Act & Trade Disputes Act, Gaborone Sun, August 27,1990 at 4 
Ibid at 4 
consequences of this change was the establishment of the Industrial 
Court through section 17 of the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act of 
1992.s The Court was primarily established to resolve disputes that could 
not be settled by government machinery. 
The study briefly outlines tl1e development of labour relations in 
Botswana with specific emphasis on developments leading to the 
establishment of the Industrial Court. Various provisions of tlle Trade 
Disputes (Amendment) Act 1992 pertaining to the Industrial Court are 
set out. The study continues to review the nature and functions of the 
Industrial Court. 
The study also looks at tlle Industrial Court process and assesses it in 
terms of the established principles pertaining to an efficient dispute 
resolution system. 
Since its inception tlle Industrial Court has dealt with a number of cases 
and has contributed significantly to the development of labour law and 
labour relations in Botswana. The study examines some of tlle major 
decisions of tl1e Industrial Court wim a view to identifying any significant 
principles and! or trends. Certain attitudes and perceptions have been 
expressed regarding the Courts' role and function in labour relations. 
Criticisms specifically raised include a concern over the Industrial Court's 
apparent lack of jurisdiction and status amongst other tllings. The study 
critically examines these perceptions and attitudes by way of standardized 
questionnaires. 
5 Section 17, Trade Disputes (Ame1ldmtlll) Act, 1992 
The study aims to assess the abovementioned in light of the Industrial 
Court's role in the changing labour relations environment in Botswana. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
OBJECTIVES, METHODOLOGY & LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
1. Objective of the study 
The broad objective of the study is to assess the contribution of the Industrial 
Court of Botswana to the development of industrial relations in Botswana. The 
nature of the approach is predominantly historical. 
1.1 Chapter One 
The objective of this chapter is to set out the objective, methodology of research 
and limitations of the study 
1.2 Chapter Two 
The objective of this chapter is to establish the need for specialized Labour 
Courts. The chapter commences with a brief outline of the historical 
development of specialized Labour Courts as they first existed in Europe and 
concludes with a brief exposition on some of the pertinent philosophies 
surrounding Labour Courts. 
1.3 Chapter Three 
To be able to effectively assess the contribution of the Industrial Court to labour 
relations in Botswana, it is necessary to set out a historical perspective of 
developments in the labour relations field. Chapter Three outlines the industrial 
22 
law as it existed prior to the 1992 reforms and sets out the legislative background 
which led to the establishment of the Industrial Court. It looks at the efficacy of 
the industrial law as it existed and briefly highlights the shortcomings of the 
previous dispute resolution machinery. The framework of approach is historical 
and is used to illustrate how the Industrial Court came into existence. 
1.4 Chapter Four 
The objective of this chapter is to set out 
Industrial Court. Chapter four outlines the 
nature and composition of the 
establishment of the Court and 
reviews its nature and functions with particular emphasis on its jurisdiction and 
powers. The chapter also describes the Courts procedures as set out in the Trade 
Disputes (Amendment) Act and the Industrial Court Rules. The chapter 
concludes with a brief discussion relating to the nature and procedure of appeals 
and reviews emanating from the Industrial Court. 
1.5 Chapter Five 
The objective of this chapter is to specifically examme the. procedures and 
processes of the Botswana Industrial Court and evaluate them against the 
international 'best practice' benchmarks of an effective dispute resolution system. 
The chapter examines the accessibility, speed and formality of the Court in detail. 
The Court is primarily ev.aluated against the South African dispute resolution 
system which is considered to be the most progressive and effective within the 
SADC region. 
1.6 Chapter Six 
The objective of this chapter is to review the case law emanating from the 
Industrial Court. Chapter six examines and analyses certain decisions of the Court 
23 
with a view to identifying any significant features or trends. The chapter aims to 
assess the overall contribution the Court to the development of industrial 
relations in Botswana, through its body case law. The facts of each case are 
briefly set out, followed by a general commentary and analysis. The chapter 
concludes with some general comments relating to the Industrial Courts role in 
the development of a body of coherent case law. 
The objective of this chapter is to set out the perceptions prevailing amongst 
labour academics, management personnel, trade unionists and labour la\vyers 
regarding the key and controversial issues that relate to the role of the Industrial 
Court in labour relations in Botswana. The format of the interview is clearly set 
out. Each question is followed by a response of the interviewees within each 
grouping. The'chapter concludes with an overall evaluation of the interviewees' 
perceptions. 
1.8 Chapter Eight 
Chapter eight concludes with an assessment of the Industrial Courts contribution 
to labour relations in Botswana. In assessing the contribution of the Industrial 
Court to labour relations, it considers some of the best practice benchmarks of an 
efficient dispute resolution system and incorporates the interviewees' perceptions 
of the Court. The chapter sets out the main findings of the study and concludes 
by suggesting possible area for future research. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
A qualitative approach will be employed in conducting research since the study 
does not lend itself to a statistical or quantitative approach. Documentary analysis 
24 
will be the primary method adopted. Data such as Government'reports, Acts of 
Parliament, draft bills, law reports, speeches and policy documents, historical 
books and documents will be analyzed. Various Court decisions, conference 
reports, workshop documents, journal articles and books on labour law will also 
be included. These documents will be used largely to provide a historical 
framework. 
2.1 Chapter One 
No specific methodology will be employed in this chapter other than setting out 
the objectives, methodology and limitations of the study. 
2.2 Chapter Two 
Labour law textbooks and journal articles were used in Chapter two to provide a 
historical background and framework .. 
2.3-2.5 Chapters Three, Four, Five & Six 
Chapters three, four, five and six will be based primarily on the analysis of 
primary and secondary materials in the form of Acts of Parliament and draft bills, 
court cases, speeches and policy documents as well as textbooks, seminar and 
conference papers and research reports. 
2.6 Chapter Six 
In addition to the above, chapter six also focuses on analyzing certain decisions 
of the Court. The decisions analyzed were selected on the basis of their; . 
contribution to fair employment guidelines and practices 
25 
impact on the prevIous common law approach to the employment 
relationship 
2.7 Chapter Seven 
Due to time limitations, discussion interviews were held using the purposive 
sampling method. Discussion interviews were also the preferred method for 
reason of eliciting precise and exact responses. 
Construction of the Interview Schedule 
Prior to interviewing the persons listed in Appendix A,l a certain amount of 
literary review was conducted to identify issues and controversies surrounding the 
functions and procedures of the Industrial Court: An interview schedule was 
accordingly constructed with open-ended questions to guide the researcher and 
facilitate the flow of interview.2 The questions were chosen in relation to 
certain areas of concern impacting on the Industrial Courts contribution to 
labour relations in Botswana. The said areas are set out hereunder: 
Industrial Court Procedures 
Industrial Courts Jurisdiction and Status 
Status of the Industrial Court 
Collective Bargaining Process 
Usage of the Court 
1 See page 1 for the list of interviewees 
2 See Chapter Eight, page for the full layout of the interview schedule 
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Impact of the Industri:d Court 
Attitudes towards the Court 
Positive/Negative aspects of the Court 
Structure of the Interview Schedule 
The 'schedule standardized interview', otherwise known as SSI, was used.3 The 
wording and structure of the guestions is identical for each respondent. The 
purpose of 'standardization' is to ensure that any variations that occur, are 
attributable to the actual differences in response and not to the instrument 
employed.4 
Choice of Interviewees 
Denzin advocates for the investzgatorapproach in selecting appropriate person for 
interview.s The approach proposes that interviewees be selected on the basis of 
their exposure to a 'particular set of events or experience'. Conseguently 
interviewees were selected on the basis of; 
• their expertise, knowledge and general 
involvement in labour relations in Botswana; 
• their involvement In the Industrial Court of 
Botswana; 
3 Denzin, N.K., Tbe ResearcbAct, Mc-Graw-Hil Book Company, New York, 1978, p59 
4 Denzin, op. cit., at p60 
5 Ibid at p 158 
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2.8 Chapter Eight 
• their written or verbal statements and/or articles 
on the Industrial Court 
A critical assessment of the Industrial Court's contribution to labour relations is 
conducted along with a summary/setting out of main findings. 
3.Limitations of the study 
The study should be examined and evaluated In light of the following 
considerations; 
• The study is intended to be exploratory in nature; 
• The small S1ze of interviewees and style of 
selection is restrictive in that; 
(i) the opln1Ons expressed are not necessarily 
representative of the population; and 
(ii) no real significant statistical measurements could 
be gleaned. 
• The limited number of cases evaluated may not 




• The opmlOns expres~ed by the interviewees in 
Chapter Seven are subject to the writers' personal 
interpretation; 
.• The use of the comparative is limited due to time 
and word restrictions. 
In spite of the paucity of material written on the Industrial Court of Botswana, 
and the abovementioned limitations of the study, the study reflects a reasonable 
assessment of pertinent issues, controversies and attitudes relating to the 
Botswana Industrial Court. 
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Chapter Two: The History of Labour Courts 
1. The Historical development of Labour Courts 
France was the forerunner with regard to the establishment of specialized labour 
courts. The first labour court, the conseil de prud' hommes Qiterally the court of wise 
men), was set up in Lyons by virtue of a Napoleonic law passed in 1806.1 The 
Court was predominantly made up manufacturers and foremen and initially 
existed as a disciplinary committee.2 The conseil initially dealt with disputes 
concerning the quality of work and the rate of payment, but this was later 
extended to provide for conciliation to minor disputes.3 In the second stage of its 
development, from 1880 onwards, the conseil underwent some fundamental 
transformation regarding the way in which labour disputes were resolved.4 This 
was largely due to the considerable interest of the workers movement in the 
system. The workers movement, accordingly worked towards obtaining an 
'improved functioning' of the court as well as a geographical and professional 
extension system. The e$tablishment of the conseil in France culminated in 
the 1924 Code du Travail0YJork Code) legislation.s 
The French model was followed by Belgium in the late 1880's, with Italy 
following suit in 1893 and passing the industrial probviri.6 In Italy the concept of 
magistratura ?10n togata (gownless courts) was introduced alongside the magistratura 
1 Ramm Tbilo, TlVorkers Participation: the Representatio11 of Labour & Special Labollr COtlrt." in Anstey M.,(ed) 
Errlolc.vee Participation & Workplace F011lms,Juta (1997) p 270 
2 Ibid 
3 Ibid 
4 Ramm 0p. cit., P 271 
5 Ramm Tbilo, op. cit., P 272 
6 Ramm Tbilo, op. cit., P 270 
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ordiniria (ordinary courtS).7 In Germany specialised 'courts were first introduced 
for manual workers in 1890 and later for clerical workers in 1904.8 The principle 
of tripartism that exists in specialized labour courts owes its origins to the 
historical circumstances that prevailed in Germany ?etween 1875 and 1890.9 The 
tripartite industrial courts known as Ge12Jerberichte were set up in 1890 and 
consisted of a professional judge and two lay members, one from the employers' 
side and the other from the employees' side. 10 The concept of full-scale separate 
courts with jurisdiction over labour matters (Arbeitsgerichte) was introduced in 
1926. 11 The courts were established with the tripartite structure being retained at 
all levels. 
Over the years there has been a tension between the individualistic nature 
common law, and the protective purpose of labour legislation. In general, the 
contractual principles of common law tend to undermine the general policy 
objectives of labour legislation. It was this tension. that prompted Lord 
Wedderburn to state the following; 
, If labour law is to escape from the clutches of common law thinking 
and procedures, the compass seems to point in a direction in which few 
7 Rarrun 1bilo, op. cir., p 272 
S Weiss Manfred, Labour Law & I;idustriaJ Relatiol1s il1 the Federal Republic of Germany, (1987), Kluwer Law & 
Taxation Publishers p 96 
9 Ibid 
10 Ramm 1bilo, op. dt., at p 273 
11 Ibid 
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instinctively wish to travel. That IS (dare one say it?) towards labour 
courts.,12 
Wedderburn, in advocating for specialized labour courts, was of the view that 
there was a need to have a 'new kind of judiciary which will assert and develop an 
autonomous labour law freed from the property based concepts, procedures and 
habits of the common law.13 Wedderburn believed that this new labour law would 
shatter some of the old employment concepts, in particular those relating to 
managerial prerogative and the subordination of the employee. This labour law 
would be further distinguishable by its collective nature and its 'avoidance of 
legally-imposed solutions'.14 
Lord Mc Carthy also supported the quest for an autonomous labour law that 
would be relatively free from the contract of service and able to promote 
collective bargaining.15 In Mc Carthy's view, the 'creation of new and separate 
institutions' would assist·in 'restricting the inf1uence of common law norms.,16 
The role that specialist industrial tribunals play in the resolution of disputes 
cannot be overemphasized. This role was succinctly described by Steyn JA in the 
Botswana Court of Appeal decision of BotsJJJana Railwqys Organisation v j. Setsogo and 
198 Others as follows: 
..... " the area of resolution of industrial disputes is a minefield, in which fairness, 
objectivity and manifest independence are prerequisites for confidence and 
acceptance of decisions - more specifically as these impact upon emotive, 
12 Wedderbum, Lobour Loll} :jivm here to autonon!}, (1987) 16 ILJ 1 at 126 
13 Hepple B., Lobour Courts: Some Comparative Perspectives (1988) 41, Current Legal Problems, p 167 
14 Hepple B., 0p. cit. at 170 
15 Hepple B., 0p. cit., at 169 
16 Hepple B., op. cit. at 170 
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volatile- indeed explosive issues. Great care must therefore be taken to ensure 
that in its composition and the procedures through when its deliberations are 
conducted, the objectivity, representativeness and impartiality of the Court are 
beyond legitimate question.,,17 
Different countries have chosen different systems or institutions to deal with 
unfair dismissal cases. In South Africa arbitration has been chosen over courts to 
provide a process that would be cheap, accessible quick and informal.1s In Great 
Britain tribunals were also chosen for reasons of accessibility, informality, speed 
and inexpense.19 In the same vein section 76 (c) of the New Zealand 
Employment Contracts Act of 1971 provided for the establishment of a 
specialist employment tribunal that would operate as a 'low level, informal, 
specialist tribunal' which would provide speedy, fair and just resolution of 
differen ces. 20 
2.1 Philosophies surrounding Labour Courts 
There are certain international 'best practice benchmarks" that have been 
developed over the years regarding dispute prevention and resolution machinery. 
These benchmarks include; 
17 Botswan Roibvays Orgallisatioll!) J. Setsogo & 198 Others, Om/Appeal # 51/95 
18 Colby S. & Newall I., Unfair Dismissal in SOllth Africa: Comparative Aspects from Great Britain & New Zealalld, 
unpublished paper delivered to 12th Annual Labour Conference, 30 June-2nd July 1999, Du£ban, South 




• Procedures- Dispute settlem~nt systems need to 
be simple and accessible to potential users so as 
to encourage the speedy resolution of disputes.21 
Dispute resolution systems should be cost 
effective and be uniformly applicable to both 
employers and employees. The system should 
promote fairness with such fairness being based 
on the setting of and conformity to minimum 
. standards. The system should also be able to 
encourage good faith negotiations. Dispute 
resolution systems should also be able to 
distinguish between disputes 0/ right and disputes 0/ 
interest. 22 
• Tripartism- Many specialist Labour Courts have 
embraced the concept of tripartism as initiated in 
the German Courts. The concept of tripartism 
requires the involvement of government and the 
social partners in the development of social and 
economic policy. Tripartism is promoted because 
it allows for consensus based solutions rather 
than imposed solutions.23 
21 Kalula Bosch C. & Clarke M Draft Report on Dispute PreveNtion & Cot/flict fuSOI1/lioll, Conference on Labour 
Relations in Southem Africa, Johannesburg, 12-15 October, 1999, p 69 
22 Kalula e. et al, 0p. cit. at p 10 
23 Kalula E. et al, 0p. cit. at p 69 
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.' 
• Dispute prevention is also viewed as a critical 
element of peaceful industrial relation~?4 This 
requires a generalized knowledge of labour laws, 
rules and policie~ as they are applicable within the 
labour market. 
• Credibility- dispute resolution system must be 
staffed with personnel who have the ability to act 
independently and without bias. This will ensure 
that the system will ,achieve a certam amount of 
credibility.25 
3. Conclusion- Labour Courts in the SADC region 
Most countries within the SADC region have some sort of specialist labour court 
or tribunal.26 In most of the courts, access to courts is given only after reasonable 
attempts at conciliation/mediation have been made. 27 Many of the courts, 
however, do also provide for direct access where appropriate. For instance an 
urgent application may be made in cases involving threatened industrial action.28 
24 KaIula E, et aI, op. cit, at p 70 
25 KaIula E. et aI, 0p. cit., at p 69 
26 Christie S. & Madhuku L. (eds) Labollr Dispute Resolutioni il1 SOllthernAfrica, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung & the 




Many of the regional labour courts have been criticized for having lengthy and 
cumbersome processes and extensive technical procedures and formalities. 29 
Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Tanzania, in particular are said to have long drawn out 
processes.30 In Tanzania, the system is highly litigous with disputes taking up to 
ten years before they are finally resolved.31 Many of the labour courts are also 
alleged to undermine the collective bargaining processes and therefore do not 
enjoy widespread legitimacy.32 






CHAPTER THREE: Industrial Law before the 1992 reforms 
1. Introduction 
The colonial period was characterized by basic .contractual common law 
principles of master and servant.1 Botswana, as a British Protectorate, was 
administered by the British High Commissioner resident in South Africa.2 
Accordingly the Masters and Servants Act of 1856 of the Colony of the Cape 
of Good Hope was applicable to Botswana from 1909.3 Also applicable was the 
Protection of Mrican Labourers Proclamation # 14 of 1936. Undet this 
proclamation, an employee was provided with a very limited amount of security 
of employment. 
These laws were repealed in 1963 and replaced with the Employment Law # 15 
of 1963 (Cap. 47: 01, Laws of Botswana). \Xlhilst the Employment Law of 1963 
covered a wide range of issues relating to labour relations, it did not provide for 
the establishment of dispute settlement machinery.4 The other existing piece of 
legislation, the Trade Unions & Trade Disputes Proclamation of 1942, 
legalized trade unions and provided limited protection for workers, but also 
neglected to set out adequate provision for the settlement of disputes. 
2. Legislative background to the establishment of theJndustrial Court 
1 Takirambudde P., & Molokomme A., The new labour law in Botslvana, Sothem African Labom: Monographs 
1/94, Labour Law Unit, University of Cape Town p 9. 
2 Frimpong K, The Protection ofJ eCtlrity ofEmploymel1! in Botslvt11la,.paper presented at the ILO/NOlway Seminar 
on protection of employment & promotion of collective bargaining, held at Gaborone, Botswana, Nov. 
19-21,1985 at p 7 
3 Proclamatioll # 36 of 1909 
4 Takirambudde P., & Molokomme A., op. cit., P 9 
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During independence in 1966, the government of Botswana took certain 
deliberate policy decisions that were aimed at promoting a stable and peaceful 
labour relations climate. The Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteed 
certain limited rights pertaining to freedom of association. Section B (1) of the 
Constitution specifically provides that; 
" Except with his mvn consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjqyme11t qf his freedom qf 
assemblY mid association, that is to sqy, his right to assemble freelY mId associate with other 
persons, and in particular to form or belong to Trade Unions or other associations for the 
protection qf his interests" *' 
2.1-2.4 Trade Unions & Trade Disputes Proclamation of 1942 
The Botswana government demonstrated further commitment to economIc 
development by adopting legislation that updated the 1942 Trade Union and 
Trade Disputes Proclamation. The government, in 1969, adopted the Trade 
Unions Act # 24 of 1969 and the Trade Disputes Act # 28 of 1969. During 
this period industrial peace was increasingly being acknowledged and recognized 
as being an essential component of sustainable development. The first President 
Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama, made the following remarks to workers in 
-,;,-",,-,ur Phikwe; 
5 Section B (1), COllstitution of Botswana, 1966. * These rights are subject to limitations set out in section 13 (2) 
of the Constitution, The said section specifies the limits within which freedom of association may be 
curbed in the interest of good government, the constitutional checks and balances: 
are required in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public 
health; 
are required for protecting the roghts and freedoms of other persons; 
restrictions upon public offic~rs, employees of local govemmet bodies or school teachers; 
- are for the registration of trade unions; 
- are shown to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society, 
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" ... .I am sure we all agree that in order for meaningful development to take 
place in the country, in an orderly fashion, there is a need for industrial peace 
(emphasis mine) and political stability.,,6 
This realization in turn led to the amendments in 1982/3 of all the prev:iously 
existing Acts. The new Acts that were introduced consisted of; 
(b) A new and overhauled Employment Act (of 1982) 
(c) A new and improved Trade Disputes Act (of 1982) 
(d) A new Trade Unions & Employers Act (of 1983) 
2.5 Employment Act of 1982 
The Act came into force on the 14th of December, '1984 and purported to set a 
minimum floor of statutory rights which also adheres to set l?-bour standards.7 
For an individual to benefit from these rights, he/she had to fall within the 
statutory definition of an 'employee'. According to section 2 (2) of the Act, an 
'employee' was defined as; 
"any person who has, either before or after its commencement, entered into a 
contract of employment for the hire of his labour. Provided that the expression 
shall not include any officer or servant of the government unless he belongs to a 
category of such officers or servants the members of which are declared by the 
6 Address by the first President of Botswana, the late Sir Seretse Kham addressing workers at Selebi- Phikwe 
on Dec. 19,1975, Government Printer, Gaborone, Botswana 
7 Takirambudde P., & Molokomme A., op. cit., P 10 
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Minister, by order published in the Gazette, to be employees for the purposes of 
the Act".8 
Under this section, the only category of employees who qualified to be defined as 
'employees' were 'industrial class' workers.9 A further consequence of this 
section was to exclude agricultural and domestic workers from the ambit of 
application of the Act.10 
Under the employment Act, the obligations were generally enforceabl.e in two 
ways, namely; 
(a) through the enforcement of employee/employer contractual obligations 
ordinarily set out in civil claims in the appropriate court; or 
(b) through filing a protest with the Department of labour as per section 27 of 
the Act. ll Section 27 of the Act allowed labour officers to fine employers 
where they found the dismissal to be unfair and accordingly had the effect of 
granting labour officers judicial powers. In a 1995 address the Commissioner 
of Labour (as he then was) had the following to say on the powers oflabour 
officers; 
" ..... Officers of the department had extensive powers not only to investigate 
grievances and disputes, but also to arbitrate and make a determination with 
the legally enforceable powers of a Magistrate,,12 
8 Section 2 (2) of die Employmmt Act of 1982 
9 Ibid 
10 Section 2 (2) of the EmploymCf1t Act of t 982 
11 Section 27 of the EmploymCf1t Act of 1982 
12 Palai M. B, Commissioner of Lsbour, 1995 address 
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2.6 Trade Disputes Act # 29 of 1982 
The Act came into effect in 1983 and set out elaborate rules relating to the 
control of trade disputes.13 The Act, amongst other things, addressed the 
procedures relating to industrial action and prescribed rules for essential and non-
essential services. 14 The Act was also significant in that it established a 'quasi-
judicial' mechanism in the form of a Permanent Arbitrator. 15 This office was set 
up primarily to deal with the resolution of collectit)e trade disputes. The office of the 
Permanent Arbitrator was never really functional as it lacked adequate resources, 
supporting mechanisms and widespread legitimacy. 
2.7 Trade Unions and Employets Organisation Act of 1983 
The Act established a means for the government to regulate trade union activity 
both internally and externally. The Act also sets out specific and compulsory rules 
for trade unions or trade union federations to comply with.16 Many of these rules 
relate to the actual formation and registration of trade unions. The Act also 
imposed certain limitations on union membership as well as certain restrictions 
on office-holding, external affiliation and the receipt of funds from outside of 
Botswana.17 
13 Takirambudde p" & Molokomme A, The New Labour Law in BotslJlalla, 0p, cit, P 13 
14 Ibid 
15 Section 9 (1) , Trade Disputes Act of 1982 
16 Takirammbudde p,> & Molokonune i\" The NeJJl Labour Law in Botswana, " op, cit., 
17 Section 63, Trade Ul1ion & Enployer Orgal1isations Act of 1983 
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3. Post 1992 Legislation 
3.1 Introduction 
The rapid economic development that occurred in Botswana from the 1970's 
onwards soon rengered the 1982/3 reforms inadequate. Accordingly several 
amendments had to be made to the already established legislation so as to render 
the legislation relevant to the prevailing economic circumstances. 
3.2 Employment Act 
There were several unsatisfactory features of the Act. Some of these aspects 
related to its statutorily enshrined gender inequalities which placed restrictions on 
women with respect to certain types of employment. IS Also unsatisfactory was 
the fact that the Act neglected to address or provide for the enforcement of the 
obligations of the employer (emphasis mme). Accordingly the amendments to 
the Act were a welcome development. 
The amendments covered several different areas. Of particular relevance were the 
changes made to the jurisdictional powers and remedies previously given to 
labour officers. The role of the Commissioner of Labour and his officers was 
changed from a largely judicial one to a largely mediatory one.19 \X/hilst the labor 
officers still retained the jurisdiction to hear cases, the procedures set out were 
now different. These procedures are contained in the amended Trade Disputes 
Act of 1982. 
Ie See: section 115 of the Act which prohibited the employment of females underground in mines. See also 
section 116 which provided that no female employee shall be emp,loyed in any industrial or agricultural 
undertaking during the night without her express consent. 
19 BOCCIM, Guide to Botswana's Employment Laws, Botswana Gazette, May 13, 1 ~92, Gaborone, 
Botswana 
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3.3 Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act'of 1992 
The amended trade Disputes Act provided for the consolidation of all procedures 
dealing with disputes and grievances. Of particular importance was that the 
amendments allowed for the broadening of the concept of a 'trade dispute:2°The 
effect of this substitution was to render all disputes arising out of employment 
subject to the governance of the Trade Disputes Act. 
Section 5 of the amended Trade Disputes replaced the previously repealed 
section 27 which related to the right of protest. 21 Section 5 now makes provision 
for the initial reporting of grievances or unfair dismissals to be made to the 
nearest labour officer within the prescribed 14 days.22 Where settlement or 
resolution of the matter is not achieved, the matter shall be referred to the 
Commissioner of Labour who has 21 days to settle matters of unfair dismissal. 
Where the matter still cannot be resolved, the Commissioner is required to issue a 
'section 7 certificate' which allows either party or both parties to refer the matter 
to the Industrial Court.2:1 
4. Establishment of the Industrial Court 
Many of the reports filed prior to the establishment of the Industrial Court, were 
according to the process set out in section 27.24 The statistics kept by the 
Labour Department show a substantial increase in the number of cases reported 
to them over the years. According to the Labour Department's statistics, 2 805 
20 Section 2, Trade Disputes (Ammdmmt) Act of 1992 
21 Section 5, Trade Disputes (Ammdmmt) Act of 1992 
22 Ibid 
23 Section 7, Trade Disputes (AmendmentJAcf of 1992 
24 Section 27, Trade Displltes Act # 29 of 1982 
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cases were handled by the district labour officers in 1986 alone.25 In 1987, this 
figure rose to 3 056 representing an increase of 9%.26 The year 1988 showed an 
increase of 45% with a total number of 5 478 cases being registered.27 More 
recent statistics show that in 1996/8 7 322 trade disputes were reported to the 
district labour officers, while in 1998, 8 308 cases were reported.29 It became 
increasingly apparent in the late 1980's that the department of labour was not 
coping with the number of disputes referred to it. The failure to cope is 
attributable to a number of factors including insufficient training of the officers 
and a general inadequacy of resources. this particular time, a trend was also 
being established within the region. The structural adjustment programmes of the 
1990's in the SAD.C countries also reflected a change of policy that essentially 
discouraged state involvement in labour relations. The trend that was developed 
at the time called for governments to reduce their involvement in labour dispute 
resolutions3o. 
The South African Labour Relations Act of 1995 is probably the best and most 
recent example of the increasing trend towards a labour relations system that is 
free from state controL The LRA established a 'state-funded industrial/labour 
relations Commission' (CCMA) that is independent from State and further 
for private or alternative dispute resolution systems.31 
25 Department of Labollri7' Social Security, 2nd Annual Report, 1986, Govemment Printer, Gaborone, Botswana 
26 Department of Labour & Social Security, 3rd i\nnual Report, 1987, Govemment Printer, Gaborone, Botswana 
27 Department ofLabotlr & Social Security, 401 Annual report, 1988, Govemment Printer, Gaborone, Botswana 
28 Departmellt ofLabollr& Social SeCllrity, 12th Annual Report, 1996, Govemment Printer, Gaborone, Botswana 
29 Department of Labour & S acia'Security, 14th Annual Report, 1998, Govemment Printer, Gaborone, Botswana 
30 Christie & Madhuku L., op. cit. at p £, 
31 Section 112, South AfricaN Labour ~elations Act # 66 of 1995 
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In Botswana, the move away from state intervention or involvement in the 
settlement of disputes began in the late 1980's. The former Minister of Labour & 
Home Mr. Patrick Balopi had following to say on previous 
government policy; 
"Ourpoliry in the past has bem to intervene administrativelY in disputes through the 
ojjices if the department if Labour .... . Altho1igh the Trade Disputes Act does provide 
for arbitration and conciliation, the legislation has Jlot become a central imtitution in 
the settlement if disputes, and both emplqyers and workers inevitablY continue to turn 
to Government. A similar problem exists lJJhen it comes to individtlal grievances and in 
particular the very emoti071al isme if dismissals. As lvith collective disputes, there is a 
dmzger if the settlement if a grievallce 
if governmellt. 
dependerJt 011 upon accesses to the corridors 
I am stronglY if the view that Government cannot continue to pIC!} this role and as ill 
collective disptltes, the time has come to establish independent instittltions, free if 
Gove17tJ1Jent, to Jj)hich both employees and emplqyers can turn to if thry are tlnable to 
settle their differences inte171al/y. ';2 
This new approach was much more in line with ILO Convention 151 of 
1978 which promotes the need to settle disputes around terms and 
conditions of employment through negotiation between parties or 
through independent and impartial third party intervention such as 
mediation, conciliation or arbitration.33 
. 
The trend towards reduced state intervention 10 industrial/labour 
relations culminated in 1990 Report if the Presidential Commission on the 
32 Balopi P.K., Opening speech by Minister of Labour & Home Affairs, Op. cit., 
33 ILO Tbe S ettlemmt 0/ Lfibotlr Dirplltes Report to the Governing Body), 1998, para 65 
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RevieJv qf the Incomes PoEry. This report not only recommended the 
reduction of state intervention in trade disputes, but also advocated for 
the establishment of a permanent Industrial Court. It was largely as a 
result of this realization that the Industrial Court came to be established 
through section 17(1) of the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act of 1992.34 
5. Conclusion 
Since the operation of the 1891 Masters' and Servants Act, it is evident 
that labour relations in Botswana underwent considerable cha~ge and 
transformation. Up until the establishme.nt of the Industrial Court in 
1992, no specialized body had existed to enforce the settlement o flab our 
disputes. The changing labour relation trends of the 1980's-1990's in the 
SADC region may be seen as the having catalysed the process of change. 
It is submitted that the establishment of the Industrial Court in 1992 . 
represents a landmark moment in the history of Botswana labour 
relations. 
34 Section 17 (1), Tmde Disputes (AmclldmeJIt) Act, # 23 11992 
46 
CHAPTER FOUR: The Industrial Court 
1. Introduction- Trade Disputes (Amendment;J Act of 1992 
One of the most significant amendments to the Trade Disputes Act relates to 
section 17 which provides for the establishment of the Industrial Court.1 The 
Court essentially replaces the office of the Permanent Arbitrator previously 
established under section 17 of the 1982 Trade Disputes Act.2 
2. Establishment and status of the Industrial Court 
Section 1 of the 1995 South African Labour Relations Act defines the purpose of 
the act as being 'the advancement labour peace,.3 In a similar vein, section 17 
(1) of the Trade Disputes Act 1995 (Cap 48:02, Laws of Botswana) as amended, 
established the Industrial Court for the purpose of settling trade disputes and 
the furtherance, securing and maintenance of good industrial relations in 
Botswana.4 It has been suggested that the term 'settle' requires the Court to take a 
proactive position with regard to its handling of disputes.s The term also implies 
that the Court is expected to incorporate 'dispute prevention' into its agenda and 
look for alternative means outside of adjudication to determine trade disputes. 
A trade dispute is defined in section 2 (interpretation section) of the TDA as 
including 'a dispute betweens unions, a grievance and any dispute over-
1 Section 17 (1), Trade Displtfes (/1mmd1?J/mt) Act of 1992, Cap. 48:01, Laws of Botswana 
2 Section 17, Trade DisplltesAct # 29 of 1982 
3 Section 1, Labour R£IatiollsAct # 66 of'995,(South Africa) states that' the purpose of this Act is to advance 
economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratization of the workplace by fulfilling 
the primaty objects of this Act .... " 
4 Section 17 (1), Trade Disputes (/1mmdment) Act of 1992, op. cit. 
S Interview held with Judge D. de Villiers, June 17, 2001, Industrial Court, Gaborone, Botswana 
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(e) the application or the interpretation of any law relating 
to employment 
(f) terms and conditions of employment of any 
employee or class of employees, or the physical 
conditions under which such employee or class of 
employees may be required to work; 
(g') the entitlement of any person or any group of persons 
to any benefit under an existing collective agreement; 
(h) the or non-existence of anv collective 
< 
agreement; 
(1) the dismissal, employment, suspensIon from 
employment, retrenchment, reemployment or 
reinstatement of any person or group of persons; or 
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(j) the recognition or non-recognition of an organization 
seeking to represent employees in the determination of 
their terms and conditions of employment;6 
2.1 Court of law and equity 
Section 151 (1) of the SA 1995 LRA. establishes the SA Labour Court as a court 
of law and equity.7 Section 151 (2) further establishes the Labour Court as a 
'superior court that has authority, inherent powers and standing, in relation to 
matters under its jurisdiction, equal (emphasis mine) to that which a court of a 
provincial division of the Supreme court has in relation to matters under its 
jurisdiction.s In contrast the Trade Disputes Act is silent on the question of the 
status of the Industrial Court. Although the Act does not specify the Industrial 
Court to be a court oflaw and equity, the Court has assumed such powers.9 The 
Court has, in several of its matters stated that it is a Court of law and equity. In 
the case of John Boblry 1vfbqyi v Wade Adams, the Court stated the following; 
"As the Industrial Court is also a court 0/ equity which the~fore places a lot 0/ emphasis on 
faimess and reasonableness to both e:mplqyer aJzd emplqyee, this Court ...... ... .. also applies 
principles rpell established lry other Industrial Courts, rJlhich are based on ILO principles, when 
dealing Jvith retrenchment procedures. ,,10 The COUlt as per de Vtlliers JP (as he then was) 
continued to state that; 
" U"til I am convinced othenvise or until the Court 0/ Appeal decides otherwise, I am 0/ the 
view that this Industrial Court in Botswana is a court 0/ /aU) as well as a court 0/ equity. The 
" Section 2, Intelpretation section, Trade Dixplltes (Amendmel1t) Aft of 1992, op. cit. 
7 Section 151 (1), SA LRA op. cit. 
s Section 151(2) SA LRA, op. cit. 
9 See: John Bobby Mbayi v IWade Adams Ie 30/94 
10 Ibid 
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reasons for sqying it is also a court of equity, is inter alia because of the court procedure being less 
formal and the wide discretion given to the court in the Trade Diputes Act. ,,11 
This position was confirmed in the 1999 Court of Appeal decision of Bots2lJana 
Building Society v Samuel Bo!okwe. 12 In this case a security guard had been employed 
on a one year fixed term contract. The security guard was later dismissed after 
refusing to be redeployed to another town. The reasons given for his dismissal 
were given as "refusing to obey a lawful instruction'. The Court of Appeal held in 
this case that" ., .. the exercise of the managements' p02JJer to transfer atl emp!qyee must still 
co1!form onto recognized international labour standards as applied l:Y Courts of equity 
(emphasis mine)." 
There is currently a proposal to amend the Trade Disputes Act to specifically 
, provide that tlle Industrial Court is a Court of law and equity so as to put the 
matter beyond doubt.13 
2.2 Status of the Industrial Court vis-a.::vis the High Court 
As earlier stated, the Trade Disputes Act is silent on the question of the status of 
the Industrial Court vis-a-vis that of the High Court. The Industrial Court, 
however, is by virtue of section 127 (1) of the Constitution subordinate to the 
High Court. 14 The section provides that; 
... "subordinate court" means any court established for Botswana other than-
(a) the Court of Appeal; 
11 Ibid 
12 BotsJllana Buildillg Sociery v Samuel Bolokwe, CA # 15/99 
13 ILO I Swiss Project to Advance Social Partnership in Promoting Labour Peace in Southern Africa, Draft 
Outline of Amemimmts to LLtb01lr LLtws, p 17 
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(b) The High Court; or 
(c) A court martial1S 
provision is similar to section 110 (2) of the Malawian Constitution.16 The 
primary distinction lies in the fact that the Malawian provision expressly stipulates 
the Industrial Relations Court of Malawi to be subordinate to the Malawi High 
Court.17 The section provides that; 
"There shall be an Industrial Relatio11S COUlt, subordinate (emphasis mine) to the High 
Court, 2vhich shall have original jurisdiction over labour disputes and such other issues relating to 
emplqyment and shall have JUch composition and procedure as mqy be specified in an Act 0/ 
Parliament. ,,78 
Section 110 (2) of the Malawian Constitution shows a deliberate move by the 
legislature to have the Industrial Relations Court established as a subordinate 
Court. In contrast, Constitution of Botswana established the Industrial Court 
as a subordinate Court by way of omission.19 It is patently clear, however, that the 
intention of the Botswana legislature was to give the Industrial Court the same 
status as the High Court. This can be gleaned from the fact that; 
14 Section 127 (1), Constit1ltion of the Republic q( Botswana, 1966 
15 Ibid 
16 Section 110 (2), COllJtiflltiol1 of the Republic q(Malt11vi 
17 Ibid 
18 Ibid 
19 Section 127 (1), Constitution of Botswana, op. cir. 
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(a) Judges of the Industrial Court are appointed by the President of Botswana 
and are required in section 17 (3) to possess the same qualifications as High 
Court judges;20 
(b) Section 28 (1) of the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act of 1992 provides 
that; (~J udges if the Industria! Court shall be paid salaries and allowances not less than 
those pqyable to I udges if the High CO?t1t in accordance with the provisiollS if the I udges 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, as from time to time amended, as mqy be detennined f!)I 
the President. ,,?I 
(c) Section 25(2) of the 1992 Trade Disputes (i\mendment) Act, provides that 
(a'!)l decision if the court shall have the same force and iffect as a judgment or order if the 
High Court, mid shall be eriforceable in like manner as such judgment or order . .. .'022; 
and 
(d) The right of appeal against decisions of the Industrial Court lies to the Court 
of Appeal and not the High Court.23 
Since the TDA however, was silent on the status of the Industrial Court in 
relation to the High Court, the Court of Appeal eventually determined in BotSIJJana 
Bank ifBotsJvana Ltd. v Botswana Bank Emplqyees UlIion the Industrial Court to be a 
subordinate court (emphasis mine) in terms of section 127(1) of the 
Constitution.24 The Industrial Court reiterated this point in its supplementary 
reasons for judgment in the matter of Bardqys Ballk if Botswana Ltd. v Botswana 
Bank Emplqyees U nioll where it stated .... "The Court was never requested in terms 
20 Section 17 (3), Trade Disputes (AJ7Je1IdJ7Je1It) Act 0/1992, op. cit 
21 Section 28 (1), Trade Displlfes (AmendJ7Jent) Act 0/1992, op. cit. 
22 Section 25 (2), Trade Disputes (AJ7Jendment) Act 0/ 1992, op. cit 
23 Section 18 (4), Trade Disputes (AmetJdJ7JetJt) Act 0/1992, op. cit. 
24 Botsillat/a Bank 0/ Botswana Ltd. v Botsll!t:ma Bank Emplyees Ullion Ie 40/94 
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of section 18(3) of the Constitution, to this constitutional question to the 
High Court. The Court was asked to make such a finding itself, which this Court 
cannot do, as the Industrial Court will also be a subordinate Court (emphasis 
mine) in terms of the definition in Section 127 of the Constitution."25 Section 127 
is currently being reviewed with the proposed changes to read; 
"subordinate court' means any' Court established for Botswana other than-
(a) the Court of Appeal; 
(b) the High Court; 
(c) a court martial; or 
(d) the Industrial Court.2\emphasis mine) 
This will have the effect of ensuring that the Industrial Court is of an equivalent 
status to the High Court as initially intended. These proposed changes will be the 
subject of a referendum to be held in November 2001. If the referendum is 
agreed to the Industrial Court will have the same status as the High Court. 
3. Composition of the Court 
Section 17 (2) of the TDA stipulates that the Court may consist of one or more 
divisions, as the Minister considers necessary, each headed by an Industrial Court 
Judge. 27 Section 17(4) further stipulates that in appointing the Industrial court 
judges, the President of Botswana shall designate one such judge to .be the 
25 Ibid 
26 Proposed referendum on changes to the Botswana Constitution to be held on October 6, 2001 
27 Section 17 (2), Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act, op. cit. 
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president of the Industrial Court, and any other judges shall rank according to 
their dates of appointment. 
Subsection 3 of 17 provides that Industrial Court Judges are to be appointed by 
the President (of Botswana) from persons possessing the qualifications to 
be judges of the High Court as prescribed in section 96(3) of the Constitution.2s 
According to section 96(3) of the Constitution, a person shall not be qualified to 
be appointed as a judge of the High Court unless; 
(a) he holds, or has held qiJice, as a judge cf a court having unlimited jurisdiction in 
civil and criminal mattes in Bots1}Ja1ta, in a CommonJvealth country, or in a1!y country 
outside the CommonJvealth that be premibed I?J Parliament or a court having 
jurisdiction in appeals fronl act; or-
(b) he is qualijied to practice as a1t advocate in such a court and has bem qualified for 
not less than jizJe years to practice as an advocate or attomry in such a court. 29 
The qualifications required of a labour court judge, are therefore, general in 
nature. Neither the Trade Disputes Act nor the Constitution require labour court 
judges to have specialist knowledge in the area of labour law as. In contrast, 
section 1 53(2) (a) & (b) of the 1995 SA LRA require the Judge President and 
Deputy Judge President the labour court to; 
(a) ... be judges of the Supreme Court; and (emphasis mine) 
(b) ... have knowledge, experience and expertise in labour law. 50 
28 Section 17(3), Trade Displltes {A.mmdment).Act, op. cit. 
29 Section 96 (3), Constitution of Botswana, op. cit. 
30 Section 153 (2)(a) & (b), 1995 SA op. cit. 
54 
On a similar note, subsection 6 (a) & (b) of s 153 of the LRA provides that a 
judge of the labour court must; 
(a) (i) be a judge of the High Court; or 
(ii) a practitioner; and (emphasis mine) 
(b) have knowledge, experience and expertise in labour law.31 
3.1 Appointment of a Registrar 
The Trade Disputes Act does not specifically provide for the appointment of a 
Registrar, Deputy Registrar or otherwise. Section 17 (8), however provides that 
'there shall be appointed such public officers as may be necessary to staff the 
Court, and enable it to carry out its functions under this Act.,,32 This section is to 
be contrasted with section 155 of the1995 South African LRA which specifically 
provides for the appointment of a Registrar, Deputy Registrar(s) and as many 
officers of the Labour Court as the administration of justice requires.33 Section 
155(a) of the SA further requires that Registrar be a person who has 
experience and ",,,r,a.-t-.,, in labour law and administration34 (emphasis mine). 
3.2 Assessors 
Section 17(6) of the TDA provides that a judge shall sit with two nominated 
members, one of whom shall be selected by him from among ten persons 
nominated by the organization representing employees or trade unions in 
31 Section 153 (6) (a) & (b), 1995 SA LRA, 0p. cit. 
32 Section 17 (8), Trade Disputes (A!JleJldment) Act of 1992, op_ cit. 
33 Section 155, 1995 SA LRA, op. cit.. 
34 Section 155(a), 1995 SA LRA, op. cit. 
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Botswana, and the other selected by him from among ten persons nominated by 
the organization representing employers in Botswana.3s section also contains 
a proviso that "where for any reason such nominated members are, or either of 
them is, absent for any part of a hearing of any trade dispute, the jurisdiction of 
the court may be exercised alone or with the remaining member of the 
Court .... unless the judge for good reason decides that the hearing be 
postponed.,,36 Section 18 (2) of the TDA also provides that matters oflaw are to 
be decided by the presiding judge.37 The decision as to what ,constitutes matters 
of fact and law, is also decided by the judge presiding.38 Section 17 (6) of the 
TDA is similar to section 17 (19) (a) (ii) of the 1956 SA LRA (Act # 28) which 
allowed for the President of the Court to appoint assessors, if he deemed it 
expedient to do so, to represent the interests of employers and employees' 
respectively. Under the previous LRA, assessors were appointed to assist the 
Industrial Court in an advisory capacity. Under the current SA LRA, However, 
there is no provision for assessors. ~ost of the other SADC countries have 
similar provisions in their Labour Relations Act. Section 66 (1) (c) and (d) of the 
Malawian Labour Relations Act stipulates that the Industrial Relations Court shall 
consist of five persons nominated by the most reptesentative organization of 
employees and five persons nominated by the most representative organization 
of employers. These persons are to be appointed by the Minister. Malawi is 
unique in that, section 66 (2) requires at least one woman to be represented on 
the 'employee' and 'employer' panels. It also shows adl)erence to the principle of 
35 Section 17(6), Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act if 1992, op. cit. 
36 Ibid 
37 Section18(2), Trade Displltes (Amendment) Act if 1992, op. cit. 
38 Ibid 
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mdustrial democracy and 'reflects government of the industrial process by all 
concerned or by their elected representatives,.39 
4. Jurisdiction 
4.1 Exclusive jurisdiction 
The jurisdiction of the Court is set out in section 18(1) of the TDA: 
"The Court, or any division of the Court, shall have exclusive jurisdiction in 
every matter properly before it (emphasis mine) under this Act.40 Exclusive 
jurisdiction was interpreted by the Court of Appeal in Botswana Raifwqys 
Organisation v S etsogo & 198 Others to mean' ... the Court shall exclusively 
of matters which are properly before it under the Act. That does not mean that all 
industrial matters have become the exclusive preserve of the Industrial 
Court (emphasis mine). It means when a matter which because of the limited 
nature of the Courts jurisdiction which is related to an industrial or trade dispute 
is properly before the Court, the Court should have exclusive jurisdiction to hear 
and determine that reference.,,41 
The jurisdiction of the Court shall include the power to; 
(a) hear and determine all trade disputes 42;- a trade dispute is defined in section 
2, the interpretation section of the TDA as to include a dispute between unions, 
a grievance and any dispute over-
39 Sections 66 (1), (c) & (d) and section 66(2) , Labour Relations Act, Malawi 
40 Section 18 (1), Tradw 
41 Botswono RoibvC1)'s Organisation v SetJogo & 198 Others, Ca # 51/95 
Section 18 (1), Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act Of 1992, 0p. cit 
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• the application or the interpretation of any law relating to 
employment; 
• the terms and conditions of employment of any employee or class of 
employees, or the physical conditions under which such employee or 
class of employees may be required to work; 
• the entitlement of any person or group of persons to any benefit 
under an existing collective agreement; 
• the existence or non-existence of any collective agreement; 
• the dismissal, employment, suspension from employment, 
retrenchment or reinstatement of any person or group of persons; or 
• the recognition or non-recognition of an organization seeking to 
represent employees in the determination of their terms and 
conditions of employment.43 
(b) to enJOin any employee or employer, or any trade union or employers 
organization, from taking or continuing any industrial action;44 
(c) to refer any matter to an expert and at 
evidence in the proceedings;45 
discretion, to 
43 Section 2, Intelpretation section, Trade Disputes (.Ammdwcnt) Act of 1992, op. cit. 
44 Section 18(1), Trade Disputes (.AmelldmentJAct of 1992, op. cit. 
4, Ibid 
58 
his report as 
Cd) generally to gtve all such directions and do all such things as may be 
necessary or expedient for the expeditious and just hearitm and 
determination of any dispute before it. 46 
It is currently being proposed that amendments be made to the Trad~ Disputes 
Act to give the Industrial Court exclusive civil jurisdiction in respect of trade 
disputes47 (emphasis mine). The object of this provision is to prevent 'forum 
shopping and the development of conflicting jurisprudence'. Plans are also under 
way to request the Office of the Attorney General to consider ways of achieving 
this objective without having to amend the Constitution, (ie by making the 
Industrial Court a division of the High Court)48. In addition, a number of 
amendments have also been proposed in respect of Section 18 of the TDA. It is 
further proposed that the Court be given the power-
46 Ibid 
• to interdict any unlawful industrial action;49 
• to hear appeals and reV1ews from decisions of mediators and 
arbitrators;50 
• to direct that the matter be referred for mediation under section 3, if 
in the opinion of the Court the matter has not been properly 
mediated or is ripe for further mediation;51 
47 ILO/Swiss Project, Draft 01lti£1Ie of A17JtndmentJ' to Labour u;vs, op. cit. p17 
48 Ibid p17 
49 Ibid p17 
50 Ibid p17 
51 Ibid p17 
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• to direct the Commissioner to refer a dispute that is before the Court 
to arbitration.52 
4.2 Jurisdiction relating to disputes of right/disputes of interest 
Disputes of right are also known as Yudiciabfe disputes' and generally relate. to the 
interpretation, implementation or violation of existing rights, whether such rights 
flow from statutory law, collective agreements or individual employment 
contracts.53 Such disputes are normally subject to adjudication, (ie; dispute 
resolution by a court of law) or arbitration.54 Disputes of interest are sometimes 
referred to as 'economic interests' and usually arise when there is a disagreement as to 
new terms and conditions of work, or the renewal of those that have expired.55 
Such disputes can also be regarded as disputes concerning the creation of new 
rights, ie; through collective bargaining. These disputes are not based on existing 
rights and are usually non-judiciable.56 They are normally resolved by the use of 
social and economic power (eg, strikes and lockouts): 
The TDii is silent as to whether the Industrial Court is empowered to hear 
disputes of rights and disputes of interest. Interestingly enough, the Court, has 
on its own, assumed a quasijudicial function and awarded itself the right to 
determine disputes of right and disputes of interest. In the cases of Debswana 
Diamond CompatfY (Pty) Ltd. v Botswana Mining W'orkers Union and Morupufe Colfiery 
Ltd. v Botswana Mining Workm Union,S? the question was raised as to whether the 
52 Ibid p17 
53 Barker F. & Holtzhausen M., South A/Tican Labour La/II Glossary, ist ed., Juta & Co. (1996) P 41 
54 Ibid P 41 
55Ibidp41 
56 Ibid P 41 
57 Debswana Diamond Compa,!) (PM Ltd. v Botswana Mining [j?'orkers U'1iol1, IC 34/94, Mort/pule Colliery Ud II 
Botswana Mini11,g Worker;- Union, IC 64/95 . 
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Court had the jurisdiction to determine a matter concerning wages and terms and 
conditions of employment. In these cases the Court held that section 18(1) (a) of 
the TDA empowered the Court to 'hear and determine all trade disputes. ii8 The Court 
further found that the relevant portion of the definition of a trade dispute was 
contained in section 2(b) of the TDA.59 The section provides that: "trade dispute" 
includes a disp1./te betwee?1 unions, a grievance and dispute over-
the terms and C011ditio71S qf empl0'ment qf at!] empl0'ee or claJJ' qf empl0'ees, or the 
pf?Jsical conditions under which such empl0'ee or claJJ' qf empl0'ees mqJ be required to 
work;'DO 
The court was therefore satisfied that the said Act conferred jurisdiction on the 
Industrial Court to determine wage disputes and disputes regarding other terms and 
conditions ~f empl0'ment. Labour law academics and practitioners alike hold 
contrasting views on whether a labour Court should'determine disputes rights 
and interest (emphasis mine). Weiss, a noted labour law scholar, held the view 
that 'labour courts, as all other courts, are only competent the disputes of 
rights and not for disputes of interests,.61 In advocating this principle, however, 
Weiss does acknowledge that the borderline between the two categories is 
'becoming less and less clear,.62 
58 Debswana case & Mort/pule case, op. cit. 
59 Ibid 
60 Section 2 (b), Trade Disputes (Amcl1dmmtjAct, op. cit. 




A recommendation has been made proposmg an amendment to the Trade 
Disputes Act stipulating that disputes ofinterestare no longer within the jurisdiction 
of the Botswana Industrial Court.63 
4.3 lusrisdiction over constitutional matters 
~ 
The Industrial Court is a creature of statute and accordingly has limited 
jurisdiction. Section 18 (1) (a) of the TDA empowers the Industrial Court to 
determine all trade disputes.64 Any matters involving constitutional issues, 
however are transferred to the High Court for hearing. Part IV of the 
Constitution of Botswana deals with the interpretation of the Constitution with 
section 105 dealing specifically with referrals to the High Court of cases involving 
interpretation of the Constitution.65 Section 105 (1) provides that 
(1) \X1here any question as to the interpretation of this Constitution arises in any 
proceedings in any subordinate (emphasis mine) court and the court is of 
the opinion that the question involves a substantial question oflaw, the court 
may, and shall, if any party to the proceedings to the party so requests, refer 
the question to the High Court.66 
(2) Where any question is referred to the High Court in pursuance of this 
section, the High Court shall give its decision upon the question and the 
court in which the question arose shall, subject to any appeal, dispose of the 
case in accordance with that decislOn.6i 
63 no/Swiss Project, op. cit. p 17 
64 Section 18 (1) (a), Trade Disputes (Amendmmt) Act oj 1992, op. cit. 
65 Section 105, Constitution oJBotswcma, op. cit. 
66 Section 105 (1), Constitlltion oj Eotswa/la, op. cit. 
67 Section 105 (2), Constitution oJBotswana, op. cit. 
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This rule was first cited in the case of Botswana Bank o/Botswana Ltd V Botswana 
Bank 0/ Emplqyees Union & Others.68 In this matter certain constitutional 
infringements were alleged to have occurred. The. Industrial Court held that 
constitutional matters are to be brought before the High Court. The Court 
further held that where it is alleged that certain provisions dealing with the 
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual are infringed, 
such action must be brought before a competent Court.69 The Industrial Court is 
not such competent court as it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on constitutional 
matters.70 
In contrast, section 157 (2) of the 1995 SA LRA specifically states that the 
Labour Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court in respect of any 
alleged or threatened violation of any fundamental right entrenched in Chapter 2 
of the Constitution of the RSA, 1996 and arising from; 
(a) employment and labour relations; 
(b) any dispute over the Gonstitutumality of any executive or administrative act 
or conduct, or any threatened executive or administrative act or conduct, by 
the State in its capacity as an employer; and 
(c) the application of any law for the administration 
responsible.71 
which the Minister is 
68 Botswana Bank ffjBotsJvana Ltd. v BotsJ/lana Balik ffjEmployee 1miofl & Others Ie 40/94 
69 Ibid 
70 Ibid 
71 Section 157 (2), 1995 SA LRA, op. cit. 
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4.4 Territorial jurisdiction 
The TDA is silent as to the territorial juri~diction of the Court. The court is based 
in Gaborone and exercises jurisdiction throug):lOut the country. Territorial 
jurisdiction can be implied from the 'exclusive jurisdiction' awarded to the Court 
in section 18 of the TDA.72 Although not expressly stipulated in the Act, the seat 
of the Court would have to be Gaborone as there are no other offices of the 
Court in the region .. 
The Act is also silent as to 'whether the Industrial Court has jurisdiction over 
persons residing outside Botswana. The validity of this question comes into 
play in instances involving the attachment of property. It is not clear whether or 
not the Industrial Court would have the power to make orders of attachment 
over persons residing outside of Botswana. 
4.5 Retrospective jurisdiction 
One of the legislative problems encountered by the Court revolved around the 
Acts silence and omission regarding the commencement of the jurisdiction of the 
court. This lacuna in the law resulted in a number of cases being set aside. In the 
case Galeaka1!Je ModiH v Botswana Building Socte(y the Applicant had been 
dismissed by the Respondent on the 27th January 1992, which was more than two 
years prior to 1 April 1994, being the date on which the Trade Disputes Act was 
deemed to come into operation.73 The 1st of April, 1994 was also the date of 
establishment of the Industrial Court. In this matter, the Respondents challenged 
the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court stated the followmg; 
72 Section 18, Trade Displlt.es Act, op. cit. 
Galeakaflye Modise v Botswana Building Society Ie 5/94 
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'The fact that the Court was onlY established on 1 April 1994 does not necessarilY mean that 
the Court cannot havejurisdiction in disputes 1iJhich arose bifore 1 April 1994. The Legislature 
can c01!fer such jurisdiction in the same on the COUft I:!Y' either providing that the ~aid Act 
shall operate retrospectivelY or I:!Y c01!ferringjurisdiction during a transitional period from the old 
procedure to the new procedure or thirdlY the Interpretation Act mqy provide for such a 
situation. Ji74 
In its determination, the Court scrutinized the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act 
1992 and found nothing in the express provisions or language of the said Act 
which in any way indicated an intention by the Legislature to authorize 
retrospective operation. Consequently, the Court held that it 'cannot clothe itself 
with jurisdiction' in such cases, nor can it assume jurisdiction when it patently 
doesn't have jurisdiction.75 Nor can the parties to the Court having 
jurisdiction in such cases. It is only the Legislature that can grant such 
jurisdiction. The Court further suggested that the Legislature consider amending 
Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1992 to give the Industrial Court 
retrospective jurisdiction to determine all such unresolved disputes, which were 
'in limbo' and/ or to make provision for the Court to have jurisdiction during the 
transitional period.76 The legislature did so by amending section 1 of Act No. 23 
of 1992 to include the following proviso; 
"Providing that, notwithstanding such dote of commencement, in relation to the Industrial 





remaining unresolved prior to the date if commencement mqy be riferred to the industrial Court 
for determination. ,91 
The effect of this amendment was to allow disputes that arose between 9th 
October and 1st April, 1994 to be determined by the Industrial Court. 
5. Powers and Procedures of the Industrial Court 
5.1 Procedures-general 
The general powers of the Court are set out in section 18 of the Trade Disputes 
Act.78 Section 19(1) of the TDA also gives the Industrial Court the power to hear 
evidence.79 Subsection (2), in particular empowers the Court to order any person 
to-
(a) furnish, in writing or otherwise, such particulars in relation to the matter as it 
may reqUlre; 
(b) attend before it; 
(c) give evidence on oath or otherwise; 
(d) produce any relevant document.so 
In general the Court is empowered to subpoena witnesses, administer oaths or 
affirmations. Require the production of books and documents and generally 
77 Section 2, Track Disp1ltes (Amendmmt) Act 0/1992, op. cit. 
78 Section 18, Trade Disp1ltes (AmendmmtJAct of 1992, op. cit. 
79 Section 19 (1), Trade Disputes (Ammdmmt) Act of 1992, op.cit. 
so Section 19 (2), Trade Disp1ltes (Ammdmmt) Act of 1992, op. cit. 
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exhibit the powers of an ordinary civil court.S1 These provisions are almost 
identical to section 17 (11) of the 1956 SA LRA.8Z The general powers of the 
Court are also contained in section 18 of the Trade Disputes Act as previously set 
out The Industrial Court Rules set out the procedures of the Court with Rule 12 
providing the following; 
81 Ibid 
(1) Without prejudice to the general discretion granted to the Court by 
section 18(1)(d) of the Act, the Court may on application or of its 
own motion at any time: 
(a) before or after the expiry of any period condone any failure to 
comply with any rule including time periods save for the time within 
which an appeal may be noted to the Court of Appeal and may 
abridge any time prescribed by these Rules; 
(b) allow the allegations in any form to be amended at any time; 
(c) if in any proceedings it appears that any party to the proceedings has 
been incorrectly or defectively cited, correct the error or defect, or 
order the substitution of a party; 
(d) join any other person at any time on such terms and conditions as it 
deems fit. 
(e) Make an order consolidating the disputes pending before it in 
separate proceedings where it deems such consolidation to be 
expedient and just; 
82 Section 17 (11), 1956, SA LRA, op. cit. 
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(f) Allow any party at any time to amend his application or his 
opposition; 
(g) Grant any order in the absence of any party if it is satisfied that, that 
party has had notice of the date of set down and that all relevant 
documents have been served on such party; 
(h) Rescind on good cause shown, any order made by it on the absence 
of a party; 
(1) Order any person who fails to comply with any notice or directive 
given in terms of these Rules to do so! and or order that any party in 
default shall not be entitled to any relief in such proceedings; 
(j) Set aside any irregular step which has been taken by another party 
unless the party complaining of the irregular step has, with 
knowledge of the irregular step, taken any further step in the 
proceedings; 
(k) Declare, in the case of a partnership or a firm, that any person was 
at a certain time or for a certain period a partner of a partnership or 
the proprietor of a firm; 
(1) Grant on application: 
(i) urgent relief; 
(ii) urgent interim relief pending a decision by the court after a 
hearing; 
68 
(iii) an interdiction or any other order in the case of any action that is 
prohibited by law regarding any trade dispute; provided that in the 
case of urgent relief sought the provisions of sub-rules 7 (1) (b) and (c) 
and 7 (2) shall not apply; 
(m) before or during a hearing, grant a rule nisi (an order requiring the 
other party to show cause why a certain order should not be made) 
and confirm or discharge a rule nisi on a return date if appropriate 
unless the Act otherwise provides; 
(n) preside at any pre-hearing conference.83· 
(2) In any application referred to in sub-rule (1) the Court may make 
such order as it deems fit, including an appropriate order as to costs 
if such costs are permissible in terms of section 27 of the Act. 84 
(3) It will be in the discretion of the judge to decide when and for how 
long the court will be in recess in any given year. 85 
(4) The Court in the exercise of its powers and discretion, and in the 
performance of its functions, or in any matter incidental thereto, may 
act in such a manner as it may consider expedient in the 
circumstances in order to achieve the objectives of the Act, and in so 
doing it shall have regard to substance rather than form, save as is 
otherwise provided in the Act. 86 
83 Rule 12 (1) (a)- (n), Industrial Court Rules (BotsI/Jaf/a) 
84 Rule 12 (2), Industrial Court futies, (Botswana) op. cit 
85 Rule 12 (3), Industrial Court futles, (Bots/Jlana), op. cit 
86 Rule 12 (4, Industrial Cottrt futles, (Botswana), op. cit 
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The Act also provides in section 18(3) that the decision of the majority of the 
persons representing the Court shall be the decision of the Court: provided that 
where there is no majority decision, the decision of the judge shall prevaiLs7 This 
provision is similar to section 17(4) (b) and (c) of the 1956 SA LRA which 
provided that a decision of a majority of members or member shall be the 
decision of the Industrial Court, provided that where more than one member is 
appointed, the member appointed as Chairman shall in the event of an equality of 
votes, have a casting as well as a deliberative vote.88 , 
The Act does not specifically refer to the offence of 'contempt of court', but it 
does state however, in section 19(4) of the TDA, that any person who fails to 
comply with an order given under section 19 of the TDA, is guilty of an offence 
and liable to a fine ofP500 (around R700) and imprisonment for three months.89 
Another one of legislative impediments experienced by the Industrial Court, 
was in relation to its powers to vary or rescind default judgments. The 1992 
Amendment Act did not give the Court the power to amend or vary its decisions. 
The general rule was that after having given judgment" the Court was functus ifJicio 
and had no power to amend its judgment thereafter unless specific provision was 
made in the Act for such power. The only provision in the Trade Disputes Act 
which provided for the 'clarification or rectification' of a judgment of the 
Industri<li Court was section 26 (3) of the Employment Act. The section provides 
as follows; 
87 Section 18 (3), Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act of 1992, op" cit. 
8S Section 17 (4), (b) & (c), 1956 SA LRA, op, cit 
89 Section 19 (4), Trade Disputes (Amet1dmet1t)Act of 1992, op. cit 
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26 (3) If a7!)l question arises as to the interpretatiOll of a decision, or as to a decision being 
inconsistent with a7!)l written laJlI) the Minister or a7!)l pa.rt:Y to the decision mqy applY to the 
Court for a determination of the quesrion, and the Court shall determine the matter qfter hearing 
the parties concerned, or if the parties: concerned consent, without such hearing, and a7!)l such 
determination shall be deemed to be a decision made under this Act: 
Provided that, where the question arises out of a7!)l elen'cal or incidental error or omission, the 
Court mqy rectifj such error or omission without hearing the parties concerned. ,90 
In the case of George Mokqya v MOlteo Condotte (Pry) , at 4, the Court held 
that section 26 (3) of the Employment Act empowered the Cburt to clarify its 
decisions if any question arises as to the interpretation of such decision and 
empowers the Court to rectify its decision only in the following two 
circumstances. Firstly it can do so on application where such decision is 
inconsistent with any written law. Secondly the Court can mero motu or on 
application rectify any clerical or incidental error or omission. The Courts inability 
to vary its judgments was eventually rectified through the insertion of sections 25 
A and 25 B in the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1998. The inserted sections 
provided; 
25 A (1) A judgment or order obtained in default'of appearance or of defence or 
in the absence of one of the parties to the action or proceeding (in this section 
referred to as a "default judgment") may be rescinded or varied on the 
application, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2), of the party 
affected by the default judgment.92 
90 Section 26 (3), Employment Act 
91 George Mokaya v Morteo Condotte (Pty) Ltd. Ie 24/95 at p 4 
92 Section 25 A (1), Trade Dipslrtes (Amendment) Act # 24 of 1998 
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(2) A party affected by a default judgment may, within one month after he has 
knowledge of the default judgment, apply to the Court, upon notice to the party 
in whose favour the default judgment was given, to vary or set aside such default 
judgment, and the Court may, on good and sufficient cause shown by the party 
against whom the default judgment was given, vary or set aside the default 
judgment on such terms as it deems just in the circumstance.93 
25 B (1) The Court may, mero motu or on the application of any party affected, 
rescind or vary-
(a) an order or judgment erroneously sought or erroneously granted 
without notice to any party affected thereby; 
(b) an order or judgment in which there is an ambiguity or a patent error 
or omission, but only to the extent of such ambiguity, error or 
omIssIon; 
(c) an order or judgment granted as the result of a mistake common to all 
parties; 
(d) an order or judgment granted as an issue raised itl limine if having 
regard to changed circumstances since such order or judgment was 
granted it would be unjust or inequitable to allow such order or 
judgment to stand;94 
93 Section 25 A (2), Trade Di.rplltes (Amendment) Act of 1998, op. cit. 
94 Section 25 (B) (1), Trade Disputes (Ammdment) Act of 1998, op. cit. 
72 
(2) Any party desiring any relief under this section shall make application 
therefore upon notice to all parties whose interests may be affected by any 
variation sought.95 
(3) The Court shall not make any order rescinding or varying any order or 
judgment unless it is satisfied that all parties whose interests may be affected 
have notice of the order proposed.96 
Recommendations have been made to amend the Trade Disputes (Amendment) 
Act to give the Industrial Court the following additional powers; 
• to hear appeals and reviews from mediators and arbitrators; 
• to determine disputes as to whether or not a trade dispute is one of 
interest or not; 
• to confirm contempt orders from arbitrators; 
• to Impose administrative penalties for non-attendance and non-
compliance; 
• to gtve the Judge President the power to refer disputes to 
arbitration.97 
95 Section 25 (B) (2), Trade Displltes (Amendmtnt) Act of 1998, 0p. cit. 
96 Section 25 (B) (3), Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act of 1998, op. cit. 
97 ILO I Swiss Project, op. cit. p 17 
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5.2.1 Level One-District Labour Office 
Generally speaking, no case can come before the Industrial Court without first 
having been heard and mediated over by the Labour Department officials. In 
Mogae Mmolawa v Lobat.re Oqy ~l7orks the court stated the following; 
" This procedure to refer disputes directly to the Industrial Court should not be 
encouraged as it was never the intention of the legislature that this procedure 
should be followed and in any case parties should be encouraged to follow the 
mediatory procedure via the District Labour Officer and the Commissioner of 
Labour as there are several advantages in such procedure. It is less costly, less 
time-consuming and a settlement could be reached at a much earlier stage."n 
The Industrial Court has since made a number of significant rulings in respect of 
the required procedure as it related to termination of employment at district 
labour officer level. 
(a) According to the requirements of section 5 (6)(d) of the 1995 TDA, an 
employee was required to exercise his/her right of protest within 14 days of 
learning 0/ the termination or intended termination 0/ the contract 0/ emplqymenL 99 The 
Court, in the case of Mogae MmolaJva v Lobatse Clqy Works dismissed the matter for 
non-compliance with section 5 (6) Cd) of the TDA. In this case the court 
proceeded to examine the aim, scope and objection of the legislative enactment 
and came to the conclusion that "it Jvas clearfy the intentioll 0/ the legislature to achieve 
some fillality ill dismissal cases as soon as possible". The Court proceeded to note that 
98 Mogae Mmolawa v lAbatse Ci'!)' Works Ie 28/95 
99 Section 5 (6) (d), Trade Disptltes (Amendment) Act of 1995 
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there was no provIsIon In the Act for the "District Labour Officer or the 
Commissioner of Labour to condone any failure to comply with the said 14 
day period". 100 (emphasis mine) 
Several other 'termination of employment' matters that came before the Court 
were also dismissed for non-compliance. A new section 6 A (3) has since been 
introduced by section 7 of the 1997 Act to now provide the following; 
"an employee shall be deemed to have waived his right of protest under 
this section unless he exercises within 14 days immediately after learning 
of the termination or the intended termination of the contract of 
employment" ..... "Provided that a labour officer, the Commissioner or 
the Court may, on good cause shown, condone any delay in making a 
protest" .101 
(b) An employee who wished to protest a termination of employment was 
required under section 5 (2) to make a report in writing (emphasis mine) to 
the nearest Labour officer (section 5 (6)), and serve a copy of the report 
upon every other party to the dispute (section 5(4) of the Act). In Tlhadiso 
Gabqfakwe v Msutse (Pry) Ltd, the Applicant made a verbal report to the 
District Labour Officer in Molepolole. 102 The Court held that section 5 (6) 
provided for a specific procedure for an employee wishing to protest against 
the termination of his contract of employment. The court further held that 
the requirements in section 5(2), (4) and (6) must be complied with when a 
protest against termination is made. The court found that the District Labour 
officer was not entitled to entertain the protest nor was he entitled to refer it 
100 Mogae Mmolawa, op. cit. 
101 Section 6 A (3), Trade Disputes (AmendmentJAct # 14011997 
102 Thladiso Gabofakl/1e v Msutse (Pry) Ltd. Ie 76/96 
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to the Commissioner of Labour. The Court found the section 7 certificate 
that had been issued to be invalid and consequently held that the matter was 
not properly before the Court. 
Section 7 of the 1997 Trade Disputes (Amendmept) Act has since introduced a 
new section 6 A which provides that the m;plqyee JJ)ishing to protest against the 
termination (of employment) shall make sllch protest to the nearest labour qfjicer. "The 
effect of tl1is provision is to remove the requirement that the protest be in 
writing (emphasis mine) .103 
5.2.2 Level two-Commissioner of Labour- 1983 Trade Disputes Act 
The procedure at the level of the Commissioner of Labour under the 1983 Trade 
Disputes Act entailed a personal enquiry by the Commissioner into the causes 
and circumstances of the dispute Section 6 (1) of the 1983 Trade Disputes Act 
provided that "the Commissioner shall consider every trade dispute reported to 
him under section 5 ... " Section 6 (2) (a) set out the manner in which the 
Commissioner was expected to conduct such enquiry. The section provided that 
, the Commissioner shall-
(aj inquire into the cause and circumstances of the dispute and, in the performance of this 
duty, request every party to the dispute to attend brfore him, either in perJon or l?Y a 
representative, at Stich time and place as he shall designate .. ,,704 
In Motseta v lvlondial the court held that a referral by the Commissioner requires 
mediation by the Commissioner.lOs The court reiterated this position in the case 
103 Section 6 A, Trade DispJltes (Ammdmel1t) Act of 1997 
104 Section 6 (2), (a), Trade Disputes Act, 1983 
105 Motutat II MOlldial Ie 33/97 
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of Keduetse Kemoabe v Yalona Chemist 106 where it held that the court could not 
exercise jurisdiction to hear the case as the Commissioner had not exercised his 
mediatory powers. In case after case, the Court emphasized that 'this duty could 
not be delegated by the Commissioner to any other officer' (emphasis mine), 
(see also: Gosalamang Moroka and 112 Others I) Feedem Catering Services (Botswana) (PM 
Ltd. IC 137/96) 
The Court also held that the Commissioner was required as a matter of 
procedure, to request every party to the dispute to attend before him. In 
Francisca Petto v Colgate Palmolive (Botswana) (Pty) Ltd, the Court found that the 
Distnct Labour Officer had wrongly nftrred the dispute, as the parties had not 
appeared before the Commissioner. Following an enquiry into the causes and 
circumstances of the case, section 6 (2) (b) of the 1983 TDA then empowered the 
Commissioner to appoint an industrial relations officer from the department to 
conciliate in the dispute. 
1997 Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act 
Under the 1997 Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act, a new section 6 has been 
created with the insertion of the words "or the labour qJicer delegated l?y him". The 
consequence of this amendment is to remove the requirement that the 
Commissioner personally enquire into the causes and circumstances of the 
dispute. The new section also allows the Commissioner to delegate his fupctions 
to a labour officer. A new section 6 A (5) also provides for a new streamlined 
procedure in that it stipulates that: 
"Where the labour officer is unable to negotiate a settlement of a dispute 
between the parties, he shall 
105 Keduetse Kemoabe v Ya Lalla Chemist Ie 62/96 
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(a) where he is of the opinion that there is no likelihood of a settlement by 
further mediation, request the Commissioner to issue a certificate in terms 
of Section 7 for the dispute to be referred to the Industrial Court; or 
(b) refer the matter to the Commissioner together with a report of his efforts to 
secure a settlement,,107 
5.2.3 Level three-Access to the Industrial Court 
Under normal circumstances, a dispute cannot be directly referred to Industrial 
Court. Existing legislation provided for two ways in which a dispute could be 
referred to the Industrial Court. Referral could either be by virtue of a section 7 
certificate issued by the Commissioner of Labour under the TDNO!l or by 
ministerial direction as per section 9 (1) (as amended) of the TDA. Section 9 (1) 
provides that: 
"\X1here the Minister is satisfied that a trade dispute exists or is apprehended and 
where-
(a) any industrial action, whether actual or declared, in furtherance of the trade 
dispute has been declared by the Minister under this Act to be unlawful; 
(b) the dispute involves an essential service; or 
(c) the Minister is satisfied that the dispute has or may jeopardize the essentials 
of life or the livelihood of the people Botswana or a significant section 
thereof or may endanger the public safety or the life of the community, 
107 Section 6 A (5), Trade Disputes (Amendmmt) Act, 1'997, O}. tit. 
108 Section 7, Trade Disputes (Ammdmmt) Act 1'992, op. cit. 
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objectives of speed, and easy access were attributed to its legalistic procedures.99 
Tribunals in the UK were said to have adopted an adversarial approach which 
encompassed two main aspects, namely; 
(a) control over the pre-hearing process- this entailed substantial control by 
parties over the definition of issues to be discussed, choice of evidence and 
. . 100 
wltnesses etc.,.. . 
(b) Control over the actual hearing- this entailed substantial control by the 
parties over the conduct of the hearing. (It includes the parties statements of 
case, examination, cross-examination and re-examination of witnesses.) In 
this instance, the tribunal would only intervene for the purpose of clarifying 
testimony.l01 
An inquisitorial system places a duty on the judge, or dispute resolver, to inquire 
into the facts and where appropriate, the law upon which the claim is based.102 In 
this system the adjudicator plays the role of an inquisitor who 'actively seeks out 
the facts by calling witnesses and questioning them,.103 This model is 
predominately used by many of the European countries and is sometimes used in 
South African arbitration .. This type of approach also places a far greater demand 
on the competence and impartiality of the arbitrators as it requires them to more 
or less 'dominate the hearing'. Studies have indicated that the 'investigative 
approach' is most suitable in dismissal cases, as it 'offers the optimum in terms of 
>9 Clark, op. cit. at 612 
100 Ibid at 612 
101 Ibid at 612 
102 Corby S. & Newall 1., op. cit. at 7 
103 Clark, op. cit. at 616 
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accessibility, informality and sp'eed,lo4 as well as providing the 'most efficient 
return on costs to both litigants and t1~e public purs{?10S 
The investigative approach is said to be the best approach where parties are not 
well represented and/or do not have equal access to resources. It is argued that 
the investigative approach is -more likely to produce an outcome that is just. 
Brand J goes as far to suggest that where disputants are not represented, justice is 
not likely to be done if the adjudicator fails to call vital witnesses or ask pertinent 
questions not raised by the parties. In contrast, in an investigative hearing an 
adjudicator can ensure that all the relevant evidence is presented and tested thus 
ensuring or allowing for substantial and material justice. 
The strengths of the investigative approach are what prompted the UK Justice 
Committee to recommend a 'stronger form of preliminary inquiry prior to the 
arbitration hearing in which the main issues could clarified, statements of cases 
from the parties requested and essential documents requested and where possible 
agreed upon.' 106 It is debatable as to whether the South African approach can be 
described as 'investigative' or 'inquisitorial'. It has been suggested that section 138 
(1) and (2) of the SA LRA, in giving substantial discretion to the arbitrator to the 
arbitrator to determine the procedure fairly and quickly and with minimal 
formality implies the primacy of approach.107 C. Nupen, former 
Director of the CCMA, the following; 
" In arbitration we are unlikely to be a court of record as the Industrial Court has 
been. It's time consuming.and expensive. In the unfair dismissal arena, where in 
104 Clark, op, cit at 614 
105 Ibid at 614 
106 Ibid at 614 
107 Ibid at 618 
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many instances parties will not be represented by lawyers, the Commissioner may 
conduct the proceedings on an inquisitorial basis and elicit the facts and have to 
determine an approach to the facts once elicited. So there will be a different 
approach taken, but I think this is contemplated and intended under 
statute.,,108 
In practice, however, it is alleged that the approach adopted by the CCMA 
commissioner has been largely adversarial and not investigative.109 
The process as it exists in Botswana can best be described as largely investigative. 
The Industrial Court Rule~ allow for pre-hearing inquiries, statements of cases 
and other documentation. In the past trade unions (BFTU in particular) 
expressed concern over the fact that most workers were unable to afford legal 
representation, whereas. employers were.110 They' further maintained that this 
provided for a distinct imbalance between workers and employers.111 The 
investigative/inquisitorial approach of the Court, has, however, been said to 
reduce any disadvantages, real or perceived. It is also important to bear in mind 
that the degree or extent of the investigative approach used will depend on a 
number of factors such as the personality of the chair or judge. Because the 
Industrial Court of Botswana presently has three judges with distinct preferences 
and personalities, it is difficult to comment on the degree of the investigative 
approach employed in the Court. 
108 Nupen (1996) , Charles Nupen of the CCMA, Preparing for Lift off Interview with Duncan Innes, The 
Times Labour Brief (l) 4 5-19 at 13 
109 Theron J & Godfrey S., op. cit. at 74 
110 See: Briscoe A., Review 0/ tbe Procedures jor the Resol,/1iotl 0/ Industrial Disputes in B()tswana, p 30 
111 Ibid 
112 
4.4 Formality: Documentation 
The general rule regarding documentation, is that the greater the documentation, 
the greater the formality. In New Zealand, employees have the onerous task of 
writing to the employer before applymg to the Tribunal. ll2 In South Africa, 
however, it is fairly easy to make a complaint of dismissal. It has even been 
suggested that the system is too informal and accessible and has resulted in an 
influx of unfair dismissal cases before the CCMAll3 (many of which are alleged to 
not be genuine). 
It is fairly easy to lodge a complaint in the Botswana Industrial Court. An 
applicant is required to bring a section 7 certificate and letter of referral to show 
that an attempt at conciliation had been made.114 After that parties are required to 
complete standardized forms provided by the Court. ll5 In the case of an urgent 
application, the procedure is slightly more onerous in that applicants are required 
to proceed by way of notice of motion and affidavit. l1O In as much as simplicity 
may be the desired ideal, it is also important to have stringent enough procedures 
that will prevent cases from being brought directly to the Industrial Court 
without an attempt being made to conciliate/mediate. Also of relevance is Rule 9 
of the Industrial Court Rules relating to pre-hearing conferences which allows the 
Judge, Registrar and nominated members of the Court to call for documentation 
with a view to shortening or even settling cases.ll7 
112 Corby S. & Newall 1., op. cit. at 7 
113 Mosime K. op. cit. at 98 
114 Rule 4, Appendix C, Il1dllstrial Court Rules, op. cit. 
115 See: Appendix I & 2 (Applicants' Statement of case & Respondents' Statement of defence) in Appendix 
C, Industrial Court Rules . 
116 See Appendix 3 (Notice of motion- Urgent application), in Appendix C, IndllJtrial Co"r! futles, op. cit. 
m Rule 9, Appendix C, IlIdtistriai Court Rilles) op. cit. at p 11 
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4.5 Formality: Appeals 
The question of whether there is an appeal, is relevant to the issue of formality. It 
is important to note the levels of appeal and whether such appeal may be made 
on fact and/or law. In South Africa, there is no appeal from arbitration. The 
Department of Labour rationalized this by stating the following;lIS 
"The absence of an appeal from the arbitrators award speeds up the process and 
frees it from the legalism that accompanies appeal proceedings. It is tempting to 
provide for appeals because dismissal is a very serious matter, particularly given 
the lack of prospects of alternative employment in the present economic climate. 
However, this temptation mu'st be resisted as appeals lead to records, lengthy 
proceedings, lawyers, legalism, inordinate delays and high costS."119 
In Botswana cases emanating from the Industrial Court go on appeal twice a year 
to the Court of Appeal. A total of 20 cases have gone on appeal to the Court of 
Appeal with 3 cases presently awaiting the January 2002 Court of Appeal session. 




NUMBER OF CASES APPEALED FROM THE INDUSTRIAL 
COURT 
YEAR Number of cases Registered Number of cases appealed 
1994 40 
1995 118 4 
1996 221 3 
1997 92 6 
1998 184 4 
1999 266 3 
2000 261 
2001 199 3* 
There is an increasing trend in the more industrialized and progressive nations 
towards granting increased monetary awards. Certain countries such as New 
Zealand, have removed all.1imits on the amount of monetary co~pensation that 
119 Ibid 
120 Statistics on number of cases appealed from the Industrial Court obtained from the Industrial Court 
RegistlY, August 5,2001. 
* 1'\5. Court of Appeal sessions are only held twice a year. The next Court of Appeal session will be held in 
JanualY, 2002. Consequently dllS figure is likely to change. 
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can be awarded for unjustified dismissal. l2l New Zealand has been particularly 
innovative in providing that the awards include in the quantum for damages 
amounts for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings.12Z In Great Britain 
the ceiling was previously defined in monetary terms, ie 18 600 pounds, which 
was said to be the average' wage earnings for the year.123 At present the 
government is said to be planning to raise the ceiling to reflect three years average 
. 124 earnmgs. 
Closer to home in South Africa, the maximum award that can be given in respect 
of unfair dismissal is 12 months payor 24 months if the dismissal was found to 
be automatically unfair.125 In Botswana the maximum compensation under 
section 24 (3) of the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act of 1992 is six months. 126 
6. Conclusion 
In spite of the initial legislative setbacks, the Court has proven to be reasonably 
accessible, speedy and informal in terms of its approach and style. Many of the 
delays initially experienced in the Industrial Court, were as a direct result of 
technical arguments raised in respect of the badly drafted TDA Since the 1995 
and 1997 amendments, however, very few legal arguments have been raised as 
points ifl fimine. The Court has also adopted an approach whereby it sets down 
cases for hearing for both legal argument and the merits of the case.127 After 
judgment has been reserved and the Court finds no merit in the technical 
121 Corby S. & Newall I., op. cit at 9 
122 Ibid at 9 
123 Ibid at 9 
124 Ibid at 9 Emplqyment Relations Bill) 
125 Section 194 (2) & (3), 1995 SA LRA, op. cit. 
126 Section 24 (3), Trade Disputes (Aml11ldn;cnt) Act of 1992, op. cit 
127 Interview with Industrial Court Judge D. de Villiers, July 16t \ 2001, Industrial COllrt, Gaborone, Bots/pana 
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argument, it proceeds to deal with the merits in the judgment.128 This approach 
ensures that there are no unnecessary delays that are brought about by technical 
legal arguments. See Table 3 below;129 
Table 3: INDUSTRIAL ~OU~T CASESJULY, 1994 - 31"t JULY, 2001 
YEAR #of cases # of # of cases # of # of # of cases 
registered cases withdrawn cases cases abandoned 
settl~d pending pending by 
hearing judgment Applicants 
. 
1994 40 4 - - - 7 
1995 118 11 - - - 18 
1996 221 24 16 - - 29 
1997 92 9 - - - 18 
1998 184 26 6 - 2 14 
1999 266 29 10 22 8 50 
2000 261 37 19 36 11 43 
2001 199 18 2 170 - -
128 Ibid 
129 Statistics on the Industrial Court cases from 1994-July, 31st, 2001 obtained from the Industrial Court 













The above table indicates the following trends; 
• Column two shows an increasing number of cases being registered 
over the years. This is testimony of the relative accessibility of the 
Court and is also indicative of the increasing legitimacy and 
credibility of the institution. 
• Column three demonstrates the Courts commitment towards 
promoting and facilitating settlement through pre-hearing 
conferences, as provided for in Rule 9 of the Industrial Court 
Rules.no 
• Column eight generally shows an absence of case backlog, thereby 
demonstrating the Courts commitment to expediting cases. In spite 
of the Court only having one judge between 1994-1998, the Court 
was able to successfully avoid the build-up of a backlog of cases 
through tl1e intermittent appointments of labour experts as Acting 
Judges. l3l 
In general the above statistics show that the Court is not only conforming to the 
international best practice benchmarks and standards, but is also enjoying 
widespread legitimacy. 
130 Rule 9, see: Appendix C, Indflltrial COllri &tIes, 0p, cit. 
131 Interview with Industrial Court Judge D. de Villiers, July 16th, Industrial Court, Gaborone, Botswana 
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CHAPTER SIX: Assessment of cases decided in the Industrial Court 
1. Introduction 
The Wiehahn Commission in South Africa in recommending the establishment 
of an Industrial Court, accepted that such a Court would "develop a body of case 
law which would by judicial precedent contribute to the formulation of fair 
employment guidelines".! Industrial Courts are expected to consider aspects 
pertaining to socio-economic, political and extra-legal affairs. In addition, 
Industrial courts are expected to consider and incorporate principles of equity in 
their decisions. The objective of this section is to review the case law emanating 
from the Industrial Court with a view to assessing the principles laid down in the 
decisions. The facts will be set out and followed by a general analysis and 
commentary. The section will conclude with a general commentary. The section 
will conclude with general comments on the role played by the Court in the 
development of case law. 
1.1 Michael Phirinyane v Spie Batignolles 19942' 
The Respondent, a French based building contractor, employed the Applicant as 
a welder to do on site welding. When there was no welding to do, the Applicant 
was required to remove refuse from the site and dump it. The Applicant was 
involved in an accident with the Respondents vehicle which he was driving on 
the 2nd of May, 1994. As the Respondent was of the opinion that the cause of the 
1 Republic of South Africa, Commission of enquity into Labour Legislation, Chainnan: Professor N.E 
Wiehahn., Government Printer, Pretoria: 1979 (RP 47/1979), (hereinafter referred to as the 'Report of the 
Wiehahn Commission', para. 4.28.6, p 51 
2 Mic/;ae/ Phirinyane v Spie Batignolles I C 18/94 
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accident was the Applicants' gross negligence, he was summarily'dismissed on the 
very same day. The dispute was reported to the district labour officer in terms of 
section 5 (1) (a) of the Trade Disputes Act. The district labour officer came to the 
conclusion that the Applicant had been fairly (emphasis mine) dismissed as he 
caused damage to the Respondents vehicle. The district labour officer was unable 
to negotiate a settlement and the Commissioner of Labour issued a certificate in 
terms of section 7 of the Trade Disputes Act that authorized the parties to refer 
the dispute to the Industrial Court. 
Decision 
The Court made the following determination: 
1) That the dismissal of the Applican t, Michael Phirinyane, by 
the Respondent on 2nd May, 1994 was unlawful and also 
procedurally unfair. 
2) The Respondent was ordered to pay to the Applicant the 
sum of P633.60 as notice pay for unlawful dismissaL 
3) The Respondent was ordered to pay to the Applicant the 
sum of P1267.20 being two months wages as 
compensation for procedurally unfair dismissal 
4) No order was made as to costs3 
In reaching its decision, the Court set out the guidelines for fair procedure for 
misconduct dismissals. In so doing, the court first set out the principles relating 
to serious misconduct (otherwise known as disciplinary dismissal). 
3 Micbael Pbirinytme, op, cit. 
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Serious Misconduct 
The Court referred to section 26 (1) as read with section 26 (4) of the 
Employment Act, the relevant portions of which provide as follows: 
s 26 (1) "Notwithstanding the other provisions of this part, the employer may 
terminate any contract of employment without giving notice of his intention to 
do so or making any payment such as is referred in section 19 (a) or (b) where the 
employee is guilty of serious misconduct in the course of his employment,,4 
s 26 (4) " For the purpose of this section the term 'serious misconduct' shall. 
Without prejudice to its general meaning, include or be deemed to include the 
following-
(a) willful disobedience of lawful andlor reasonable orders gtven by the 
employer; 
(b) willful express or implied, misrepresentation by the employee in respect of 
. his skills or qualifications; 
(c) habitual or willful neglect of duties; 
(d) acts of theft, misappropriation or dishonesty against the employer, another 
employee, or a customer or client of the employer; 
(e) acts of violence; 
(f) damage caused willfully or by gross negligence to movable or immovable 
property of the employer; 
4 Section 26 (1), EmploymmtAct, op. cit. 
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(g) willful disclosure of confidential information or trade secrets where such 
disclosure is or is likely to be detrimental to the interests of the employer; 
01) inability to carry out normal duties, due to the consumption of alcohol or 
habit-forming drugs; 
(i) willful refusal to obey or comply with any safety rules or practices for the 
prevention or control of accidents or diseases; 
(j) consistent work performance below average despite at least two written 
warnmgs; 
(k) offering or receiving bribes; 
(I) persistent absence from work without permission.s 
The Court went further to state that 'although the Act does not prescribe any 
procedure to be followed by the employer before an employee is dismissed for 
misconduct, the rules of natural justice, however, dictate that in labour or 
industrial relations, when dealing with a misconduct dismissal case, there must be 
a fair and valid reason for such dismissal and to establish that, a fair procedure 
must be followed by the employer prior to dismissing such employee.,6 The 
Court also set out the following cardinal requirements for a fair disciplinary 
hearing as follows; 
(a) The employee who faces discipline must be given reasonable notice of the 
time and place the employer intends holding a disciplinary enquiry. 
5 Section 26 (4) (a)-O), Employment Act, op. cit. 
6 Michael Phirinqyne, op cit. 
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(b) At the same time the employee mus.t be informed of the nature of the charge 
or charges against him. 
(c) The employee must be gtven the option of being assisted or represented at 
the enquiry by a co-employee of his choice. 
(d) The employer should place sufficient evidence before the enquiry to prove 
that the alleged misconduct has been committed and that it has been 
committed by the employee so charged. 
(e) The employee should be entitled to question any witn~ss who testifies 
against him. 
(t) The employee must be entitled to give evidence himself and to call his own 
(g) In the event of being found guilty of the alleged misconduct, the employee 
must be given a further opportunity of putting forward facts in mitigation 
a sanction is decided on. 
(h) If found guilty and after a sanction has been imposed, the employee should 
be informed of his right to appeal against such finding and/ or sanction. 
(i) The enquiry should be conducted in good faith. 
The decision of the Court was especially significant to the development of labour 
relations in Botswana in that extensive guidelines were laid down with regard to 
appropriate disciplinary and dismissal procedures. The common practice that 
prevailed amongst employers was to dismiss employees with without any 
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reason. This was regarded as·'managerial prerogative'. Employers were also prone 
to dismissing employees just before the completion of their 60 months 
continuous service in an effort to avoid payment of severance pay benefits. In 
this decision, the court raised the issue of 'substantive fairness' and emphasized 
that an employer may only dismiss an employee by giving notice if he has good 
reason (emphasis mine). The Court further stated that such reason must be 
communicated to the employee. The decision was therefore especially welcomed 
by the Unions who saw it as a significant breakthrough in that, the Court not only 
established a precedent in terms of the appropriate procedure to be followed for 
misconduct dismissals, but also laid down principles that conformed to rules of 
natural justice and fairness.? 
1.2 Stanley Moyo v Kgolagano College 19958 
The Applicant commenced empl?yment on 7th March, 1994 with the Respondent 
as the Financial Administrator of the college, the Respondent being a college for 
theological education. The Applicant's letter of appointment stated that his 
monthly salary would be P 2 104, that would be on probation for six months 
and that a copy of his conditions of employment and job description were 
attached. The Respondent had been sending out memo's to its teaching staff in 
1993 (prior to the Applicants arrival) regarding amendments to their terms and 
conditions of employment. New terms were proposed in 1994 and the Applicant 
refused to sign a new contract of employment containing the new amended tenns 
and conditions of employment. The Respondent, in the absence of such consent, 
Interview, J. Motshwarakgole, E.M. Botsalano, M.H. Phokontsi, National Amalgamated Local & Cmtral 
GoverlllJlent and Parastatal Manual Workers U'lion, July 20, 2001 
8 Staniry Mqyo v Kgolagano College; Ie 33/95 
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nevertheless went ahead and implemented these new terms unilaterally. The 
Applicants contract was eventually terminated. 
Decision 
1. The Court found the termination of the contract of employment of 
the Applicant, Stanley Moyo on 20tl1 September 1994 by the 
Respondent wa~ wrongful.and unfair. 
2. In terms of section 25 (1) of the Trade Disputes Act, the 
Respondent was ordered to pay the Applicant the sum of P 1 400, 
being outstanding salary for September, 1994 
3. In terms of section 25 (1) of the Trade Disputes Act, the 
Respondent is ordered to pay to the Applicant the sum of P 1 000 
being outstanding leave pay. 
4. In terms of section 24 (1) (a) of the Trade Disputes Act, the 
Respondent is ordered to pay to the Applic~nt compensation in the 
amount ofP 12620 (equivalent to the maximum compensation of 6 
. . 
months/ 
In deciding upon the matter, the Court made reference to the fact that the 
Industrial Court of South Africa had dealt with unilateral changes in terms and 
conditions of employment to establish whether it constituted an unfair labour 
practice. While the Court acknowledged the concept of 'unfair labour practice' 
to be germane to the South African LRA, it also acknowledged that the Court, in 
its determination of what constitutes an unfair labour practice, applied principles 
of equity. 
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In deciding whether there had been a unilateral change of contract, the court 
referred to the common law principles of contract. The Court stated the 
following; 
" As to the variation of contractual terms, the general rule is that terms and 
conditions of a contract of employment may only be varied with the consent of 
both parties. Under the common law no party has the right to vary or amend 
such terms and conditions unilaterally. If one party does so act, and it is not 
accepted by the other party, it amounts to a repudiation of the said contract. 
There is however, an exception to this rule as regards contracts of employment. 
This is essentially because a contract of employment cannot remain static over 
the years, as some element of change is inevitable, which change according to the 
common law must be mutually agreed by both parties (emphasis mine). If an 
employee however, refuses to accept the change, the employer may according to 
the principles of equity, under given circumstances, unilaterally amend such tenns 
and conditions of employment, because an employee cannot be allowed to 
exercise a power of veto over any such proposed amendments."lo 
The Court ruled that there are certain requirements according t.o the principles 
of equity (emphasis mine) that have to be complied with. These are; 
(a) There must be a valid reason for the change; and 
(b) The change must be affected through a fair procedure. lI 




As regard 'fair procedure', there should be a 'commercial rationale' behind the 
amendment. In other words, it must be based on a 'rationalization of an 
economic, technical or structural nature, to render it substantively fair, and it 
must also not be illegal, as being in conflict with any statutory provision or 
unlawful, as being in conflict with a collective labour agreement.'12 The Court 
further held that in as much as it is basically managements prerogative to amend 
terms and conditions of employment, the Court could never 'sanction any blatant 
implementation without allowing the 'employee to challenge this decision of 
management. There must be bargaining to deadlock and the employee must be 
allowed to resist any alteration in accordance with available conciliatory 
machinery, before it can be said that the unilateral amendment was fair, The 
Court relied on the South African case.s of Usher v umJar (PM Ltd i3 and S. Pyatt 
e:.,,'" Ano. v Rand Mines· (Milling and S e17Jim) Ltd 14 
Commentary 
This decision was again welcomed by the unions, whereas management viewed it 
as an encroachment on its managerial powers. The decision warns employers to 
consult with employees before embarking on any economic, technical or 
structural changes that may affect the employees of the enterprise. This decision 
along with others played a major role in establishing the credibility of the Court in 
the eyes of trade unionists. 
12 Stanlry Mqyo, op. cit. 
13 Usher v linvar (Pry) Ltd. (1992) 1:3 ILJ at 249 (IC) 
14 S. Pyatt & Ana. v Rand Mines (Mini!1!, and Semites) Ltd. (1993) 4 (2) SALLR 48 (IC) 
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1.3 George Mokaya v Morteo Condotte (Pty) Ltd. 199415 
The Applicant was a citizen from Kenya. On the 15th October, he entered into a 
written contract of employment with Morteo Condotte (Pty) Ltd, which was an 
Italian Construction company contracted by the Botswana government to build 
roads. The Applicant was employed as a surveyor. The Respondent terminated 
the Applicant's services by handing him a letter dated 6th March 1993, giving 
him one months' notice of termination of service. The Respondent maintained 
that the basis for the termination was 'operational reasons' and accordingly 
attempted to justify the short notice of retrenchment. 
The Court found the retrenchment to be substantively fair but procedurally 
unfair. The Court held that 'even when a retrenchment is substantively, if the 
correct procedure is not followed, such retrenchment will be procedurally unfair 
and it can result in the employer being ordered to pay compensation to such 
employee'. 
The Court proceeded to set out the well-established guidelines regarding 
retrenchment procedures. 
The Court referred to section 25 of the Employment Act. The said section 
touches on some of the retrenchment principles such as the LIFO principle, the 
giving of notice to all employees who will be affected by the decision to 
retrench, and prioritization of retrenched workers when. work becomes 
available. The Court recognized tha~ decisions taken by employers to economize 
15 George Mokqya 1) Morten Condotte (Pry) Ltd., Ie 6/94 
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are commercially based and within the realm of exclusive managerial 
prerogative.16 The Court went further to set out the guidelines for retrenchment 
as follows; 
• Should an employer decide in principle that retrenchment or any 
other method which will, or is likely to affect an employee is a 
possible way of achieving that result, then he must forthwith notify 
all (emphasis mine) such employees (or their representatives) of the 
possibility of retrenchment and the reasons for it .. Section 25 (2) of 
the Employment Act also requires that the Commissioner of Labour 
be notified. 17 
• The employer must consult with such employees or their 
representatives at the earliest opportunity. The reason for such 
consultation is threefold. Firstly for the parties to seek ways of 
avoiding or averting the need to terminate the employees' 
employment. Secondly, if retrenchment proves unavoidable, then the 
parties should consult on a fair selection criterion and thirdly consult 
on ways of alleviating the hardships caused by the retrenchments, eg 
a reasonable severance package, possible employment elsewhere, 
time off to seek alternative employment,18 etc 
• The employees should be given a fair chance to participate 
meaningfully in such discussions and be invited to propose 
reasonable alternatives to retrenchment, e.g. reduction in wages etc. 
In such consultations it is the duty of the employer to 'consult' and 




not necessarily 'negotiate'. If after fair and adequate consultations the 
parties still cannot reach agreement and they remain intransigent in 
their attitudes, then the employer is free to make the ultimate 
decision, as long as he acts fairly. The Court referred to the leading 
South African case of NUMSA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (P!J) Ltd., 
where Fagan, D].P stated that "Fairness in this context goes further than 
bona fides and commercial justificati011 for the decision to retrench. It is 
conce17led, first and foremost, with the question whether tetmination qf 
emplqyment is the onlY reasonable option in the circumstances. It has become trite 
for the Courts to state that tetmination qf etnplqyment for disciplinary and 
peifotmance-related reasoJ'lS should abJJqys be a measure qf last resort. That, in 
our vie2v, applies equallY to termination qf emplqyment for economic or operational 
reasons. n19 
• The normal and generally accepted criterion is the LIFO principle. 
2°Section 25 of the Employment Act also provides for this criterion 
to be adopted "wherever reasonably practicable', taking into account; 
(i) the need for the efficient operation of the undertaking in question; and 
(iii) the ability, experience, skill and occupational qualifications of 
each employee concerned.,,21 
19 NUMSA vAliantis Diesel Engines (PM Ltd. (1993) 14 IL] 642 (LAC) 
20 Last in, First out principle. See also: Section 25, Employme1lt Act, op. cit. 
21 Section 25, Employmettt Act, op. cit 
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Commentary 
The decision of the court had significant implications to the development of 
labour relations in that; 
• it emphasizes that companies are expected to adhere to equitable 
retrenchment procedures; 
• it agam emphasizes the importance of consultation between 
employers and employees in matters of economic and structural 
change. 
Once again, this decision was welcomed by the trade unions . .KALCGWU in 
particular, embraced the decision and submitted the following statement; 
"One qf the greatest challenges facing the trade 11.nion movement todqy, is loss q/jobs. fP'e appeal 
to government to tighten the labour laJVS and make it difficult teJ retrench. This can be done qy, 
among other things, elevating the equitable principles, laid down qy the Industrial Court from 
time to time into statutory provisions". 22 
1.4 Morupule Colliery Ltd.' v Botswana Mining Workers Union 199523 
The Applicant operates the Morupule Colliery in Palapye, which is the only 
colliery in Botswana. The majority of coal consumed in Botswana is supplied by 
this colliery. One of the Applicant's biggest consumers is the Botswana Power 
Corporation (BPC) which is listed as an essential service and supplies over 80% 
22 National Amalgamated Local & Central Government and Parastatal Manual Workers Union, Position Paper 
on SomeAspccts of Labour ugislation that Need Immediate Attmtion, unpublished paper, 19th Sept, 2000, at p 5 
23 Morupulr Colliery Ltd. v Botsllltma Mining Workers Uni01~ IC 4/95 
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of Botswana's electricity. The colliery also supplies electricity to three of 
Botswana's vital industries, namely; Soda Ash Botswana (Pty) Ltd, which 
produces soda ash for making paper and glass, Botswana BCL Ltd. \\/hich mines 
copper and nickel, for use in its furnaces and to Botswana Meat Commission. 
The Applicant, Morupule Colliery Ltd. brought an urgent application to the 
Industrial Court against Botswana Mine Workers Union in which an order was 
requested in terms of section 18 (1) (b) of the Trade Disputes Act to inter alia, 
enjoin employees of the Colliery who were members the Union, from 
continuing the strike action they had embarked upon on 9th January, 1995. In the 
application, the Court was also asked to declare the strike action unlawful and 
unprocedural. 
Decision 
The Court granted the aforesaid orders for reasons set out below; 
In dealing with the lawfulness of the strike, the Court stated that 'employees in 
essential services (emphasis mine) (who) want to embark on lawful strike action or 
any other lawful mdustrial action, first have to comply with the provisions of 
Section 43 of the Trade Disputes Act. Should they fail to comply with such 
provisions, any ensuing strike action will be unlawful. ... " The Court also made 
the observation that there seemed to be some confusion about strike action in 
non-essential services because the Act did'not contain any prerequisites for lawful 
strike action in non-essential services. The Court noted however, that the 
Legislature did contemplate and provide for strike action in sections 34-39 of the 
TDA.24 In setting out the procedure to be followed regarding strike action in 
24 Sections 34-39 deal with unlawf'ul strike action, Trade Disp1ltes Acl, op. cit. 
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, . 
non-essential services, the Court had regard to the 'definition' of a strike as found 
in section 2 of the TDA. Section 2 0f the said Act provides that; 
"Strike means the cessation qf work try a botjy qf emplqyees in mry tmde or industry 
actiJtg in c0J11bination or under a common ,,,nderstanding or a concerted rqusal or a 
rif!JJai under a COmmon understanding try S11ch botjy qf emplqyees to continue to work u5 
The definition must be read in conjunction with the following definition in 
Section 2 of "industrial action'~ 
"industrial action means a iock-out, strike or action short qf a strike in furtheratlce qf 
a tmde dispute, ,£6 
The Court therefore, observed that. industrial action embarked upon by 
employees in non-essential services would only be iaJ1!/ul if it was in 'Jurthemnce qf a 
tmde dispute", The Court referred to the definition of a trade dispute as contained 
in section 2 of the TDA and proceeded to consider the question of 'who can dec/are 
industria! action unlauful'. "Unlawful industrial action "is defined in section 2 of 
the Act as; 
", ..... a7!J industria! action declared this A&t or try the Minister under this Act to 
be unlawful or atry iock-out, strike or action short qf a strike deemed to be uniauful 
industrial action try virtue qf section 36. ,£7 
The abovementioned definition considers three possibilities in which unlawful 
industrial action may come about; 




(A) Firstly unlawful industrial action may be deemed unlawful in terms of section 
36 of the Act which provides that; (:r1~y lock-out, strike or action short 0/ a strike 
intended or calculated to compel or itifluence ary emplqyer not to emplqy or continue to emplqy a 
person 011 the ground that he-is not a member 0/ a trade union or that he is oris not a member 0/ 
a particular trade union shall be deemed,for the purpose o/this Act, to be unlauful industrial 
action. ,{?8 
(B) Secondly the Minister may declare any industrial action unlawful in terms of 
section 34 and 37 (1) of the TDA. Section 34 provided that: "Where it appears to 
the Mitzister that there is actual or declared industrial action infurtherance qf a trade dispute, 
whether existing or apprehended, and he is satisfied that all practicable means for reaching a 
settlement 0/ the trade dispute, I?J wqy qf the procedures prescribed I?J a collective labour 
agreement or I?J this Act, have not been exhausted, he mqy, I?J order, declare the industrial 
action to be u1tiaujit!" 29Section 37 (1) deals with the Ministers powers to declare 
industrial action unlawful where there is a collective agreement or a decision of 
the Industrial Court.30 The relevant portions of that section provide that: 
"(1) Where it appears to the Minister that there is actual or declared industrial action in 
furtherance 0/ a trade dispute, whether existing or apprehended, in ary trade or industry and he 
is satisfied-
(aJ that the matters to which the trade disputes relates have been settled: I?J a collective 
labour agreemel1t or I?J a decision 0/ the I11dustrial Court; 
28 Section 36, Trade Di.rplltes Act, op. cit. 
29 Section 34, T mde Displltes Act, 0p. cit 
30 Section 37 (1) (a)- (c), Trade Disputes Act, op. cit 
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(b) that a substantial proportion 0/ the emplqyers and a substatltial propmtion 0/ the 
emplqyees in that trade or industry are, either directlY or through their respeCtive 
organizatio1lS, bound I?y the agreement or decision; and 
(c) that the agreement or decision or agreement remains in force, the A1.inister mqy-
(I) ------------ --- -------------------------------------- -- -- ----------------------------- -------
(iii) -----------------------------------------------------.. -----------.. -------------------------
(t'zl) ----------------------- ------------------------------------- --------------------- ----------
(t'v) I?y order declare the industrial action to be lm/auful until such date as shall be 
specified in that order. " 
(C) Thirdly, any industrial action may be declared unlawful in terms of the said 
Act. 
The Court also found that in terms of section 18 (1) (b) of the TDA, it had the 
jurisdiction to "e1!Join at!) emplqyee or emplqyer, or at!) trade union or emplqyer's 
organization, from taking or contillui1zg a'!) industrial action." Consequently, the Court 
can interdict any industrial action, and therefore also a lawful strike. The Court 
then, reasoned that by virtue of being able to interdict a lawful strike, it can surely 
declare any (emphasis mine) industrial action unlawfuL The Court referred to 
section 18 (1) (b) as read with section 17 (1) and the definition of 'unlaufol 
industrial action' as contained in section 2. It found that the wording of section 
17(1), dealing with the purpose for wl-:ich the Industrial Court was established, 
showed that the intention of the Legislature was to give the Court the power to 
declare any industrial action unlawful. T~1e Court finally held that the only way it 
could achieve its purpose set out in section 17(1), being to 'further, secure and 
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maintain good industrial relations in BotsllJand is by having power to declare industrial 
action unlawfuL The Court consequ~ntly found that it had such power. 
Commentary 
Prior to this Industrial Court decision the law relating to industrial action had 
been considered complex and unclear. The decision of the Court was largely 
welcomed by all, in so' far as it provided clarity regarding the procedures to be 
followed in instances of strike action. 
1.5 Kedibonye Ben & Ano. v Green Industrial Enterprises Corporation 
(Botswana) (Pty) Ltd. Ie 20/95 
The two Applicants worked for the Respondent on the Francistown Northline 
Project; one as a plumber foreman since August, 1987 and the other as a concrete 
foreman, since March 1988. Both Applicants fell'ill with similar lung problems 
and requested sick leave. Whilst on sick leave, the two were dismissed from work. 
The Applicants' maintained that they were dismissed for reasons of ill health, 
while the Respondent submitted that the Applicants' had been retrenched. 
Decision 
The Court found that 'no acceptable reason had been given by the Respondent 
for the 'said' retrenchment.' The Court also found that 'the two Applicants' had 
in fact been dismissed by the Respondent, who used retrenchment as a guise, 
(emphasis mine) to try and justify such dismissal.' The Court awarded the First' 
Applicant three months wages and the Second Applicant two months wages as 
compensation for unfair dismissal. 
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The Court also addressed its mind to the issue of severance benefits and the 
method of calculation of such benefits. The Court referred to section 28 as 
amended by act 26 of 1992. Subsections 28(1) and (2) provide as follows: 
28(1) Without pro/udice to section 31, on the termination rf a contract rf empir!Jment, lvhether 
i?Y reason rf the death or the retirement rf the emplqyee orfor at!} other reaSOll, the emplqyer shall 
pqy to an emplqyee }vho has been in continuous emplqyment with him for 60 months or more, a 
severance benifit at the rate prescribed;provided that-
(i)severance benifit shall be pqyable at the conclusiol1 rf each period rf 60 months continuous 
service l?J the emplqyee, or at the termination rf his emplqyme'!lt, at the option rf the emplqyee; 
(zz) where, upon the date rf pqyment rf a7!J SelJeranCe benifit, the emplqyee, or his dependent or 
bel1ificiary, is at that date or some ji{ture date entitled to the pqyment rf a gratuity and pension 
in respect rf the period rf emplqyment under the contract, no severance benifit tphkh would 
otherwise be pqyable in terms rf this section to the emplqyee or his dependent or his benificiary 
shall be pqyable; and 
(iii) u;here the continuous emplqyment began at a~lJ time bifore the comme1lcement rf this AC0 
that emplqyment shall be deemed, for the purposes rf this section, to have begun at the 
commencement rf this Act. 
(2) For the purposes rf calculating the Se!Jerance benifit pqyable in accordance with this section-
(a) in subsection (1)- (i) 'month', in relation to the first 60 months rf 
continuous emplqyment , means a complete month and, ill relation to 
C07lti1lUOUS employment thereqfter, meallS a complete month or a1!J 
fraction thereof; and 
(zz) 'basic pqy'means the basic pqy pqyable to the emplqyee at the 
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time of the termi'(lation of the contract of emplqyment; and 
(b) ivhere, at.the time of the termination of the contract of emplqyment, 
a'!} leave is due to the emplqyee or he has a1!y other right of absence 
under this Act, the period of that leave or other right of absence shall 
be deemed to be part of his period of continuous emplqyment. " 
The Court also set out the rate prescribed for a severance benefit as contained in 
Regulation 2 A of the Employment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations, 
published in the Government Gazette on 20 November 1992. The regulation 
provides as follows: 
2A " For the putposes of section 28 (1) of the Act the severance bentjit to be paid 011 the 
termination of a contract of emplqymcnt shall be at the rate of one dqys' basic pqy i11 respect of 
each of the first 60 months of continuous emplqyment and two days basic pqy in respect of each 
additional month of continuous mplqymmt: 
The Court interpreted subsection 28 (1) and its provisos as stipulating, that 
severance benefit is not only payable on the termination of a contract of 
employment, but is also payable at the con.c1usion of each period of 60 
months continuous service with the same employer. (emphasis mine). The 
Court also analyzed subsection 28 (2) (a) (i) and found that the legislature had 
made provision for two separate situations. In the first instance, the first period 
of 5 years a 'month' means a complete month, which means that for an employee 
to qualify for his first severance benefit he must have 60 complete months of 
continuous employment. Secondly in relation to further periods thereafter, the 
Court found that a 'month' means a complete month or any fraction thereof. The 
Court found that this clearly indicated that 'a second or further period need 
'not be 60 complete months' (emphasis mine). The Court accordingly held that 
the Applicants were entitled to a further pro rata severance benefit for every 
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additional month and any fraction of a month of continuous employment after 
their first 60 months of contjnuous employment. 
Commentary 
The decision was of major significance in that it set out the procedure to be 
followed in the calculation of severance pay. Even more importantly it established 
the principle that severance pay is payable at the conclusion of every 60 months 
service and further that severance pay could be calculated on a pro rata basis. 
1.6 Botswana Diamond Sorters Valuators Union v Botswana Diamond 
Valuing Company Ie # 213/2001 
The Applicants in the matter, BDVC Union went on strike at the Respondents 
premises between the 14th of Augustuntll the 17th of August, 2001. On the 17th of 
August the Applicants brought an urgent application before the Industrial Court 
requesting the Court to issue a rule . in the following terms; 
(1) Declaring that the sit-in and mass gathering and/or work stoppage ('the 
Industrial Action') by the Appkant held on Tuesday the 14th August, 2001 is not 
in breach of the provisions of the Trade Disputes Act (Cap. 48:02) and is 
therefore not illegal and/ or unlawful; 
(2) Interdicting and restraining the Respondent from dismiss.ing Applicant's 
members who are embarking on lawful industrial action; 
(3) That the order set out in the (above) paragraphs ... operate as an interim 




The Court in granting the rule nisi, made a preliminary finding that the 
Respondent's business was not an essential service in ·terms of the Trade 
Disputes Act. The Court also found that the 'strike action embarked on by the 
Applicants members on the 14, 15, 16 and 17 August, 2001 at the Respondents 
premises was for the purpose of furthering a trade dispute, namely a grievance 
regarding the 2001 wage increases, which falls within paragraph (b) of the 
definition of 'trade dispute' in section 2 of the Trade Disputes Act.' Consequently 
the Court found the strike action to be a lawful strike. On the 19th August, 2001, 
the Court directed that the rule nisi issued on the 15th August, 2001 be 
discharged. The Court found that the parties had not made sufficient attempt to 
reach agreement regarding the said 2001 wage increases. The Court therefore, 
found the strike action embarked upon by the j\pplicants' members to have been 
premature and non-functional and accordingly declared the strike action unlawful. 
The Court also directed, in terms of section 20 (2) of the Trade Disputes Act, 
that the dispute be remitted to the parties for purposes of enabling the parties to, . 
'engage in proper, constructive and meaningful collective bargaining 
(emphasis mine) regarding the said 2001 wage increases'. The Court further 
directed tlnt; 
• In the event of the parties not reaching agreement on the said 
dispute, they are hereby directed and ordered to refer the said dispute 
to the Commissioner Labour for mediation in terms of section 5 
(1) of the Trade Disputes Act; 
• During the said collective bargaining and pending the Commissioner 




(a) The Respondent is hereby directed and ordered not to take 
any disciplinary action against the Applicant's members 
regarding the said strike action; 
(b) The Applicant's members in the employ of the 
. Respondent are hereby directed and ordered not to embark 
on any industrial action. 
This decision of the Industrial Court is significant for the following reasons; 
• It illustrates the power of the Court regarding its ability to declare 
strike action illegal; 
• It illustrates the Courts' high regard for the collective bargaining 
process. The decision also reflects the 'non-interventionist' approach 
adopted by the Court with regard to the collective bargaining 
process; 
• It emphasizes the Courts' support of conciliatory and mediatory 
processes. 
The deCIsion is likely to be well received by employers who have tended to view 
the Industrial Court as an institution that is biased towards workers and unions. 
The decision may also influence the unions to take the collective bargaining 
process more seriously and to refrain from bringing 'premature or frivolous' 
actions before the Court. 
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2. Conclusion 
To a certain extent, the decisions of the Industrial Court reflect the uncertainty 
and anomalies of the legislature as set out previously in chapter four of the study. 
As previously stated, the legislative amendments made between 1992 and 1998, 
have generally empowered the Court to function more effectively as is evidenced 
by the rapidly increasing cases refle~ted in Table 3. In general, the Court can be 
seen to have established itself, through its decisions, as a Court of equity and 
fairness. 
Certain trends and guidelines have emerged from the Industrial Court decisions. 
Of particular importance are the following guidelines relating to employment 
practices; 
Dismissal and Discipline 
• An employer should ensure that they have dismissal and diSCiplinary 
procedures that are fair and adhered to. 
• Disciplinary measures should provide for written warnmgs and 
should adhere to the audi aLteram partam rule by allowing an employee 
to be made aware of any impending action against him/her and be 
given ample opportunity to state their case and be represented. 
• On managerial prerogative-The Court has clearly not supported the 
idea of unlimited or unbridled managerial prerogative. The Court has 
also, in its decisions, rejected unilateral decision-making that affects 
the rights and interests of employees. Decisions of the Court have 
emphasized the need for management to consult with employees or 
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their chosen representatives before taking any action(s) that may 
affect them. 
• On retrenchment- The Court has on numerous occasions stated that 
retrenchment procedures should be fair and consistently adhered to. 
F3;ilure to adhere to the said principles, even where there is good 
cause, will result in the retrenchment being held procedurally unfair. 
The Court has also shown that it will not tolerate employers who use 
retrenchment as a 'guise' to remove certain 'unwanted employees'. 
The Court has also shown that it will not tolerate employers who 
unfairly dismiss or 'retrench' employees in a bid to avoid payment of 
severance benefits. 
• On collective bargaining- The Court has sent a clear message that it 
supports the collective bargaining process, and will therefore not 
intervene prematurely 
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Chapter Seven: Perceptions of the Industrial Court 
A. Introduction 
This chapter sets out the views and attitudes expressed by a particular sample of 
interviewees listed in Appendix A towards the Industrial Court. The format of 
the interview schedule is set out and followed by the responses of interviewees 
according to their individual grouping.1 
B. Interview Schedule & Responses 
Question 1. 
1. Industrial Court Rules & Procedure 
The ILO has stated that an effective dispute resolution system must be speedy 
and efficient. Please comment on the Botswana Industrial Court procedures 
having specific regard to the following; 
1.1 Complexity- Are the rules and procedures user friendly? Are the rules 
practical and informal whilst allowing each party to fully state its case and 
explain fully its position in the dispute? 
1 Refer to Chapter One at 2.7 with regard to the following methodology; 
• construction of interview schedule; 
• structure of interview schedule; 
• choice of interviewees. 
See also: Chapter One at 3., on the limitations of the report 
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1.2 Timeliness 
1.3 Technical arguments/legal representation- Many of the arguments 
before the Court are legal argUments. What is your view on technical 
arguments that result in long delays? 
1.4 Costs 
Academics 
(a) Complexity- All of the academics felt that the rules were both informal and 
user-friendly. Most felt that the rules addressed the needs of the parties. One 
academic felt that the rules were 'almost moving towards the cumbersome 
and technical side'. He emphasized the need for simplicity and felt that the 
rules should leave room for discretionary functions. 
(b) Timeliness- All the academics felt that the time limitations were 
accommodating enough, more especially since the Court has the discretion 
to condone late applications. One academic emphasized that the Court 
should not be under any pressure to conclude a matter. 
(c) Technical arguments- All of the academics felt that technical arguments 
cannot be avoided for the simple reason that the Court has to deal with the 
interpretation of statutes. One academic stressed that while the Court should 
not be bogged down by technicalities, the Court should also create room for 
lawyers to com.e in and offer expert advice. 
(d) Costs- All academics lauded the Industrial Courts approach to costs in that 
most of the parties seeking redress from the Court had been unfairly 
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dismissed and consequently were not able to' bear any additional financial 
costs. 
Labour Lawyers 
(a) Complexity- All of the labour lawyers felt that the rules were user-friendly. 
All felt that the rules were relatively simplistic and much Jess formalistic than 
the High Court Rules. The lawyers lauded the Courts approach as being 
extremely informal and noted several instances where the Court did not 
confine itself to the pleadings before it and often sought further details not 
included in statements of case. One labour lawyer expressed the view that 
the Industrial Court Rules should be given Rule status so as to give the Court 
sufficient power for enforcement. . 
(b) Timeliness- All the labour lawyers felt that the Industrial Court had a 
'distinguished culture of time-keeping' which ultimately helps in 'speeding up 
the resolution of cases'. All agreed that matters before the Industrial Court 
were concluded in considerably less time than matters before the High 
Court. All labour lawyers, however felt that there was room for 
improvement. One lawyer suggested that delays in the handing down of 
judgments in the Industrial Court could further be reduced by the reduction 
of the judges workloads and sitting time. Another lawyer suggested that 
many attorneys take advantage of the Courts liberalism in condoning late 
applications. It was suggested that tf1e Court exercise a more strict approach 
in condoning late filing, especially with regard to Respondent statements of 
defence. A suggested approach was that the Court only condone late filing in 
'compellingly exceptional circumstances '. 
(c) Technical arguments- All labour lawyers felt that technical arguments were 
inevitable in that the Industrial Court is a court of equity and law. All agreed 
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that legal representation should be allowed as it enriches the jurisprudence of 
the Court and helps the Court reach a final decision. One lawyer, however 
submitted that there are' certain absurd technical points that are raised. He 
further submitted that a proviso should be drafted to prevent the submission 
of 'frivolous and vexatious' submissions. 
(d) Costs- All the labour I~"vyers acknowledged that the Court had established a 
general precedent of not awarding costs. Sixty six percent of the lawyers 
agreed with the Courts present approach and felt that costs should be 
awarded where there was a 'patent abuse of the court process'. The 
remaining thirty-three per cent, felt that the Court needs to be more robust 
in its attitude to awarding costs so as to restrict the number of 'unnecessary 
cases' coming before the Court. This particular group felt that many of the 
cases that come before the Court would not if there was a 'cost consequence' 
Management Personnel 
(a) Complexity- All the management personnel were of the opinion that the 
Industnal Court procedures were simple to use and user friendly. One of the 
employer officers recommended that the rules be interpreted into one or 
more of the indigenous languages of the country to make them more w;er-
I 
friendly. 
(b) Timeliness-All members of management felt that the matters were 
concluded in the Industrial Court within a 'reasonable' time frame. 
(c) Technical arguments-All management officers expressed the vIew that 
technical arguments before the Court did not result in unnecessarily long 
delays. One of the officers emphasized that the Court dealt with any 
technical arguments that arose before it as expeditiously as possible. 
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(d) Costs- All the management officers felt that any costs incurred at the 
Industrial Court were 'manageable'. 
Trade Unlonists*2 
(a) Complexity- All trade unionists expressed satisfaction with the establishment 
of the Industrial Court and its procedures. They used the High Court as their 
basis of comparison and felt that the Industrial Court was much less formal. 
In their opinion the Industrial Court was 'doing its job'. The N.ALCGPWU, 
in particular felt that the ordinary c04rts had not been particularly helpful in 
providing its members with the relief sought and therefore welcomed the 
Industrial Court with its specialized knowledge oflabour law and procedures. 
(b) Timeliness- All the trade unionists felt that the Court was not expeditious 
enough in handing out its written judgments. Most felt that this was due to 
the shortage of Judges and Industrial Court professional staff in .general. 
Trade U~ionjsts felt that the appointment of more judges would be helpful. 
They further emphasized that it was important that appointed judges be 
acquainted and familiar with labour law. 
(c) Technical arguments- Most of the trade unionists felt that technical 
arguments could not be avoided since the 'concept of democracy allQws for 
legal representation'. The BFTU, however argues that many of the 
arguments before .the Court that are technical 10 nature require legal 
representation.3 The Union further argued that 10 most instances, the 
employee cannot afford such representation, whereas most employers can. 
2 * Please note that the responses submitted by the umon are largely representative of one Union, namely 
NALCGWU. All attempts to illicit responses from other unions proved futile. 
3 Briscoe A, op. cit. at 30 
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The Union maintains that this ultimately gives the employer an unfair 
advantage over the employee.4 
(d) Costs- All trade unionists w.ere satisfied with the Courts approach in 
awarding costs. They further expressed satisfaction with the fact that any 
individual can appear before the Industrial Court and get relief. In their 
opinion justice before the Ie was both inexpensIve and accessible. 
Question 2-Industrial Courts Jurisdiction & Status 
2. Please comment on the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court with specific regard 
to the following; 
2.1 Exclusive jurisdiction- What is your viewpoint on the dual jurisdiction 
exercised by the ordinary courts and the Industrial Court? 
2.2 Disputes of right/ Disputes of interest- The Trade Disputes 
(Amendment) Act is silent on the question of whether the Court should 
deal with disputes of interest. Should the Court be empowered to deal 
with disputes of interest? 
2.3 Awards/ Compensation 
Academics 
(a) Exclusive jurisdiction- Labour academics disagreed on the question of the 
dual jurisdiction exercised by the ordinary courts and the Industrial Court. 
The majority felt that it was appropriate, more especially since the Industrial 
4 Ibid at 30 
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Courts power to award compensation was limited. The remaining individual 
felt that the purpose of the Industrial Courts existence was being defeated. 
(b) Disputes of right/Disputes of interest- All labour academics felt that the 
Industrial Court should be empowered to deal with disputes of interest. 
(c) Awards/ Compensation- Fifty per cent of labour academics were satisfied 
with the awards given by the Court, whilst the remaining fifty per cent, felt 
that the restrictions placed on the Court by section 24 of the 1992 Trade 
Disputes (Amendment) Act were unreasonable. Most felt that the six 
months maximum award restriction was unreasonable and most advocated 
for the removal of the restriction. All academics submitted that there must 
be a reasonable (emphasis mine) limitation. 
Labour Lawyers 
(a) Exclusive jurisdiction- All the labour lawyers felt that the Industrial Court 
should be given 'exclusive jurisdiction' in labour matters since it is a 
specialized court with more 'streamlined and user-friendly procedures'. All 
of the lawyers felt that the Industrial Court has established a culture of equity 
which includes incorporating ILO Conventions and established labour 
relations principles. Lawyers also expressed concern that the dual jurisdiction 
currently being exercised, has the effect of providing for two different 
streams of labour law judgments and further runs the 'risk of conflicting 
decisions'. This is particularly so, since the ordinary courts tend not to use 
equitable principles used by the Industrial Court. The lawyers further 
submitted that a lot of uncertainty will be created if the two forums are 
allowed to 'pronounce differently and emphasize differently'. Ultimately this 
will hamper the development, of law. The lawyers maintained that in the 
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interests of consistency, certainty, and development of law, the Industrial 
Court must be given exclusive jurisdiction. 
One of the labour lawyers further submitted that labour law cannot be 
separated from constitutional law. He maintains that freedom of association 
rights overlap with constitutional issues. Consequently, he suggested that the 
Industrial Court be g-iven concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court on 
constitutional issues. 
(b) Disputes of right/ Disputes of interest- On this issue, lab,?ur lawyers were 
divided. Most felt that the Court should not determine pay increases. This 
group of lawyers felt that such disputes should be left to the parties to 
resolve through either alternative dispute resolution procedure, or where 
necessary, through industrial action. The remaining individual felt that the 
Court should be empowered to deal with disputes of interest only if judicial 
officers have been afforded the necessary training. In his view, the evaluation 
of expert evidence regarding wages requires sound knowledge of financial 
and economic issues. 
(c) Awards/Compensation- All labour lawyers agreed that the six months 
maximum award given to the Court under section 24 of the TDA was far 
too restrictive. Different opinions were expressed on the appropriate amount 
to be awarded. One lawyer was concerned that the Industrial Court should 
not be viewed by employees as a 'cash cow' and therefore suggested a 12 
months salary maximum. Another lawyer suggested a 24 months ceiling, 
similar to the one established under the SA LRA It was further suggested 
that the Court be given the power to award damages (ie general and specific 
damages). All lawyers emphasized that in making an award, the court must 
take relevant circumstances into account. 
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Management Personnel 
(a) Exclusive jurisdiction- All management officers emphatically stated that the 
Industrial Court should be given exclusive jurisdiction to deal with labour 
matters as it is a specialist Court. Management officers shared the view that 
the ordinary courts were not 'particularly familiar' with labour matters. 
(b) Disputes of right/ Disputes of interest-Only one management officer felt 
that the Industrial Court should be empowered to deal with disputes of right 
and interest. 
(c) Awards/Compensation- All the management officers felt that the six month 
maximum compensation awarded to the Court was sufficient, 
Trade Unionists 
(a) Exclusive jurisdiction- The trade unionists also felt that the Industrial Court 
should have exclusive jurisdiction. NALCGPWU made a submission to the 
Parliamentary Committee to advocate for the Industrial Court to be given 
exclusive jurisdiction. In its submission before the Parliamentary 
Committee, the Union argued that the dual jurisdiction currently being 
exercised by the Courts is resulting in confusion and forum shopping, 
whereby litigants can choose whether to got to the High Court or the 
Industrial Court. The Union accordingly requested that the Industrial Court 
as a Court of 'equity be given exclusive jurisdiction. The union further 
advocated for the establishment ofa Labour Court of Appeal. 
(b) Disputes of right/ Disputes of interest - All of the trade unionists were of 
the view that the Industrial Court should be empowered to deal with 
disputes of interest, espeeially where there seems to be an injustice. 
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(c) Awards/Compensation- %ilst most of the trade unionists expressed 
satisfaction with most of the awards given by the Court, many felt that the 
six month restriction imposed on the Court was too little. All of the trade 
unionists expressed a desire to see an increase in the Courts discretion to 
award compensation. 
3. Status of the Industrial Court 
Question three 
Please Comment on the status of the Industrial Court vis-a vis that of the High 
Court: 
Academics 
Status of the IC- None of the academics were satisfied with the status of the 
Indust~ial Court as it presently exists. All of tile academics expressed the view 
that the Ie's status should be enhanced to enable it to have full powers to 
function properly. One of the academics suggested tl1at the Industrial Court 
should be able to rule on constitutional issues. Another academic recommended 
that the Industrial Court should exist as a specialized branch/division of the 
High Court that deals only with trade disputes.' 
Labour lawyers 
Status of the IC- All of the labour lawyers fully supported the upcommg 
referendum on the status of tile Industrial Court. 
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Status of the IC- All the management officers expressed a desire to see the , 
Industrial Court being given the same status as '~he High Court. One officer in 
particular, felt that the Industrial Courts inferior',status was partly attributable to 
the fact that the Court fell within the mandate of the Ministry of Labour and 
Home Affairs. 
Trade Unions 
Status of the Industrial Court- All-the trade unionists expressed a desire to see 
the Industrial Court being on par with the High Court. NALCGPWU in 
particular, stated that they will be embarking on a campaign to educate their 
workers on the upcoming referendum to be held on October 6, 2001 on the 
status of the Ie. The Union also stated that they will also advocate for that their 
members vote for the referendum to be passed. 
4. Collective Bargaining Process 
Question 4 
4.1 How would you describe the Industrial Courts' role in the collective 
bargaining process? Would you say it was interventionist in nature or 
not? 
4.2 Does the existence of the Industrial Court have any effect on the 




(a) All of the academics felt that the IC was non-interventionist in nature. One 
of the academics emphasized that the Court must tulfill its adjudicatory role 
and in so doing must act as a facilitator. The Court should therefore act as an 
'overseer providing assistance to the parties'. Any intervention by the Court 
should be minimal. 
(b) All of the academics felt that the mere existence of the Court promoted fair 
and voluntary settlement. Parties were often more prone to settling because 
they realized that their position may be challenged in the Ie. 
Labour lawyers 
(a) None of the labour lawyers were of the view that the IC role in the collective 
bargaining process was interventionist in nature. One of the lawyers 
expressed the view that the contribution of the IC lies in its pronouncements 
which have given trade unions some leverage in the collective bargaining 
process. Some of the IC's judgments defined issues of 'consultation and 
negotiation' and in so doing extended the parameters of the collective 
bargaining process. 
(b) All the labour lawyers answered the question in the affirmative. Some of the 
labour la\vyers expressed the view that the IC has provided a wealth of 
jurisprudence and case law. This in turn means that a properly advised union 
and employer organization are more likely to settle. One la\vyer expressed 
the view that settlement may sometimes occur for the wrong reasons, ie, an 
employer may decide to settle for financial reasons. It was also suggested that 
the existence of the Court has encouraged settlement in the cases of illegal 
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strikes where applications for interdicts were issued. It is maintained that this 
action by the Court has tended to concentrate the minds of the parties. 
Management Personnel 
(a) All management officers expressed the view that the Industrial Court was 
largely non-interventionist in nature. 
(b) All management officers felt thatt~e Industrial Courts existence encouraged 
voluntary settlement. 
Trade Unions 
(a) All of the trade unions were of the view that the Court was largely non-
interventionist in its approach to the collective bargaining process. 
(b) All of the trade unions felt that the mere existence of the IC facilitated 
voluntary settlement as employers now knew that employees had a proper 
forum for relief. 
5. Usage of the Industrial Court 
Question 5 
Please give your viewpoint regarding the usage of the Court by; 
5.1 Unions 
5.2 Employers/Management 
5.3 Do you think the Court enjoys widespread legitimacy? 
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Academics 
(a) All the academics felt that the Unions are using the Court more and more as 
they realize that they have a place to take their disputes. 
(b) All the academics expressed the view that employers showed an initial 
reluctance to use the Court. Most of the academics, however felt that the IC 
was beginning to have an impact even on employers. 
(c) The academics felt that the Court is beginning to enloy widespread 
legitimacy. One of the academics stated that the governments initial efforts 
to establish the Court were half-hearted and resulted in a hampering of its 
initial growth. All the academics expressed the view that the Court 
particularly enjoyed widespread legitimacy amongst dismissed employees and 
aggrieved trade unions. 
Labour Lawyers 
(a) All of the labour la\Nyers agreed that the Unions are beginning to use the IC 
much more. One of the lawyers expressed the view that in the early days of 
the Courts establishment, many of the unions' applications before the Court 
failed due to the legal and technical problems of the Trade Disputes 
(Amendment) Act. Consequently, the unions may have formed a false 
perception that the Court was biased towards the employers. All of the 
lawyers agree that the Industrial Court is presently much more favoured by 
the Unions than the High Court for reasons of its relative informality, speed 
and cost effectiveness. The Courts reference to ILO Conventions has also 
inspired confidence in Unions. One of the lawyers stated that in general, 
unions tend to approach the Court over the more complex issues. Where the 
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matter is stFaight~orward, the unions do not usually bother to access the 
Court. 
(b) All of. the labour lawyers felt tha~ employers are still to a large extent, 
uncomfortable with the equity jurisdiction of the Industrial Court. 
Employers tend to use the Court widely for dealing with matters involving 
industrial action. Apart from that employers normally participate in the court 
process as Respondents. 
(c) All of the labour lav,,-yers felt that the Ie enjoyed widespread legitimacy 
amongst employees and the unions. Employers, however, seemed to still 
carry certain reservations with regard to the Courts legitimacy. One of the 
lawyers emphasized that the medium to small businesses felt 'bewildered and 
besieged' and felt that the Industrial Courts approach was 'unrealistic and 
uncommercial'. Many of the employers ~lso feel that they have been 
'bushwacked' by the introduction of procedures that do not appear in the 
Employment Act and can only be found in judgments that they are not 
equipped to disseminate. 
Management Personnel 
(a) All the management officers were of the view that Unions were beginning to 
use the Industrial Court more. 
(b) All of the management officers also agreed that employer usage of the Court 
was minimaL 
(c) Sixty-six per cent 'of management officers felt that the court enjoyed 
widespread legitimacy. One of the officers, however qualified his answer to say 
that the legitimacy was only widespread, in so far as it pertained to the urban 
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areas. The said officer was of the view that the Court did not enjoy the same 
legitimacy in the remote and rural areas of the country. The remaining officer felt 
that the Court only enjoyed a certain limited measure of legitimacy. 
Trade Unions 
(a) The trade unions admitted to not having used the Industrial Court very well 
until recently. Most of the trade unionists stated that they started to use the 
Court a lot in the year 2000. All of the trade unionists stated that they are 
now committed to sensitizing workers on the usage of the Court as it is the 
only 'genuine' forum for trade disputes. 
(b) Trade unionists state tllat the usage of the Court by employers has declined 
since employers realized that the IC was a court of fairness and equity 
(c) All the trade unionists felt that tile Industrial Court was a credible institution. 
They also felt that the Court was beginning to gain credibility in the sight of 
employers' .as they were now beginning to sensitize their enterprise~. on fair 
employment practices. 
6. Impact of the Industrial Court 
Question six 
How do you think the Industrial Court decisions have affected management 
practices with specific regard to; 
6.1 Awareness of fair labour practices 
6.2 Implementation ofIndustrial Court decisions regarding fair labour practices 
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6.3 Managerial prerogative 
6.4 Management practice~ in general 
Academics 
(a) Awareness- The academics were divided on the issue of awareness of fair 
labour practices. Sixty six per cent felt that the IC had greatly influenced and 
enhanced awareness of fair labour p~actices, whilst the remaining academic 
felt that there was room for improv~ment. 
(b) Implementftion- The academics expressed the same view as in 6(a) above. 
(c) Managerial Prerogative- Whilst all the academics felt that the 'managerial 
prerogative' of employers had been limited somewhat, they also expressed 
the view that employers were still free to enjoy a substantial amount of 
managerial prerogative. 
(d) Management practices- All the academics were of the view that the IC has 
affected management practices positively. 
Labour Lawyers 
(a) Awareness- Most of the labour lawyers felt that the Industrial Court 
decisions have 'revolutionized the industrial relations climate'. One of the 
lawyers, however felt that there was insufficient awareness amongst the 
smaller businesses. 
(b) Implementation- The lawyers expressed the general view that most people 
comply with the decisions of the Court. They stated that the parties 
(employers in particular) seemed to respect the opinion of the Court, 
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whereas they do not show any regard for labour and their attempts 
at conciliation and mediation. One lawyer ~gain eXl)teSSe~a the view that 
implementation of IC decisions is more common in larger organizations as 
they tend to be more aware of procedures to be followed. 
(c) Managerial Prerogative- All the labour lawyers were of the V1ew that 
employers feel that their managerial prerogative is being eroded. 
(d) Management Practices- All labour ~awyers that the Industrial Court 
decisions have had some positive impact on management practices. 
Management Personnel 
(a) Awareness- All of the management officers expressed the view that only the 
individuals and companies that subscribed to Industrial Court Judgments 
were aware of fair labour practices. 
(b) Implementation- All the management officers expressed the same view as in 
(a) above. 
(c) Managerial Prerogative- All the management officers expressed the view that 
whilst the Industrial Court decisions had 'curtailed' managerial prerogative, it had 
also contributed to the formulation of implementation of 'fair management 
practices'. 
Cd) Management Practices- Al of the management personnel felt that the 
Industrial Court has had a positive on management practices in general. 
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Trade Unionists 
(a) Awareness- All the trade unionists felt that the IC decisions had brought 
about a measure of awareness of fair labour practices. 
(b) Implementation- All trade unionist stated that employers, in particulflr were 
beginning to appreciate the need to implement the decisions of the Court 
(c) All trade unionists stated that until the establishment of the Industrial Court, 
employers had enjoyed absolute managerial prerogative as it existed under 
the old "master/servant' relationship. They also expressed the view that the 
Industrial Court decisions are viewed by employers as an encroachment of 
their managerial prerogative. 
(d) All the trade unionists felt that the Industrial Court decisions have had a 
positive impact on management practices. 
7. Attitudes of the Court 
Question 7 
7.1 Comment on the Employers attitudes to the Industrial Court 
7.2 Have you observed any real perceived changes in management practices 
or policies since the establishment of the Court? 
7.3 Comment on the Union attitudes to the Industrial Court 
7.4 Have you observed any changes In, unton attitudes Since the 
establishment of the Court? 
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Academics 
(a) & (b)- Employer attitudes- The academics felt that the employer were 
initially hostile to the Industrial Court and its decisions. There have, 
however been changes with indications that employers are becoming 
more accepting of the Court and it decisions. 
(b) & (d) Union attitudes- All of the academics agreed that in general the 
Unions are satisfied with the establishment of the Industrial Court and 
view the Court as an institutiort 'which fights for worker rights'. One 
academic expressed the view that the. Unions feel the Court is still 
conservative and as such would like see tlte Court adopt a more 'radical' 
approach. 
Labour lawyers 
(a) & (b)- Employer attitudes- labour la\,vyers felt that most employers 
are aware of employment reguirements but still feel uncomfortable with 
the loss of managerial prerogative. One la\vyer in particular, expressed the 
view that employers now seek opinions before implementing 
employment policies. He stated further that, most of the conditions of 
service currently utilized in companies, reflect almost all of the principles 
enunciated in the Industrial Court judgments. 
(b) & (d) Union attitudes- All of the labour lawyers felt that the Unions were 
satisfied with the decisions and awards of the Court. One labour lawyer, 
however observed that Unions still tend to breach recognition 
agreements particularly with regard to industrial action. 
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Management Personnel 
(a) & (b) Employer attitudes- All of the management officers felt that 
employers were aware of the correct procedures to be followed but were 
still loathe to follow the said procedures. One of the officers maintained 
that employers felt that the Court was largely biased towards employees. 
(b) & (d) All of the management of6cers expressed the view that the Unions 
were satisfied with the establishment of the Court and the 
pronouncements of the Court. 
Trade Unionists 
(a) & (b)- Employer attitudes- Trade unionists stated that the Industrial 
Court decisions have brought about a complete change in employer 
attitudes and management practices. According to the trade unionists, 
company policies are now being amended. on the basis of IC judgments. 
(b) & (d)- Union attitudes- The trade unionists agreed that they had been 
slow to approach and fully utilize the Industrial Court. They have since 
wholeheartedly expressed appreciation 'of the institution and have 
pledged to make full use of the Court in future. 
8. Positiv,: & Negative Aspects/Features of the Industrial Court 
Question eight 
8.1 What are the positive aspects of the Industrial Court? 
8.2 What are the negative aspects of the Industrial Court? 
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The responses given by the different categories of interviewees were very 
similar. Consequently the answers have been combined as follows; 
(a) Positive Aspects 
• the Industrial Court of\ers employees easier and cheap access to law 
and remedies; 
• the Industrial Court deals with cases expeditiously; 
• the Industrial Court offers fairness and justice; 
• the Industrial Court is extre~e1y user-friendly; 
• the Industrial Court has 'revolutionized the industrial relations 
landscape'; 
• the Industrial Court has contributed to the settlement of disputes 
before they come to Court; 
9 Negative A.spects 
• the. Industrial Courts restricted cost jurisdiction; 
• the Industrial Courts equity jurisdiction must be implicitly stated; 
• the narrow jurisdiction of the Industrial Court in general; 
• the insufficient powers of the Industrial Court; 
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• the relative informality of the Industrial Court means that many legal 
practitioners do not accord the Court the status and respect that they 
should; 
• the Industrial Courts effectiveness is 'hampered by badly drafted/ 
amended and outdated legislation'; 
• the Industrial Courts apparent 'lack of consistency' as between 
judges on similar issues; 
• Individuals appointed as Judges of the Industrial Court should have 
specialized labour law knowledge and expertise; 
• the Industrial Courts lack of financial resources; 
• the Industr:~al Courts lack of manpower resources, specifically with 
regard to the professional staff (Judges and Registrar(s) ); 
• the Registrars' office should. be strengthened to facilitate the 
resolution of disputes through conciliation and mediation; 
• the Industrial Court needs to be more proactive 10 nature and 
sensitize the public on the role of the Court through conducting 
workshops and seminars; 
• the bureaucratic restrictions placed on the Industrial Court as a result 
. . 




The interviewees appear to share identical opinions on many of the issues. Some 
of the issues raised are curr~ntly being addressed by way of proposed legislative 
intervention whilst other issues still remain problematic 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion- An Assessment of the Industrial Courts 
Contribution to Labour Relations 
1 Introduction 
During the time of the establishment the South African Industrial Court, 
P.A. K Le Roux remarked that" the potential pOJPer of the Court, through its development of 
the COl1Cept of the u1!/air labour practice, to cha11ge al1d. affect the whole rystBm of industrial 
relatiolls in South Africa ... .is quite clear'~ 1 There can be no doubt that the Industrial 
Court played a major role in transforming industrial relations in South Africa. In a 
similar vein, the Industrial Court in Botswana is having a substantial impact on 
labour relations in Botswana. 
2. Final Conclusion 
The Industrial Court of Botswana has, without doubt, played a pivotal role in 
the area of labour relations in Botswana. The Court has provided a forum in 
which employees are able to exercise their rights and has developed extensive 
guidelines and principles for fair employment practices. It is also evident that the 
decisions of the Industrial Court have made it compulsory for employers to 
rethink their previous employment practices. Managerial prerogative has been 
severely curtailed and employers are being called upon to ensure that their 
employment practices are fair, known to the employees and consistently adhered 
to. 
The Industrial Court appears to be accomplishing what the legislation has failed 
to do, namely bring about progressive and positive change in the labour relations 
field. Although the existing labour legislation provided a 'framework' within 
1 Le Roux P.A.K., Developing a System oflndtlstrial ReiatiOlls LalPJor South Africa: The Role of the lndtlstrial COllr!.;, 
South African Journal of Labour Relations, Vol. 4, No. 3& 4 (1980) :28 
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which employment rights could be attained or ~ccessed, much of the actual 
v"'~UF;" that has occurred appears to have been instigated by the Court. The Court 
has also brought a certain element of clarity in the face of badly drafted and 
complicated legislation. It has significantly simplified complicated procedures 
relating to strike action and severance pay, to name but a few. Many companies 
have since taken the IC judgments and incorporated them holistically into their 
employment policies. 
The decisions of the Court have not only wrought a substantial and positive 
change in the area of employment practices, but have also affected the collective 
bargaming process. Through its decisions, the Court has clearly supported the 
collective bargaining process by favouring.continued negotiation where necessary. 
In addition, the Court has not intervened in any collective bargaining process 
unless asked by one of the parties to promote or facilitate a voluntary settlement 
or unless a dispute arising from a collective bargaining process is referred to the 
Court by one of the parties. The general approach of the' Court has been to 
promote the Court as a forum of ' last resort'. This certainly conforms to the best 
practice benchmark that seeks negotiated compromise over enforced remedies. 
The Court has also supported the conciliatory and mediatory functions at the 
level of the Department of Labour thereby emphasizing its commitment towards 
seeking consensus-based solutions over imposed solutions. 
The Court has, by virtue of its existence; tended to promote voluntary settlement 
of disputes. The mere 'threat ' of court action seems to have the effect of 
catapulting parties into the arena of voluntary settlement. In addition, the Court 
has attempted, whenever possible, to promote settlement of disputes through 
holding pre-hearing conferences. This approach helps the Court to identify and 
narrow the issues at hand and consequently appears to be an important factor in 
helping the Court to its case load effectively. The Court is to be 
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commended for glVtng consideration to 'integrating conciliation and 
adjudication'. 
Individual dismissals account for the majority of cases before the Industrial 
Court. Most individuals are self-represented, with union officials generally failing 
to appear in Court to represent their members. Unions have, until recently, 
referred only three strike action disputes to the Court. Previous observations 
made by the ILO technical assistance teams noted that the Botswana unions were 
not using the existing systems and institutional frameworks to their best 
advantage. Another significant consequence of the Industrial Court decisions, is 
that Unions are now beginning to rely on the principles and guidelines enunciated 
in the IC judgments to better orgamze tl1emselves. Unions are expressing a 
newfound desire to use the Court and its judgments to their benefit . . 
2.1 Implications for the future 
Recent studies show an increasing global trend towards ADR. Prospects of 
establishing successful ADR techniques in Botswana in the near future appear to 
be slim. This is largely because of; 
• the scarcity of private/independent mediation and arbitration 
services in Botswana; 
• the fact that the Botswana government is the largest employer in the 
country. It is unlikely that the government will submit its labour 
disputes to such private mediation service; and 
• The fact that individual dismissals account for over 90% of the 
disputes brought before the Court. Most of these individuals are not 
in a position to pay for private dispute resolution services. 
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Consequently efficient dispute resolution seems to be largely in the 
hands of the Industrial Court (for the time being). 
3. Possible Areas of Further Research 
• A study could be undertaken on the future prospects of the 
Botswana Industrial Court in strengthening labour relations in 
Botswana; 
• Research could be conducted to examine the possibility of extending 
the Courts dispute prevention functions; 
• A comprehensive comparative analysis of Industrial/Labour Court 
practices and procedures in the SADC region could be conducted to 
properly assess and evaluate the impact of the Botswana industrial 
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APPENDIX B- QUESTIONNAIRE/INTERVIEW 
Industrial Court Procedures 
1) The ILO has stated that an effective dispute resolution system must be 
efficient and speedy. Please comment on the Botswana Industrial Court 
procedures having specific regard to the following; 
Complexity; ie; Are the rules and procedures user friendly? Are the rules 
practical and informal whilst allowing each party to state its case and 
explain fully its position in the dispute? 
Timeliness 
Technical arguments- The Industrial Court is empowered to sit with 
assessors to deal with issues of fact and not law. Many of the arguments 
before the Court are legal arguments. \\!hat is your view on technical legal 
arguments that result in long delays? 
Costs 
Jurisdiction 
2) Please comment on the Industrial Court's jurisdiction with specific regard to 
the following; 
Exclusive jurisdiction- What is your viewpoint on the dual jurisdiction 
exercised by the ordinary Courts and the Industrial Court which has 
exclusive jurisdiction in trade disputes? 
178 
Disputes of right/Disputes of interest- The Trade Disputes Act is silent 
on the question of whether the Court should deal with disputes of 
interest. Should the <Sourt be empowered to deal with disputes of 
interest? 
Awards/ Compensation 
3) Please comment on the status of the Industrial Court vis-a vis that of the High 
Court. 
Collective bargaining 
4) (a) How would you describe the Industrial Cour.ts role in the collective 
bargaining process? Would you say it was interventionist in nature or not? 
(b) Does the existence of the Industrial Court have any effect on the 
collective bargaining process at all, ie; Does it facilitate/promote voluntary 
settlement? 
Usage of the Court 
5) Please give your viewpoint regarding the usage of the Court by; 
Unions 
Union Strategies; Exploitative or minimal usage of the Court by Unions 
Employers 
Employer Strategies; Exploitative or minimal usage of the Court by 
Employers 
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Do you think the Court enjoys widespread legitimacy? 
Impact of the Industrial Court 
6) How do you think the Industrial Court decisions have affected management 
practices with specific regard to the following; 
Awareness of fair labour practices 
Implementation of labollr Court decisions regarding fair labour practices 
Managerial prerogative' 
Positive or negative impact on management practices? 
7) Comment on the Employers attitudes to the Industrial Court? 
Any perceived changes in management practices/policies Since the 
establishment of the Industrial Court? 
Comment on the Unions attitudes since the establishment of the Court 
Any perceived change in union attitudes since the establishment of the 
Industrial Court? 
Positive/Negative aspects of the Industrial Court 
8) What are the positive aspects of the Industrial Court? 
9) "xx1hat are the negative aspects of the Industrial Court? 
180 
APPENDIX C - INDUSTRIAL COURT RULES 
RULES FOR THE CONDUCT OF 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE 
INDUSTRIAL COURT OF BOTSWANA 
.I 
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RULES OF THE INDUSTRIAL COURT 
(Made under the discretionary powers granted to 
the Court in terms of Section 18(6) of the Trade Disputes Act) 
PREAMBLE 
As the Trade Disputes Act, Chapter 48:02, as amended, gives this Court all the powers 
and rights set out in the Act or any other written law, for the purpose of settling trade 
disputes, and the furtherance, securing and maintenance of good industrial relations 
in Botswana (Section 17 (1» and as this Court is not bound by the rules of evidence 
and procedure in civil and criminal proceedings and may disregard any technical 
irregularity which does not and is not likely to result in a miscarriage of justice (Section 
19 (1», these Rules are therefore made to assist the Court in achieving the aforesaid 
objectives of the Act and when interpreting these Rules, the Court will have regard to 
substance rather than form (Rule 12 (4» in order to dispense substantial Justice 
between the parties. 
1. APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION 
(1) These Rules may be cited as the Rules of the Industrial Court and shall 
apply to proceedings in the Industrial Court. 
(2) These Rules shall not have the force of law and shall serve merely as 
guidelines for the conduct of proceedings in the Industrial Court. 
(3) Non-compliance with any of these Rules shall not render any proceedings 
void unless the Court, in its discretion, so directs in terms of Section 
18(6) of the Act. 
(4) In these Rules unless the context otherwise indicates, any word or 
expression to which a meaning has been assigned in the Trade Disputes 
Act, Chapter 48:02, as amended, shall bear such meaning and any 
reference to a section shall be a reference to that section in the said Act 
and 
"Act": means the Trade Disputes Act, Chapter 48:02, as amended, 
and includes any regulation made thereunder; 
means the Industrial Court contemplated in Section 17 (1) 
of the Act and includes any Judge and any Judge sitting 
with any nominated member, authorised to perform the 
functions of the Industrial Court; 
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"day": means a court day, which in tum means any day other than 
a Saturday, Sunday or public holiday, and only court days 
shall be included in the computation of any time expressed 
in days prescribed by these Rules or fixed by any order of 
court; 
"deliver": means to serve a copy of any process on each party and to 
file the original process with the Registrar; 
Unotice": means a written notice and (!notify" means to notify in . 
writing; 
Ul2.!;lrty": means a party to a trade dispute and also includes the 
representative of a party; 
!!process": means any document or fonn required to be served or filed 
in terms of these Rules or the Act; 
Upublic holiday": means a day declared by law to be a public holiday 
under the Public Holidays Act, Chapter 03:07; 
!!serve.": means to serve in accordance \vith Rule 6 and uservice" has 
a corresponding meaning. 
2. OFFICE HOURS AND ADDRESS OF THE REGISTRAR 
(1) The office of the Registrar shall be open to the public for the filing of 
process from 08:00 to 12:30 and from 14:00 to 16:00 on every other day 
than a Saturday or Sunday or public holiday: provided that the Registrar 
may in his discretion or shall when so directed by the Court, issue such 
process and accept documents for filing before or after the said official 
hours. 
(2) The address and other relevant numbers of the Registrar are as follows: 
(a) Physical address: 
Broadhurst Business Centre 
Units 4 and 5 
Plot Numbers 10210/11 
Comer Bodungwe Road and Nelson Mandela Drive 
Broadhurst Industrial Estate 
Gaborone 
{b) Postal Address: 
Private Bag BR 267 
Gaborone 
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(c) Telephone Number (267) 300565 
(d) Telefax Number (267) 300567 
3. DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE REGISTRAR 
(1) The Registrar is a person appointed in tenns of Section 17(8) of the Act 
and who is responsible for the administrative functions of the Court. 
(2) The Registrar shall perform all the duties and functions set out in the 
relevant job description under the supervision of a Judge, who is in 
charge .of that office. 
(3) The Registrar, in conjunction with the Judge President of the Industrial 
Court, shall decide for which matters fees are payable, and for such 
matters the fees, set out in the Second Schedule to the Rules of the High 
Court, shall be paid in respect of the matters to which they relate. 
4. FORJvl AND CONTENT OF PROCESS 
(1) Any trade dispute, as contemplated in Section 5 (1)(a) of the Act, which 
need not necessarily be referred to and which has not been referred to 
the Commissioner of Labour, may as soon as possible be referred by any 
party to the dispute directly to the Industrial Court for a hearing and 
determination. 
(2) Any trade dispute, as contemplated in Section 50)(a) of the Act, which 
has nevertheless been referred to the Commissioner of Labour and any 
trade dispute, as contemplated in Section 5(6) of the Act, which has to be 
referred to the Commissioner of Labour, may as soon as possible after the 
Commissioner of Labour has issued a certificate in terms of Section 7 of 
the Act, be referred to the Industrial Court for a hearing and 
determination by any party to the dispute. 
(3) A letter of referral, (Form IC.I) and where applicable, accompanied by 
the said certificate, shall be deemed to be a proper referral of such 
dispute to the Industrial Court. 
(4) Such party (the Applicant) may simultaneously with the delivery of such 
letter of referral or shall with 14 days thereafter, file with the Registrar, 
a statement of case, as near as may be in accordance with Appendix 1 to 
these Rules, and serve a copy thereof on the Respondent, which statement 
of case shall: 
(a) be signed by the party by whom it is delivered; 
6 
(b) contain in full the title of the matter, the names of the parties and 
where possible, the number assigned by the Registrar to the matter 
at the head of such statement; 
(c) contain clear and concise particulars relevant to the unresolved 
trade dispute and any further material facts on which the 
applicant relies for the relief sought; 
(d) be divided in paragraphs including subparagraphs, in respect of 
content, which paragraphs shall be consecutively numbered and 
which shall, as near as possible, each contain a distinct averment; 
(e) set out clearly the nature of the relief sought; 
(f) contain an address at which the Applicant will accept service of 
process in the proceedings; 
(g) contain a notice that if the other party (the Respondent): 
(i) intends opposing such application, he is required within 14 
days after delivery of the said statement of case, to deliver 
a reply referred to in subrule (5); 
(ii) fails to deliver such reply, a determination, including an 
order as to costs, may be made in his absence; 
(h) contain a list of books and documents relevant to the application, 
which are in the applicant's possession or under his control. 
(5) A Respondent intending to oppose the application shall within the said 
14 day period file with the Registrar, a statement of defence, as near as 
may be in accordance with Appendix 2 to these Rules and serve a copy 
thereof on the Applicant, which statement of defence shall: 
(a) set out clearly and concisely the grounds of opposition and the 
material facts relied upon in support of such grounds; 
(b) comply with all the requirements set out in subrules (4) (a), (b), 
(d), and (0; 
(c) contain a list of books and documents relevant to his opposition 
and any relief he may seek which are in the Respondent's 
possession or under his control. 
(6) A Respondent intending to counterclaim shall simultaneously with his 






(a) contain clear and concise particulars relevant to his counterclaim 
and any further material facts on which he relies for the relief 
sought, 
(b) comply with al1 the requirements set out in subrules (4) (a), (b), 
(d), (e), (f) and (Z), which will allow the Applicant 14 days within 
which to reply to the Respondent's counterclaim statement. 
The parties may not without the leave of the Court deliver any further 
statements and if no such leave is sought, the pleadings will be deemed 
to be closed 7 days after the filing of the last of the aforesaid statements. 
The facts set out in the Applicant's statement of case and in the 
Respondent's statement of defence and in his counterclaim statement 
need not be verified in an accompanying affidavit (sworn statement). 
Anv late deliver"! of a statement of case or statement of defence mav be . ~ , 
condoned by the Court on good cause shown in terms of Rule 12 (1) (a). 
Should the court direct that the documents in the Court file be indexed 
and paginated, then the provisions of Rule 7 (2) shall apply. 
5. FILING OF PROCESS FOR A HEARING 
(1) The filing of process with the Registrar shall take place by hand~ by 
registered post, by telefax or other electronically printed manner. 
(2) If any process is transmitted by telefax or other electronically printed 
manner, then the original process shall, for record purposes, be handed 
in to the Registrar or sent to him by registered post before the matter is 
set down for a hearing. 
(3) A document shall be deemed to have been filed with the Registrar on the 
date: 
(a) on which such document was handed in to the Registrar; 
(b) on which such document sent by registered post was received by 
the Registrar; 
(c) indicated on the telegram received by the Registrar; 
(d) of the completion of the whole of the transmission of the telefax 
or other electronically printed transmission. 
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6. SERVICE OF PROCESS 
(1) Subject to subrule (2) any process which is required to be served in tenns 
of these rules shall be served by the party who desires service thereof or 
served on behalf of such party by any private person or by a person 
authorised to serve process of the High Court or the Magistrates' Court: 
(a) by handing a copy thereof to the person concerned personally; 
(b) by leaving at the place of residence or business of the person 
concerned a copy thereof with the person apparently in charge of 
the premises at the time of deli very being a person who is 
apparently not less than 16 years of age: provided that where a 
building other than a hotel, boarding house, hostel or similar 
place of residence is occupied by more than one person or family, 
!fplace of residence" for the pUrpOSe of this paragraph means that 
portion of the building occupied by the person on whom service 
is to be effected; 
(c) by leaving at the place of employment of the person concerned a 
copy thereof with any person who is apparently not less than 16 
years of age and who is apparently in authority over the person 
concerned; 
(d) if the person concerned has chosen a domiciJium citandi (an 
address for service of process), by leaving a copy thereof at such 
address; 
(e) in the case of a company or other juristic person, by handing a 
copy thereof to a responsible employee of such a company or other 
juristic person at its registered office or its principal place of 
business within Botswana, or its main place of business within the 
district in which the dispute first arose, or, if there is authorised 
by its constitution to defeno such employee willing to accept 
service, by affi.."'Cing a copy to the main door of such office or place 
of business; 
(f) by handing a copy thereof to any representative authorised in 




(g) in the case of a partnership, firm or voluntary association, by 
leaving a copy thereof with a person who at the time of service is 
apparently in charge of the premises and apparently not less than 
16 years of age, at the place of business of such partnership, firm 
or voluntary association or if such partnership, firm or voluntary 
association has no place of business, by serving a copy thereof on 
a partner in the partnership, the owner of the firm or the 
chairman or secretary of the managing or other controlling body 
of such association, as the case may be, in one of the manners set 
forth in subrules (1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (i); 
(h) in the case of a local authority, by handing a copy thereof to the 
town clerk, associate town clerk, assistant town clerk or any 
person acting on behalf of any such officer, and in the case of a 
statutory body, by handing a copy thereof to the person nd 
proceedings on its behalf, or any other person authorised to act on 
its behalf, or in any other manner provided by law; or 
(i) by sending a copy thereof by registered post to the last known 
postal address of the person concerned and, unless the contrary is 
proved, it shall be presumed that service was effected on the 
fourth day following the day upon which the process was posted. 
If the Court is satisfied that service cannot conveniently or expeditiously 
be effected in any manner contemplated in subrule (1), service shall be 
effected in the manner directed by the Court, which may include 
electronic transmission by telegram, telex, telefax or other electronically 
printed manner. 
Where the party to be served with any document initiating or opposing 
an interlocutory or other appplication is represented by a representative, 
service may be effected on the representative. 
Service shall be proved in a court: 
(a) by a signed acknowledgement or receipt by the person upon 
whom the document was served; 
(b) by an affidavit by the person who effected service, if such person 
is a private person; 
(c) by the usual return of service form if service was effected by a 
person authorised to serve process of the High Court or the 
Magistrates' Court; 
(d) in the case of service by registered post, by producing the 
certificate concerned issued by the Post Office for the posting of 
such registered letter. 
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(5) Service shall be deemed to have been effected if the Court is satisfied that 
any process has come to the notice of the person for whom it was 
intended, regardless of the manner in which it came to such person's 
attention. 
(6) If the Court is not satisfied that service has taken place in accordance 
with this Rule or that the process has come to the attention of the person 
concemed~ it may make such order as to service as it may deem fit. 
7. INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS AND PROCEDURES NOT SPEClflCALLY 
PROVIDED FOR IN OTHER RULES 
(1) (a) An interlocutory application or other application, in respect of 
which no procedure has been provided for by the Act or by these 
Rules, shall be brought by a party on notice of motion as near as 
may be in accordance with AppendL'\: 3 to these Rules and shall be 
supported by affidavit (sworn statement)~ save that applications as 
to procedural aspects need not be supported by affidavit, and~ 
depending on the nature thereof, the Court may dispense with 
such notice~ 
(b) The Respondent may serve an answering affidavit on the Applicant 
within 10 days of service of the application; 
(c) The Applicant may serve a replying affidavit on the Respondent 
within 7 days of service of the answering affidavit. 
(2) Any party shall, when requested to do so by the Registrar on the direction 
of the Court, paginate and index all the process (not correspondence) in 
the Court file at least 24 hours before the hearing and hand a copy of 
such index to the other party before the commencement of the hearing. 
(3) Should a situation arise in proceedings or contemplated proceedings, for 
which the Rules do not provide, the Court may adopt such procedure as 
it may deem fit in the circumstances. 
8. WITHDRA WALS AND POSTPONEMENTS 
(1) Whenever a matter is settled out of court, or when parties agree to 
postpone a matter, the party who requested the matter to be placed on 
the roll shall fOlthwith notify the Registrar by delivering a notice of 
withdrawal or postponement, as the case may be. 
(2) The parties may not, without the leave of the Court, postpone or remove 
a matter from the roll within 2 weeks of the date of set down, unless such 
matter has been settled. 
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9. PRE-HEARING CONFERENCE 
(1) The parties shall, when requested by the Court to do so, hold an infonnal 
conference at a mutually convenient time, date and place, prior to the 
hearing of any matter. 
(2) At such conference, without prejudice to the rights of the parties, 
consideration may be given to the following matters: 
(a) any means whereby the dispute may be settled, inclusive of such 
previous endeavours as have been made by the parties to settle the 
dispute by agreement or otherwise; 
(b) any agreement as to the nature and extent of the unresolved 
Issues; 
(c) such facts as are common cause or are admitted by any party; 
(d) any steps which may shorten the hearing; 
(e) discovery or exchange of documents; 
(f) the manner in which documentary evidence is to be dealt with; 
(g) whether evidence on affidavit will be admitted with or without 
cross-examination of the deponent; 
(h) which paliy shall begin; 
(i) the necessity or otherwise for an on-the-spot inspection; 
(j) securing the presence at court of any witness; and 
(k) any other matter or means whereby the proceedings may be 
shortened. 
(3) Notwithstanding the provlslons of subrule (1) any party may on 
reasonable notice require the other party or parties to attend a conference 
at a mutually convenient time, date and venue to attempt to agree on 
such matters referred to in subrule (2) as may be relevant. 
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subrules (1) and (3), the parties shall, 
when directed by the Court to do so, hold a further conference in 
chambers prior to the hearing of any matter, during which a Judge or a 
nominated member of the court or the Registrar may preside, in which 
case such presiding officer may also act as a mediator or conciliator. 
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(5) The parties shall draw up and sign minutes recording the matters agreed 
to at the conferences referred to in subrules (1) and (3) as well as the 
matters still in dispute and the Applicant shall ensure that a copy thereof 
is filed with the Registrar at least 3 days prior to the hearing. 
10. PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
(1) A party shall be obliged to produce all documents listed in his process, in 
court at the hearing of the matter. 
(2) A party shall afford the other party, on request, a reasonable opportunity 
to inspect and make copies of the documents referred to in subrule (1) 
before the hearing . 
. (3) A party who believes that the other party is in possession of documents 
which he has not listed may apply to the Court for an appropriate order 
and the Court may make such order as it deems fit. 
(4) Should a party intend to introduce a document in evidence which has not 
been discovered in terms of Rule 4(4)(h) the Court may in its discretion 
decline to admit such document or admit it on such terms as it deems fit, 
including an adjournment to enable the other party to consider the said 
document. 
11. CONSENT TO DETERMINATIONS AND ORDERS, AND JUDGMENTS BY 
DEFAULT 
(1) (a) A Respondent may at any time in respect of the whole or any part 
of an application consent to judgment for the relief claimed. 
(b) The consent referred to in subrule (1) shall be in writing, signed 
and dated by the party and shall be witnessed. 
(c) On receipt of such consent, the Applicant may apply in writing to 
the Registrar that an order be made by the Court in accordance 
with such consent and the Court may make such an order. 
(2) Whenever an Applicant fails to file his statement of case or other 
response to an application by the Respondent timeously the Court may on 
application, having satisfied itself that notice of set down or other 
appropriate notification has been given, and that all relevant documents 
ha ve been served on the Applicant, order that the matter proceed and 
make such determination or order as it considers just in the absence of 
the Applicant. 
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(3) Whenever a Respondent fails to submit an answering affidavit, his 
statement of defence or other response to an application, the Court may 
on application, having satisfied itself that notice of set down or other 
appropriate notification has been given, and that all relevant documents 
have been served on the Respondent order that the matter proceed and 
make such determination or order as it considers just in the absence of 
the Respondent. 
(4) (a) Whenever any party fails to comply in good time with any time 
limit or any request in terms of these rules, the other party may 
notify the defaulting party that he intends to apply, after expiry of 
a period of 14 days from the date of dispatch by registered post or 
telefax or deli very by hand of such notice, for an order requiring 
compliance within the time indicated in such notice and may 
include a notice of intention to bar. 
(b) Upon the failure of the party upon whom a notice referred to in 
subntle (4) (a) has been served to comply therewith, the party 
giving such notice may make application to the Court for an order 
for ;:,uch relief as is specified in such notice, including an order of 
bar, and the Court may make such order as it may deem fit. 
(5) The Court may grant an order by default without hearing evidence or 
may require viva voce (oral) evidence or evidence by way of affidavit 
before granting an order by default. 
12. GENERAL POWERS OF THE COURT 
(1) Without prejudice to the general discretion granted to the Court by 
Section 18 (1) (d) of the Act, the Court may on application or of its own 
motion at any time: 
(a) before or after the expiry of any period condone any failure to 
comply with any ntle including time periods save for the time 
within which an appeal may be noted to the Court of Appeal and 
may abridge any time prescribed by these Rules; 
(b) allow the allegations in any form to be amended at any time; 
(c) if in any proceedings it appears that any party to the proceedings 
has been incorrectly or defectively cited, correct the error or 
defect, or order the substitution of a party; 
(d) join any other person at any time on such terms and conditions as 
it deems fit; 
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(e) make an order consolidating the disputes pending before it in 
separate proceedings where it deems such consolidation to be 
expedient and just; 
(f) allow any party at any time to amend his application or his 
opposition; 
(g) grant any order in the absence of any party if it is satisfied that, 
that party has had notice of the date of set down and that all 
relevant documents have been served on such party; 
(h) rescind on good cause shown, any order made by it in the absence 
of a party; 
(i) order any person who fails to comply with any notice or directive 
given in tenus of these Rules to do so and/or order that any party 
in default shall not be entitled to any relief in such proceedings~ 
(j) set aside any irregular step which has been taken by another party 
unless the party complaining of the irregular step has with 
knowledge of the irregularity taken any further step in the 
proceedings; 
(k) declare, in the case of a partnership or firm, that any person was 
at a certain time or for a certain period a partner of a partnership 
or the proprietor of a firm; 
(1) grant on application: 
(i) urgent relief; 
(ii) urgent interim relief pending a decision by the court after 
a hearing; 
(iii) an interdict or any other order in the case of any action that 
is prohibited by law regarding any trade dispute; provided 
that in the case of urgent relief sought the provisions of 
subruIes 7 (1) (b) and (c) and 7 (2) shall not apply; 
(m) before or during a hearing, grant a rule nisi (an order requiring 
the other party to show cause why a certain order should not be 
made) and confirm or discharge a rule nisi on a return date if 
appropriate unless the Act otherwise provides; 
(n) preside at any pre-hearing conference. 
". "- .. 
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(2) In any application referred to in subrnle (1) the Court may make such 
order as it deems fit, including an appropriate order as to costs if such 
costs are permissible in terms of Section 27 of the Act. 
(3) It will be in the discretion of the Judge to decide when and for how long 
the court will be in recess during any year~ 
(4) The Court in the exercise of its powers and discretion and in the 
performance of its functions, or in any matter incidental thereto, may act 
in such manner as it may consider expedient in the circumstances in 
order to achieve the objectives of the Act, and in so doing it shall have 
regard to substance rather than fonn, save as is otherwise provided In the 
Act. 
13. EVIDENCE 
(1) Without prejudice to the general powers granted to the Court by Section 
19 of the Act regarding the hearing of evidence, the following rules of 
evidence shall also apply: 
(a) A party intending to call an expert witness shall give reasonable 
notice thereof to the Registrar and the other party to the dispute 
together with a summary of the proposed evidence of such witness 
at a time prior to the hearing which is sufficient to enable each 
party to consider the summary and to prepare its case. 
(b) Should a party fail to comply with subrnle (1) (a) the Court may 
in its discretion decline to admit such expert evidence or admit it 
on such terms as it deems fit, including an adjournment to enable 
the other party to consider such expert evidence. 
(c) The Court may pennit the parties together with or in lieu (instead 
of) of other evidence: 
(i) to adduce evidence by way of affidavit; or 
(ii) to argue a matter on a stated case; or 
(iii) to argue a matter on the record of some other proceedings. 
(2) The Court shall decide in its discretion which party shall commence a 
matter or commence leading evidence. 
14. LANGUAGE TO BE EMPLOYED IN COURT 
(1) The language to be employed in the court shall be English and the 
evidence, all process and all the records of proceedings in the court shall 
be in that language. 
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(2) If any of the parties or witnesses in proceedings before the court do not 
understand the English language, then the proceedings shall be 
interpreted from English into the language understood by the parties or 
the witnesses concerned as the case may be, and vice versa (the other 
way round). 
15. OATH OF OFFICE 
(1) Before any interpreter may interpret in court he shall take an oath or 
make an affirmation in the following form: 
"I , 
(full names) 
do herebv swear / solemnly and sincerelv affirm and declare that 
~ ~ J 
whenever I may be called upon to perform the functions of an interpreter 
in any proceedings in the court I shall truly and correctly and to the best 
of my ability interpret from the language I am called upon to interpret 
from into the English language and vice versa". 
(2) A nominated member of the court shall not perform any function of the 
court unless he has taken an oath or made an affirmation in the following 
form: 
!'I, ....................................... : ........ .. 
(full names) 
do hereby swear/ solemnly and sincerely affirm and declare that I will in 
my capacity as nominated member of the Industrial Court, administer 
justice to all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice". 
(3) Any such oath or affirmation shall be taken or made before the Judge of 
the court, who has been designated the President of the court and shall 
be signed by the person taking such oath. 
16. HEADS OF ARGUMENT 
The Court may at any time before, during or after a hearing and in any matter 
call upon the parties to deliver a concise statement of the main points which the 
parties respectively intend to argue, as well as a list of authorities intended to be 
referred to, and shall specify the date by which those documents shall be 
delivered and the number of copies required. 
17. COSTS 
(1) The costs awarded in terms of a determination, order or award of the 
Court shall be taxed by the Registrar in accordance with the provisions 
of Section 27 of the Act. 
(2) (a) 
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Costs taxed by the Registrar shall be subject to review by a Judge 
of the court on application by one or more of the parties on notice 
to all other parties within 14 days of such taxation. 
(b) Such application shall identify each disputed item or part of an 
item together with the grounds of objection to the allowance or 
disallowance thereof. 
(c) Any other party may within 10 days of receipt of the application 
submit written contentions, including ones not advanced at the 
taxation, on each item sought to be reviewed and thereafter the 
Registrar shall frame his report and supply a copy to each party 
who may within 7 days of receipt thereof submit further 
submissions. 
(d) The Registrar shall thereafter submit the above documents to a 
Judge of the court who may decide the matter on the documents 
alone or together with such information he may require from the 
Registrar or if he deems fit, after hearing the parties in chambers. 
(e) The Judge may make such order as to costs of the case as he deems 
fit, if such costs are permissible in terms of Section 27 of the Act. 
(3) Qualifying fees for expert witnesses shall not be recoverable as costs 
between party and party, unless so directed by the Court. 
18. INDUSTRIAL COURT AS COURT OF RECORD 
(1) A record shall be kept of: 
(a) any judgment or ruling given by the Court; 
(b) any evidence given in court; 
(c) any objection made to any evidence received or tendered; 
(d) any on-the-spot inspection and any matter recorded as a result 
thereof; and 
(e) the proceedings of the Court generally, save that the Court may 
direct that argument need not be recorded. 
(2) Such record shall be kept by such means, including hand-written notes, 




After the person who made the hand-written notes, shorthand 
notes or electronic recordings has certified it as correct it shall be 
filed with the Registrar. 
(b) A transcript of the notes or the record or a portion thereof may be 
made on request of the Court or any of the parties upon payment 
of such fee as may be prescribed from time to time. 
(c) After the person who made the transcription has certified it as 
correct the transcript, together with the hand-written notes, 
shorthand notes or electronic record shall be returned to the 
Registrar. 
(d) The transcript of the hand-written notes, shorthand notes or 
electronic record certified as correct as envisaged in paragraph (c) 
shall be deemed to be correct until the contrary is proved. 
19. SECURING THE ATTENDANCE OF A WITNESS AND WITNESS FEES 
(1) A witness who attends court bv order of the court in terms of sub-section 
19 (2) (b) of the Act shall be paid an allowance towards travel and 
subsistence as are provided for in Rule 76 of the Rules of the High Court. 
(2) A party who requires a witness to attend court~ shall be liable for the 
payment of any travelling and/or subsistence costs so incurred by such 
witness. 
(3) Any party who anticipates any problem or possible problem in securing 
the attendance at court of a witness, may request the Court to authorise 
the issue of a subpoena for such witness to appear at court on a date and 
at a time and place specified in the SUbpoena: provided that such party 
must satisfy the Court that, in his opinion, such witness may be able to 
give material information concerning the alleged dispute, or who he 
suspects or believes has in his possession or custody or under his control 
any book, document or thing which has any bearing on the alleged 
dispute: provided further that such party must also satisfy the Court as 
to the grounds for anticipating any problem or possible problem in 
securing the attendance at court of such witness: provided further that 
the provisions of subrule (2) shall apply in respect of the travelling 
and/ or subsistence costs of such witness. 
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20. APPEALS 
(1) An appeal in terms of Section 18 (4) of the Act shall be noted and 
prosecuted in terms of Part III of the Court of Appeal Rules. 
(2) A copy of the notice of appeal shall be filed with the Registrar of the 
Industrial Court. 
(3) The fees set out in Parts A and C of the First Schedule to the Court of 
Appeal Rules shall be paid in respect of the matters to which they relate. 
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APPENDIX 1 
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COURT OF BOTSWANA 
APPLICANT'S STATEMENT OF CASE IN TERMS OF RULE 4 (4) 
Applicant: 
Respondent: 
TO: The Registrar 
Industrial Court 
Private Bag BR 267 
Gaborone 
In the dispute between: 
And to: (Insert the Respondent's name and address) 
1. Particulars of the Applicant: 
Case No. IC 1 __ _ 
(a) Name: (If there are a number of Applicants, attach a list with all their names) 
(b) Description: (e.g. individual! s, firm, company, partnership, organisation, 
trade union, etc.) 
(c) Physical Address: 
(d) Postal Address: 
(e) Telephone No.: 
(f) Telefax No.: 
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(g) Address for service of documents in these proceedings: 
2. Particulars of the Respondent: 
(a) Name: 
(b) Description: (e.g. individual, firm, company, partnership, organisation, trade 
union, etc.) 
(c) Physical Address: 
(d) Postal Address: 
(e) Telephone No.: 
(f) Telefax No.: 
3. Employment particulars of the Applicant: 
(a) Date of commencement of employment with the Respondent: 
(b) Nature of the Respondent's business: 
(c) Nature of the Applicant's employment: 
(d) Remuneration of the Applicant when so employed: 
(e) Date of termination of contract of employment or date on which alleged trade 
dispute arose: 
4. Brief description of alleged trade dispute: (e.g. dismissal, suspension, withholding 
wages etc.) 
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5. Particulars of alleged trade dispute: (set out clear and concise particulars in 
paragraphs, including sub-paragraphs, consecutively numbered on a separate sheet 
of paper) 
6. Particulars of relief sought: 
7. Dates and venues of all attempts to settle the alleged trade dispute: 
(a) Before the District Labour Officer: 
(b) Before the Commissioner of Labour: 
(c) Privately between the parties: 
8. List of books or documents relevant to this matter, which are in the Applicant's 
possession or under his control (use a separate sheet of paper) 
9. Notice to the Respondent: 
(a) If the Respondent intends opposing this application, he is required within 14 
days after service on him of the Applicant's statement of case to deliver, in 
terms of Rule 4 (4), his statement of defence, as near as may be in accordance 
with Appendi.-x: :2 to the Rules. 
(b) If the Respondent fails to deliver such statement of defence, a determination, 
including an order as to costs, may be made in his absence. 
Signed at __________ this ____ day of ______ 19_ 
APPLICANT OR APPLICANT'S REPRESENTATIVE 
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APPENDIX 2 
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COURT OF BOTSWANA 
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF DEFENCE IN TERMS 
Applicant: 
Respondent: 
TO: The Registrar 
Industrial Court 
Private Bag BR 267 
Gaborone 
OF RULE 4 (S) 
In the dispute between: 
And to: (Insert the Applicant's name and address) 
1. Particulars of the Respondent: 
(a) Name: 
Case No. IC 1 __ _ 
(b) Description: (e.g. individual, firm, company, partnership, organisation, 
trade union, etc.) 
(c) Trade name (if any): 
(d) Physical Address: 
(e) Postal Address: 
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(0 Telephone No: 
(g) Telefax No: 
(h) Address for service of documents in these proceedings: 
z. Objection to jurisdiction of this Court: (Complete only if applicable - set out 
fully the grounds for such objection - if necessary use a separate sheet of paper) 
3. The Respondent's opposition to the applicant's statement of case: (set out clear 
and concise grounds of opposition with a specific admission or denial of the 
allegations in each paragraph and sub-paragraph on a separate sheet of paper) 
4. Relief sought: (If the Respondent opposes the relief sought but thinks the 
Applicant is entitled to some other relief - set out particulars of such other relieD 
5. List of books and documents relevant to the Respondent's opposition, which 




____________________ this ______ dayof ____________ 19 
RESPONDENT OR RESPONDENT'S REPRESENTATNE 
If the Respondent intends to counterclaim he must deliver simultaneously 
with his statement of defence a statement as near as may be in accordance with 
Appendix 1 to the Rules, with the necessary amendments to the required 
particulars to suit his specific counterclaim and the heading should be changed 
to read: Respondent's Counterclaim. 
APPENDIX 3 
RULE 7 (1) (a) 
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COURT OF BOTSWANA 
HELD AT ---------------------
Case No. IC -------' 




TO: The Registrar 
Industrial Court 
Private Bag BR 267 
Gaborone. 
NOTICE OF MOTION 
And to: (insert the Respondent's name and address) 
Kindly take notice that the Applicant intends bringing an application in terms of Rule 7 (1) (a) at 
a time and date to be fixed by the Registrar for an order in the following terms: 
(Here set out the relief sought, if necessary use a separate sheet of paper) 
(In the case of an urgent application the Applicant must telephone the Registrar in advance for a 
suitable date and time and this paragraph should then read as follows: 
Kindly take notice that the Applicant intends bringing an urgent application in terms of Section 
20 (3) of the Trade Disputes Act at the Industrial Court at 
on the day of 
20 , or so soon thereafter as the matter can be heard, for an order in the -----------
2 
following terms: (Here set out the urgent relief sought, if necessary use a separate sheet of paper.) 
Take notice further that the affidavit of together with the 
annexures thereto (if any). annexed hereto, will be used in support of this application. 
Take notice further that the Applicant has chosen the following address at which service 
of process in these proceedings will be accepted: 
Dated at _________ this ______ day 
NOTE: 
APPLICANT OR APPLICANT'S REPRESENTATIVE 
The facts on which the Applicant relies for the relief sought must be set out clearly and 
concisely in an accompanying affidavit in paragraphs, including sub-paragraphs, 
consecutively numbered and any other supporting affidavits and documents must be 
attached to this founding affidavit. The Respondent in his answering affidavit must 
either admit or deny each of these facts and must similarly set out facts on which he relies 
for opposing such application. 
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Letter of referral 
Commencement of Proceedings 
Copy of Index Pleadings 
Pre-hearing requirements 
Reminder 
Respondent in default 
Enrolment requirements 
Notice of setdown 
Change of date of setdown 
Request to facilitate service 
Telephone Memo 
Copy of Court order 
Copy of judgment 
List of exhibits 
Result sheet 
Subpoena 
Oath of Office (Assessors) 
Confirmation of Selection of Assessor 
Reminder to File Statement of Case 
Reminder to File Proof of Service 
Writ of Execution 
THE INDUSTRIAL COURT OF BOTSWANA 
FORMIC.1 
LETTER OF REFERRAL 
(RULE 4 (1) AND (2» 
I , the undersigned, hereby refer the dispute between the following parties to the 
Industrial Court in terms of Section 7 of the Trade Disputes Act, Chapter 48:02, as 
amended, for a hearing and a determination in terms of Section 18 (1) of the said 
Act: 
APPLICANT: ________________________________________ _ 
ADDRESS: 
TEL. NO.: FAX NO. 




TEL. NO.: _________ FAX NO.: ____ - __ _ 
REFERENCE NO. OR PERSON IN CHARGE: 
2 
A copy of the Section 7 certificate, received from the Commissioner of Labour, is 
annexed hereto. 
The applicant's statement of case (rule 4(3)) is also annexed hereto/will be filed 
within the said 14 day period. * 
Dated at on this day of 19 --------------- ------ ---------------
APPLICANT OR APPLICANT'S REPRESENTATIVE 
* delete whichever is not applicable 
PRIvATE BAG BR 2fJ7 
BROA.DHtm.ST 
GABORONE 
ThI.aHoNE: (267) 300565 
'fm..m>AX: (267) 300S67 
TO: 
Dear Sir/ Madam 
Applicant: 
Respondent: 
REPUBUC OF BOTSWANA 
Form Ie..2 
Commencement of Proceedings 
And to: 
Re: The dispute between: 
lNDt.lS'l.1UAL COURT 
BROA.DHtlltS';: BUSINESS CENl'llE 
UNII'S 4 AND 5 
COltNEJI. BooUNGWE ROAD 
AND NELSON MANoEU DRIvE 
BROADHtlltSI' lNDUS'TlUAL EsTATE 
GABORONE 
Case No. Ie. ! __ _ 
Date: ___________ _ 
This office has received a letter of referral from the Applicant in the abovementioned dispute. 
Case number Ie. has been allocated in respect of the said dispute. which case 
number should be used in all future communications and on all relevant documents. 
The Applicant's attention is drawn to the prOvisions of ruie 4 (3) regarding the delivery of a 
statement of case, if it has not already been done. 
The Respondents' attention is drawn to the provisions of rule 4 (3) (g) (i) and rule 4 (4) 
regarding the delivery of a statement of defence, if it has not already been done. 
Yours faithfully 
REGISTRAR 
PMv4TB B40 BR 161 
BIIOADIRIII'f 
GA ..... 
TE1..uHcNI: (267) 300565 
TEu!P.u: (267) 300567 
TO: 
Dear Sir/ Madam 
Applicant: 
FORJ.'1 Ie. 3 
~COllI.T 
BmAl.lIIIlItr." BtlmaIss C2Nru 
UtC'S4ANDS 
Ccma!It BoooNowB RoAD 
AND NIuoN MA.NDEu DIrvE 
Bacw:H1IS'I' INDtlsmAL &rAT! 
GABOI.ONE 
COpy OF INDEX OF PLEADINGS 
Case No. IC. , __ _ 
Date: ________ _ 
Re: The dispute between: 
Respondent: ___________________________________ _ 
Herewith a copy of the index of the pleadings in the above matter which has been set down for 
a hearing at on of 19 at 09:30. 
Kindly see to it that your documents are marked and paginated accordingly, to obviate 
unnecessary delays when these documents are referred to in Court. 
Yours faithfully 
REGISTRAR 
PRIvATE BAO BR 267 
Blt.OADHURST 
GABOllONB 
Tm.:emoNE: (267) 300565 









Re: The dispute between: 
1NDUS'l'lUAL COtJlO' 
BROADH.tJRS;' BUSINESS CENntB 
UNJ7S4ANDS 
CORNER BODUNOWE ROAD 
AND NELSON MANDELA DRlVB 
BROADHURST INDUSTlUAL EsTATE 
GABORONE 
Case No. IC __ ...:' __ 
Date: ______ _ 
The above matter has been enrolled for a hearing in the Industrial Court at the abovementioned 
venue on _______ at _____ _ 
Your attention is drawn to the following items set out here below, which are circled. Kindly 
attend to the circled items immediately. 
1. CONFIRMATION OF ATTENDANCE 
To ensure that this matter is heard on the abovementioned date/s, both parties are 
requested to contact the Registrar at least one week before the aforesaid trial date to 
confirm that the matter is being proceeded with. 
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2. PAGINATION OF DOCUMENTS 
In terms of rule 4(9) read with rule 7(2) the Court has directed that the Applicant paginate 
and index all the process (not correspondence) in the court file at least 24 hours before the 
hearing and hand a copy of such index to the Respondent before the commencement of the 
hearing. 
3. PRE-HEARING CONFERENCE 
(a) In terms of rule 9( 1) the Court has directed that the parties shall hold an informal 
pre-hearing conference at a mutually convenient time, date and place prior to the 
aforesaid trial date to consider the matters set out in rule 9(2) and the parties' 
attention is drawn to the provisions of rule 9 (5) regarding the filing of pre-hearing 
minutes. 
(b) In terms of rule 9(4) the Court has directed that the parties attend a pre-hearing 
conference in the Judge's Chambers at 09:00 on the morning of the aforesaid trial 
date, during which conference the Judge or a nominated member of the Court or 
the Registrar will preside. 
Yours faithfully, 
REGISTRAR 
PRIvATE BAG BR 267 
BROADHUIST 
GAsoltoNE 
Ta..EPHoNE: (267) 300565 
TEu.!P.u:: (267) 300567 
REPUBUC OF BO'I'SW ANA 
lNDUSTlUAL COURT 
BROADHtJRS"' .. BtlSINESS Cmmta 
UNrrS 4 AND 5 
CORNEK BODUNGWl! ROAD 
AND NELSON MANDELA DRIVE 




Case No. Ie 
Date: _________ _ 
TO: __________________ _ 
Dear Sir/Madam 
Re: The dispute between 
Applicant: 
Respondent: ____________ -__________________ ___ 
On the Applicant was sent a letter (form lC.-> 
regurung ________________________________________ __ 
to which no response has as yet been received. 
Should you fail to respond within one month hereof: the file will be closed. 
Yours faithfully 
REGISTRAR 
PRIvATE BAO BR 267 
BROADHURST 
GABORONE 
1'El..smoNl!: (267) 300565 





REPUBUC OP BO'I'SW ANA 
FORMIC.6 
RESPONDENT IN DEFAULT 
lNDusnuAL COURT 
BROADH'lJR.r." BtlSINESS CENntE 
UNll'S 4 AND 5 
CORNER BODUNom ROAD 
AND NELSON MANDELA DRIVE 
BJI.OAl)HUJtST lNoUSTlUAL EsrATE 
GABORONE 
Case No. Ie ______ 1 
Date: ___ --------
Re: The dispute between: 
The records in this office show that the Respondent has to date failed to file a 
statement of defence in reply to your statement of case. 
In the circumstances you are requested to advise this office as soon as possible 
whether the matter has been settled or whether you wish to apply for a default 
judgment against the Respondent. 
Yours faith:fu1ly 
REGISTRAR 
• P'luvAl'l! BAG BR 267 
BROADHURST 
GABOItONl! 
TEt.mi0NE: (267) 300565 





REPUBUC OF BOTSWANA 
FORM IC.7 
ENROLMENT REQUIREMENTS 
Case No. IC 
Date: 
And to: 
Re: The Dispute between: 
!Nr.n:.JsnuA.L COURT 
BROAD~' BUSINESS C:ENnu! 
UNtl"S 4 AND 5 
CORNER BooUNGWE ROAD 
AND NI!l.SON MANDELA DRM 
BROADHURST INDumuAL. EsTATE 
GABORONE 
As both parties have filed documents. tbe abovementioned matter is now ready for setdown. but before it can 
be setdown. tbe Applicant. after having consulted tbe Respondent. must complete (a) and (b) herebelow and 
return tbis form to the Registrar as soon as possible and send a copy thereof to tbe Respondent. 
(a) It is expei:ted tbat _____ Court days will be required for tbe hearing of the abovementioned 
matter. 




The attention of the parties is drawn to rule 8(2) which provides that the parties may not, without 
the leave of the Court, postpone or remove a matter from the roll within 2 weeks of the date of 
setdown., unless such matter has been settled. 
When a postponement is sought prior to 2 weeks of the date of setdoWD. the Registrar must be 
informed what the attitude of the other party is regarding such postponement. 
Yours fa:ithfully, 
REGISTRAR 
PRIVATE BAG BR 267 
BROADHURST 
GABORONE 
TELEPHONE: (267) 300565 
TELEFAX:(267)300567 
TO: 
Dear Sir IMadam, 
Appiicant: 
Respondent: 
REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA 
FORM Ie. 8 
NOTICE OF SETDOWN 
AND TO: 
Re: The dispute between: 
INDUSTRIAL COURT 
BROADHURST BUSINESS CENTRE 
UNITS 4 AND 5 
CORNER BODUNGWE ROAD 
AND NasON MANDELA DRIVE 
BROADHURST INDUSTRIAL ESTATE 
GABORONE 
Case No. IC 
Date: ____ _ 
The above matter has been enrolled for _______ at ____ (or as soon thereafter as the parties 
may be heard) at the abovementioned venue for: 
(insert for what purpose, e.g. the hearing and determination of the above dispute, the hearing of the point in 
limine raised on the papers, a default judgment. the hearing of an application for rescission of a default 
judgment, the hearing of an application for the postponement of the matter, etc.) 
The attention of the parties is drawn to rule 8(2) which provides that the parties may not, without the leave of the 
Court, postpone or remove a matter from the roll within 2 weeks of the date of setdown, unless such marter has 
been settled. 
When a postponement is sought prior to 2 weeks of the date of setdovl!1 the Registrar must be informed what the 
attitude of the other party is regarding such postponement. 
Parties must see to it that if they intend calling any witness or using any document in evidence which has not yet 
been filed at Court, that such witness and lor document is present at Court on the said date of hearing. 
Yours faithfuUy, 
REGISTRAR 
cc: Commissioner of Labour 
PJuvATE BAa BR 267 
BI.OADB.tlRST 
GABOIONI! 
'I'li:u:PHoNE: (267) 300~ 





REPUBlJC OFBOTSW ANA 
FORi,! Ie. 9 
CHA"~'GE OF DATE OF SET DOWN 
Re: The dispute between: 
The above matter will no longer be heard on ___ _ 
lNot.lmu.u. Comrr 
BROADmlJIlr.,' Bt.lSINESS C:E:Nrm! 
UNJn 4 AND 5 
CoIINI!R BODtlNO"Mt ROAD 
AND NELSON MANDE:t..A. Dlu:vB 
BltOA.OHIJaST lNoos'r.RI.u. EsrATE 
GABORONE 
Case No. Ie / 
Date: _______ _ 
enrolled for a hearing on 19 at 
19 _-' but is now 
(or as soon ----
thereafter as the parties may be heard) at the abovementioned venue. 
Yours faithfully, 
REGISTRIAR 
PIuv ATE BAa BR U,7 
BitOADRtlRST 
GABoRONE 
'I":F.u:PHoNE: (267) 300565 





REPUBUC OF BOTSWANA 
FORM IC.lO 
OOllSTIUAL Cotnrr 
BROAD~' BUSINESS CENr.R.B 
UNC'S4AND S 
CORNER BODUNGWI!: ROAD 
AND NELSON MANDELA DRM! 
BROADHURST OOtJST1UAL EsTATE 
GABORONE 
REQUEST TO FACILITATE SERVICE 
Case No. Ie ___ 1 __ 
Date: -------
AND TO: 
Re: The dispute bet\.veen: 
The enclosed letter dated 19 addressed to the Respondent was returned 
undelivered to this Court. To facilitate service, kindly serve or have the enclosed letter served on 
the Respondent at its physical address and immediately file with the Registrar your return of 









IN THE INDUSTRIAL COURT OF BOTSWANA 
FORMIC. 11 
TELEPHONE MEMO 
Case No.: IC 
Name of Respondent: 
Date and time of call: 
Name of Caller: 
Tel. No. and code: 
State what was discussed and/or agreed upon: 
SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL RECEIVING CALL 
PLEASE PLACE TIllS MEMO IN THE COURT Fll.,E. 
PRIvATE BAG BR U,7 
BROADHt1RST 
GABORONE 
1'EI.:EPH0NE: (U,7) 300565 





REPUBUC OF BOTSWANA 
FORMIC. 12 
COPY OF COURT ORDER 
AND TO: 
Re: The dispute between: 
INDUS'I'RJAL COURT 
BROADm.JR$';' BUSlNESS CENrRE 
UNII'S 4 AND 5 
CORNER. BODUNGWE ROAD 
AND N:BLSON MANDELA DRIVE 
BROADHURST INDuSTRIAL EsTATE 
GABORONE 
Case No. IC I 
Date: _______ _ 
Herewith a copy of the order made by the Court in the above matter. A judgment setting out the 
reasons for making such order \\till be forwarded to you in due course. 
Yours faithfully. 
REGISTRAR 
PRIvATE BAO BR U,7 
B~ 
GABoIlOM! 
Tl!U!l'HONE: (267) 300s6S 
Tm..mrAX! (267) 300567 
TO: 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
REPUBuc OP BOTSWANA 
FORMIC. 13 
COPY OF JUDGMENT 
lioanlsnuAL COURT 
BJlaADBlmr.; BtJm/BSS C:emm 
UNrl'S 4 AND S 
COItNEll BoDtJNGWI! ROAD 
AND NELSON MANDEU DltJ:vE 
lbaADmJur fNDt.IS'nlW. EsTATE 
GAaoaoNB 
Case No. IC 1 __ 
Date: _______ _ 
Herewith a copy of the judgment delivered by the Court in the following matter(s): 
Yours faithfully, 
REGISTRAR 
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COURT OF BOTSWANA 
FORMIC. 14 
Case No.: IC ___ ----' __ 
LIST OF EXHIBITS 
NUMBER DESCRIPTION 
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COURT OF BOTSWANA 
HELD AT: 
FORJ.'1 Ie. 15 
Case No. IC I -----:---
Date: --------------------




CONSTITUTION OF THE COURT: 
Industrial Court Judge: 
Nominated Member (Union): 
Nominated Member (BOCCIM): ________________ ~ 
ON BEHALF OF APPLICA.l.Vf/S: 
Of or instructed by: 
Person in charge of case: 
Tel. No. _______________ FaxNo. 
ON BEHALF OF RESPOND [NT: 
Of or instructed by: 
Person in charge of case: 
Tel. No, _____________ Fax No. 
2 
RESULT OF HEARING: 
Signed at ________ tIDs __ day of _______ 19 
INDUSTRIAL COURT JUDGE 
NOMINATED MEMBER (UNION) 
NOMINATED MEMBER (BOCCIM) 
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COURT OF BOTSWANA 
FORM IC.16 
Case No. IC --------' 
In the matter between: 
App Hcan t: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondent: --------------------------------------- ---- ---------------.-----------------------------------•... --
SUBPOENA 
(Issued under the provisions of Section 19(2) (b) of the Trade Disputes Act) 
TO: 
You are hereby summoned to appear in person before the Industrial Court at Broadhurst Business 
Centre, corner of Bodung;ve Road and Nelson Mandela Drive, Broadhurst Industrial Estate, 
Gaborone on 20 at as well as on any 
subsequent day to which the proceedings may be postponed, to give evidence regarding the above 
matter and to bring with you and there to produce to the COUf( the books, documents or items 
specified here below: 
2 
Your attention is drawn to the provisions of Section 19 (4) of the said Act, which provides that 
any person who fails to comply with any instruction contained in this subpoena, shall be guilty of 
an offence and liable to a fine of 500 Pula and imprisonment for three months. 
Given under my hand at Gaborone on this day of 20 ------ ------------
REGISTRAR, INDUSTRIAL COURT 
PRIvATI! BAO BR 267 
BROADHURST 
GABORONE 
TEt..BPH0NE: (267) 300S6S 
Tm.P.PAX: (267) 300S67 
REPUBUC OF BOTSWANA 
FORM IC. 17 
OATH OF OFFICE 
IND'USTRIAL CoURT 
BROADHtlltS';: BUSlNBSS CENnm 
UNII'S4ANDS 
CORNER BODUNOWE ROAD 
AND NEI.3ON MANDELA DIuvE 
BROAllHtlRST INDUSTRIAL EsTATE 
GABORONE 
Case No. IC. /-
I do hereby swear/solemnly and sincerely affirm and 
declare* that I will, in my capacity as nominated member of the 
Industrial Court, administer justice to all persons alike without 
fear, favour or prejudice in the matter between: 
Signed and sworn to before me at 
day of 19 
delete whichever is not applicable 
Nominated member 
this 
D. J. de Villiers 
Industrial Court Judge 
PRIVATE BAG BR 267 
BROADHURST 
GABORONE 
TELEPHONE: (267) 300565 
TELEFAX: (267) 300567 
REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA 
FORM Ie. IS 
INDUSTRIAL COURT 
BROADHURST BUSINESS CENTRE 
UNITS 4 AND 5 
CORNER BODUNGWE ROAD 
AND NELSON MANDELA DRIVE 
BROADHURST INDUSTRIAL EsTATE 
GABORONE 
CONFIRMATION OF SELECTION OF ASSESSOR 
Case No. Ie. ____ I __ _ 
Date: __________ _ 
TO: AND TO: 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Re: The Dispute between: 
Applicant: 
Respondent: 
I hereby confirm that you have been selected, in terms of Section 17 (6) of the Trade Disputes Act, to sit with 
the Judge as an assessor in the Industrial Court in the above matter, which has been set down for a hearing at 
________ on of , 2001 at 09:30, before Judge 
Kindly aminge with your employer to release you from duties on the aforesaid days to enable you to attend 
the said hearing. 
A copy of the Court pleadings in the above matter is enclosed for your information and attention/will be 
sent to you in due course.* 
Yours faithfully, 
K. P. Kalonda 
REGISTRAR, INDUSTRIAL COURT 
* delete whichever is not applicable 
PRIVATE BAG BR 267 
BROADHURST 
GABORONE 
TELEPHONE: (267) 300565 
TELEFAX: (267) 300567 
TO: 
Dear SirlMadam 
REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA 
FORMIC. 19 
REMINDER TO FILE STATEMENT OF CASE 
Re: The Dispute between: 
INDUSTRIAL COURT 
BROADHURST BUSINESS CENTRE 
UNITS 4 AND 5 
CORNER BODUNGWE ROAD 
AND NasON MANDELA DRIVE 
BROADHURST INDUSTRIAL ESTATE 
GABORONE 




You referred the abovementioned dispute to this Court on , but you failed to file 
your statement of case. On you were sent/given a letter drawing your 
attention to the provisions of Rule 4 (3), which requires that you file your statement of case at Court within 14 
days after you have referred the dispute to this Court and at the same time you are also required to serve a copy 
of your statement of case on the Respondent. 





Commissioner of Labour 
PRIVATE BAG BR 267 
BROADHURST 
GABORONE 
TELEPHONE: (267) 300565 
TELEFAJG (267) 300567 
TO:· 
Dear SirlMadam 
REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA 
FORMIC. 20 
REMINDER TO FILE PROOF OF SERVICE 
Re: The Dispute between: 
INDUSTRIAL COURT 
BROADHURST BUSINESS CENTRE 
UNITS 4 AND 5 
CORNER BODUNGWE ROAD 
AND NELSON MANDELA DRIVE 
BROADHURST INDUSTRIAL ESTATE 
GABORONE 
Case No. IC. --------/------------
Date: -•••••••• -•••.• --•••••• --
Applicant: -.• ----••••••.• -•• -••••••••••........ -... --.--.---.•..••..•• -•••• --.--•.••.••.....••.•••• -••.•.• ---•..••• -•. --•••••.•. 
Respondent: •••• -.--•• --•• -•••••••• -.•••••••••••• -.---.--••••••••••.••••••••. --.•.••••• -••••••••• -.-.•.•• -.----.•••••••••••• -•.••• 
You referred the abovementioned dispute to this Court on and at the same time -----------------------
you also filed your statement of case. 
There is however no indication whether you also served a copy of the said documents on the Respondent. 
Before this Court can commence to determine this dispute, the Court must be satisfied that a copy of your 
statement of case was properly served on the Respondent. 
If it is at al1 possible please come and see me here at the Court as soon as possible or telephone me so that I can 
explain to you how service should be effected and/or how to file proof of service. 




Commissioner of Labour 
FORM IC. 21 
WRIT OF EXECUTION 
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA 
HELD AT GABORONE 
CASE NO. IC. 




To the Deputy Sheriff 
For the district of Gaborone 
You are hereby directed to attach and take into execution the movable 
goods of the Respondent, ---------------------------------------------------------------- of 
(address), and of the same to cause to be realized by public auction the 
sum of -------------, which the Applicant has recovered by judgment of 
this Court dated --------- day of ----------, in the above-rnentioned case, 
and also all your costs thereby incurred. 
Further pay to the said Applicant or his attorney the sum or sums 
due to himfher with costs as above-mentioned, and for your so doing 
this shall be your warrant. 
And return you this writ with what you have done thereupon. 
Dated at Gaborone this day of 2001. 





























the Minister may, whether the dispute has or has not been reported to the 
Commissioner under section 5 and whether the par~es consent or do not consent 
to his doing so, refer the dispute to the Industrial Court (emphasis mine).109 
Where clarification or rectification of a Court decision was sought, the Minister 
or any party to the dispute may.apply under the cir.cumstances set out in section 
26 (3). 
Urgent Applications in the Industrial Court 
Prior to the 1997 amendments to the TDA, there was no specific provision that 
gave the Court the power to hear urgent applications. In tbe case of Barclqys Bank 
ofBotSJvana Ltd v BotSJJJa11a Bank Emplqyees Union an urgent application was brought 
to the Court against the Union and 2 others interdicting a countrywide strike. l1O 
In this matter the Respondents challenged the Court power to hear urgent 
applications on the basis that the requisite section 7certificate had not been issued 
by the Commissioner. On the question of its powers to hear urgent applications, 
the Court had the following to say; 
"The powers of the Court or any division of the Court, are set out inter alia in 
section 18(1) of the Trade Disputes Act, the relevant portions of which provide 
as follows: 
The Court or any division of the Court, shall have exclusive jurisdiction in 
every matter properly before it under this Act and without prejudice to the 
generality of the foregoing, such jurisdiction shall include power-
(a) ................................................................. . 
109 Section 9 (1), Trade Disputes Act, op. cit. 
110 Barclays Bank if Botswana Ltd 11 Botswana Bank El1lplqyees UniOlI Ie 40/94 
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(b) to enJoin any employee or employer or any trade union or employer's 
organization from taking or continuing any industrial action; 
(c) ................................................................ . 
(d) generally to give all such directions and do all such things as may be 
necessary or expedient for the expeditious and just hearing and 
determination of any dispute before it."111 
The Court went further to interpret section 18 (?) as giving the Court a wide 
discretion as it provides: 
"The Court shall regulate its own· procedures and proceedings as it considers 
fit"112 
In its reasoning the Court stated further that 'when the Court has to make an 
order in terms of section 18 (1) (b) regarding industrial action, it is inconceivable 
that the legislature intended such disputes to follow the long procedure laid down 
for ordinary matters, as industrial action, if not taken in accordance with the 
provisions of the Act would be unlawful and is therefore a matter that must be 
dealt with expeditiously by the Court (section 18 (1) (d») and the Court can decide 
on what procedure to follow (section 18 (6) ) to achieve such an expeditious 
determination'.113 The Court was therefore satisfied that the Industrial Court had 






The Industrial Courts' power to hear urgent applications was once agam 
challenged in the Court of Appeal case Botswalta Rai/wqys Organisation v Setsogo 
& 198 Others. ll5 This resulted in a new ground for referral being introduced in the 
1997 Trade Disputes (amendment) Act with section 20 of the TDA being 
amended by adding at the end of subsection (2) the following new subsections-
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 4-9, a party to a trade dispute may 
make an urgent application to the Court for the determination of a trade dispute; 
(4) An urgent application under subsection (3) shall be brought on notice of 
motion supported by an affidavit as to the facts upon which the applicant relies 
on for relief. 
(5) The applicant shall set forth, in the affidavit, explicitly the circumstances 
which he avers render the matter urgent and the reasons why he claims that he 
could not be afforded substantial redress at a mediation by the Commissioner in 
due course.1l6 
Section 19 (1) states that the Court shall not be bound by the rules of evidence or 
procedure in civil or criminal proceedings.117 This provision is targeted at 
reducing the number of delays that may arise from unnecessary technicalities. 
Section 18(d) of the TDA, further empowers the Industrial Court to 'do all such 
things as may be or expedient for the expeditious and just hearing and 
determination of any dispute before it,.118 This would include empowering the 
115 Botswana Rmlwq)'s Organiration v Setsogo & 198 Others CA 51/95 
116 Section 20 (3) -(5), Trade Disputes (A11lend11lent) Act, op. cit 
117 Section 19 (1), Trade Disputes {A11lend11lentJAct of 1992, op. cit. 
118 Section 18 (d), Trade Disputes (A11lend11lent) Act of 1992, op. cit. 
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Industrial Court to make rules regarding its functions and the proceedings before 
it. 
Section 159 (1) of the 1995 Si\ LRA establishes a Rules Board for the Labour 
Court for the purposes of regulating the conduct of the proceedings in the 
Labour Court. 119 The procedure to be follDwed in the Botswana Industrial Court 
is set out in the rules of the Industrial Court. These rules are geared to 
establishing simpler, speedier and less costly litigation. The preamble to the 
Industrial Court rules state the purpose of the rules as being' .... to assist the 
Court in achieving the objectives of the TDA and when interpreting the rules, the 
Court will have regard to substance rather than form in order to dispense 
substantial justice between the parties.'120 This purpose is reiterated in Rule 12(4) 
of the Industrial Court Rules. (At present the Rules have no force of law and 
have not been published. It is presently bemg proposed that the Judge President 
of the Industrial Court publish the rules after consultation with the Labour 
Advisory Board.) 
6. Remedies for unfair dismissal 
Section 193 (1) and (2) of the SA LRA list the available remedies in the Labour 
Court as reinstatement, re-employment and compensation. 121 Section 193 (3) 
further provides that 'where a dismissal is automatically unfair or, if a dismissal 
based on the employers operational requirements is found to be unfair, the Labour 
Court in addition may make any other order that it considers appropriate in the 
circumstances. Sections 194 and 195 of the LRA deal with the amount of 
compensation awarded to a dismissed employee, with section 194 setting out the 
119 Section 159 (1), 1995, SA IJ{A, op. cit. 
120 Preamble to the Industrial COllrt Rules (Botswana) 
121 Section 193 (1) & (2),1995 SA IJ{A, op. cit. 
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limits on compensation. The maximum that can be awarded to a dismissed 
employee is the equivalent of 24 months remuneration calculated at the emplqyees' 
rate 0/ remuneration on the date 0/ dismissal. 122 For an employee to qualify for this 
amount the dismissal must have been found to have been automaticallY ti1ifair. 
Section 24 (1) of the Trade Disputes (amendment) Act of 1992 provides the 
following; 
"In any case wh'ere the Court determines that an employee has been wrongfully 
dismissed or disciplined, the Court may, subject to its discretion to make any 
other order which it considers just-
(a) in the case of wrongful dismissal, order reinstatement of the employee, with 
or without compensation, or order compensation in lieu of re-instatement; 
or 
(b) 10 the case of wrongful disciplinary action, order the payment of such 
compensation as it considers just: Provided that-
. . 
(i) compulsory re-instatement as a remedy for: wrongful dismissal 
should only be considered-
(a) where the termination was found to be unlawful, or 
motivated on the grounds of sex, trade union 
membership, trade union activity, the lodging of a 
complaint or grievance, or religious, tribal or political 
affiliation (this section is similar to sections 5, 187 (1) and 
187 (f) of the SA LRA); or 
122 Section 193 (3),1995 SaLRA, op. cit. 
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(b) where the employment relationship has not irretrievably 
broken down; and 
in a case where re-instatement is· ordered, any compensation 
ordered shall not exceed the actual pecuniary loss suffered by the 
employee as a result of wrongful dismissal, and in any other case, 
any compensation ordered shall not exceed six months 
monetary wages. 
(2) In assessing the amount of compensation to be paid under subsection (1), 
the Court may take the following factors into account-
(a) the actual and future loss likely to be suffered by the 
employee as a result of the wrongful dis~issal; 
(b) the age of the employee; 
(c) the prospects of the employee in finding other equivalent 
employment; 
(d) the circumstances ofthe dismissal; 
(e) the acceptance or rejection by either the employer or the 
employee of any recommendations made by the Court for 
the re-instatement of the employee; 
(~ whether or not there has been any contravention of the 
terms of any collective agreement of any law relating to 
employment by the employer or the employee; 
(g) the employers' ability to pay 
84 
Section 24 (3) of the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act of 1992 addresses 
terminations of contracts of employment by the employee. The section provides 
that" Where a contract of employment is wrongfully terminated by an employee, 
the Court may make such order of compensation in favour of t~e employer as is 
considers just: 
Provided that in no case shall such order of compensation exceed six months 
monetary wages. 
7. Appeals & Reviews 
In the absence of a Labour Court of Appeal, section 18(4) of the TDA provides 
that the right of appeal against a decision of the Industrial Court lies with the 
Court of Appeal of Botswana. I :' The section does not set out the instances or 
circumstances in which a matter may be referred to the high¢r judicial body. The 
Court has, however, in practice, referred matters to the High Court on its own 
motion (eg, constitutional matters) and to the Court of Appeal for determination 
of questions of law. One of the shortcomings noted with the present system is 
that appeals of the Industrial Court lie with the. Court of Appeal. Most 
jurisdictions provide for appeals from Labour Courts to lie in the Labour Court 
of Appeal. Section 166 (1) of the SA LRA provides that; 
"Any party to any proceedings before the Labour Court may apply to the 
Labour Court for leave to appeal to the Labour Appeal Court against any final 
judgment or final order of the Labour Court.,,124 
123 Section 18 (4), Track DiSPllt£s (Amendment) Act of 1992, op. cit. 
124 Section 166 (1), 1995, SA LRA, op. cit. 
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The importance of having Labour Appeal Courts lies in the fact that Labour 
Courts are considered to be specialist Courts. Advocates of Labour Appeal 
Courts argue that there is little sense in referring a dispute from a specialist 
Labour Court to a non-specialist Court. of AppeaL Consequently, 
recommendations have now been made that the legislation be amended to 
provide; 
(a) provision for the appointment of a labour law specialist to the panel of the 
Court of appeal judges;12S and 
(b) provision for a labour law judge to sit on appeals em~ating from the 
Industrial Court. 126 
Powers of Review 
The legislation is silent as to the powers of review relating to Industrial Court 
decisions. In the absence of a Labour Court of Appeal, the Constitution and 
Court of Appeal Act need to give the Court of Appeal inherent jurisdiction to 
review any decision of the Industrial Court. It is vital that the Industrial Court 
have the benefit scrutiny by an appellate body tlut would enhance its stature 
and help maintain its standards. 
8.===-",""" 
It is clear that there were a number of omissions and anomalies within the Trade 
Disputes (Amendment) Act 1992. The Act was not well drafted and it bogged 
down the Industrial Court with many technical arguments. The 'teething' 
problems experienced by the Botswana Industrial Court, were to a large extent, 
125 ILO I Swiss Project, Dmft Outline, 0p. cit. p 17 
126 Ibid 
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similar to those experienced. by the previous Industrial Court of South Africa. 
Whilst much of the SA Industrial Courts' problems revolved around the concept 
of an 'unfair labour practice', the Court also experienced some jurisdictional 
problems. Frequent legislative intervention was required to enable the Industrial 
Court of South Africa to function as intended. In a similar vein, fundamental 
changes to the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act were required to enable the 
Industrial Court of Botswana to function as envisaged. In spite of the many 
hindrances, however, the Industrial Court was able to determine a number of 
relevant cases. Three important trends emerge from the early decisions of the 
Court; 
the Industrial Court insists that the statutory procedures relating to 
conciliation and mediation be exhausted before the parties can approach 
the Industrial Court for relief; 
the Industrial Court demonstrates a clear intention to depart from the 
rigid formalism of the ordinary courts; and 
the Industrial Court also recognizes that it is a creature of statute and 
subject to limitations. \X1here the Act is silent, however, the Court tends 
to assume wide discretionary and quasi-judicial powers. that enable it to 
function effectively. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: Assessment of the Industrial Court's Decisions from a 
Labour Relations Perspective 
L Introduction 
The procedures of ordinary courts have been declared too formal and 
cumbersome to handle the rapid deyelopments in labour relations.1 As a general 
rule specialized Labour Courts are expected to be accessible, speedy, efficient and 
informal.2 This chapter endeavours to examine the general efficiency of tbe 
Industrial Court of Botswana. 
2. ACCESSIBILITY 
The question of accessibility is multi-dimensional. In general parties should have 
easy access to the dispute resolution system. Pertinent considerations under this 
heading include legal, geographical and financial accessibility of the dispute 
settlement machinery to the parties. 
2.1 Legal accessibility 
In Britain, a minimum of one years' service is required to access certain statutory 
employment rights.3 Employment rights can only be accessed from the very 
beginning if they fall within certain categories, ie; discrimination on grounds of 
sex, race or disability.4 Placing such legal time limitations creates a barrier that can 
be liable or open to abuse and manipulation. Many employers would seek to 
1 Mischke C. (Re)I.lvlmtiotlS- Reflectio1lS UpOl1 Entering a New s.ystcm of Dispute Reso/ution, in Labour Dispute 
Resolu cion, Brand J. et aJ , p 18 
2 Ibid P 19 
3 Corby S. & Newall 1., U,!/air Dismissal in South Africa: comparative perspectives from Great Britail1 atId NCII; Zealal1d, 
unpublished paper, 12th Aruma} Labour Conference, 30 June-2nd July, Durban, SA., p 4 
4 Ibid p4 
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challenge an employees' continuous service under this provision. In South Africa 
employee rights start from the first day of employment. Section 5 of the SA LRl\ 
even goes as far as to protect persons seeking employment.s In Botswana 
employee rights are accessed from the very beginning.6 No minimum statutory 
limitations have been set out to limit an employees right of access to employment 
rights. The Industrial Court has however, deliberated on a case in which the 
Respondent employer challenged the emplqyees continuous service. In the case of 
Thono Pilane v WiLfy Kathurima Associates (Pry) Ltd.' the applicant had been 
authorized to take a years study leave. The issue to be determined by the Court, 
related to the calculation of severance pay. The Respondent denied any obligation 
to pay severance benefits to the Applicant, on the ground that the Applicant was 
on study leave and not in the employ of the Respondent. The Court held that 
authorized absence from work does not interrupt.continuous employment and 
accordingly held the Respondent liable to pay severance benefits.s 
2.1.1 Legal accessibility-Who is an employee? 
The question of who is an employee is also relevant to the accessibility of the 
dispute settlement machinery. In Great Britain, New Zealand and South Africa, 
only employees can make use of the unfair dismissal procedures.9 The question of 
who is an employee, however, is left to the arbitrator/adjudicator to determine on 
the facts. 1o The British tribunals usually rule out atypical workers, indudinghome-
5 Section 5, 1995 SA LRA, op. cit 
6 See: Employmmt Act, Botswana 
7 Tho7lO Pilmle 11 I~'il!y Kathlllima & Associates (Pty) Ltd. IC 98/85 
8 Thono PiJaJJe case, op. cit. 
9 Corby s., & Newall L, unpublished paper, op. cit. p 4 
10 Ibid P 4 
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workers ll but this is likely to change in light of the global trend towards atypical 
employment. Section 213 of the 1995 SA LRi\ specifically excludes independent 
workers from the definition of an 'emp]oyee,.12 In addition the SAS, South 
African Defence Force (SANDF) and National Intelligence Agency (NIA) are 
excluded from the Act.!3 
In Botswana, an employee has been defined in section 2 (1) of the Employment 
Act (Cap: 47: 01, Laws of Botswana) to mean; 
"any person who has entered into a contract of employment for the hire of his 
labour: 
Provided that the expresslOn shall not include any officer or servant of the 
government unless he belongs to a category of such officers or servants the 
members of which are declared by the Minister under the Employment Act to be 
employees for the purposes of that Act.,,14 
Section 2 (1) of the Trade Disputes Act contains an almost identical definition of 
an 'employee' .15 In the case of S difa DitshJ2;ane v Botswana Raiiwqys Organisation 16 
the court said that the two definitions were for all practical purposes the same and 
were also interlinked. In this matter, the applicant, an employee of the Botswana 
Railways Organisation, made a protest against the termination of his employment 
as per section 5 (6) (d) of the TDA. The court ruled that the definitions contained 
in section 2(1) of the TDA and Employment Act make it patently clear that an 
11 Ibid P 4 
12 Section 213, Definition section, 1995 SA IRA, op. cit. 
13 See also: section 213 , 1995, LRA 
14 Section 2 (1), E11lploynmltAct, 47:01, LaIIJS ofBotslIJana, op. cit. 
15 Section 2 (1), Trade Disputes Act, Cap: 48:01, LaliJS ~rBotslVafla, op. cit. 
16 Setefa DitshllJa1Je v Botswana RPibvq)'S O'lJ,aflisatio1J, Ie. 90/95 
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qjJicer or servant rf the Govemme1lt cannot be an emplrzyee Jot' the purposes rf the Trade 
Disputes Act unless he belongs to a category of public servants who have been 
declared by the Minister to be employees for the purposes of the 
Employment Act. ,,17 The court ruled that the Botswana Railways Organisation 
was part of the Government of.Botswana and further that the Applicant was an 
officer or servant of the Government of Botswana. Consequently the Applicant 
was found to not be an employee as defined in the Employment Act and Trade 
Disputes Act. Agricultural workers and domestic workers are also excluded from 
the ambit of the legislation guaranteeing employment security. In another 
decision of the Industrial Court, Edrogan Cahit v Musto Olmez (PM Ltd 18, the court 
held that Directors and shareholders are not employees. 
2.2 Accessibility-Financial barriers 
A general 'rule-of thumb' of the 'ideal dispute resolution system is that it should 
be relatively inexpensive.19 Whilst dispute resolution systems are required to be 
inexpensive, they can never be entirely free. The c~sts of running the institutions 
must be borne by either the parties or some institution (in most cases the State) 
It's important to note that a balance must be struck between 'the efficient way in 
which the dispute resolution system operates and the costs involved in the 
efficient running of the system.,,20 In certain jurisdictions 'user fees' provide a 
form of financial barrier. In Great Britain and South Africa there are generally no 
fees payable, whereas in New Zealand parties are required to pay fees at every 
stage.21 In New Zealand, fees must be paid for an application to the Tribunal, for 
17 Selefa Ditsblwnc case, op. cit. 
18 Edrogl111 Cabi! v Mllsto Olmez (Pty) Ltd. IC 89/95 
19 Mischke c., op. cit p 24 
20 Ibid at 24 
21 Corby S. & Newall I, op. cit. at 4 
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an adjudication hearing, for an appeal and for an appeal hearing per half day after 
the first day.22 
User fees are generally thought of as being undesirable in so far as they tend to be 
restrictive and prohibitive. At present, no user fees are payable in the Botswana 
Industrial Court. The majority of the users and potential users of Labour Courts 
do not often have the necessary financial means to access .the justice system. This 
is particularly true of many of the countries within the SADC region. 
Consequently, it has been suggested that fee requirements are to be rejected and 
discouraged for being impractical and unrealistic. 
At one stage, South Africa was considering implementing an alternative that 
would require an mdividual to register a down payment or refundable deposit.23 
This alternative was being considered as a means of discouraging the many 
unnecessary cases that come before the CCMA. Tfle CCMA also felt that they 
could improve on the quality ofarbitration service by requiring a more stringent 
screening on a tariff of fees. 24 The tariff is therefore intended to 'create a small 
hurdle for people to think about before referring disputes to the CCMA".25 A 
crucial element to consider prior to introduction of user fees is whether or 
not this 'financial barrier' will affect the people who need it most. It is suggested 
that Botswana is not the best country to employ this kind of barrier. This is 
because the mediation and conciliation processes alone, may take up to six 
months or more. A further six or more months may elapse before an individual 
obtains relief from Industrial Court. 
Corby S.& Newall t, op. cit at 5 
23 Mosime K., CCMA: AdJievemmts & Challenges, ,presentation, 12th Annual Labour Law Conference, 30th 
June-2nd July, 1999, Durban, SaudI Africa at p 98 
24 Ibid p98 
25 ibid P 98 
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2.3 Financial barriers- Costs 
The awarding of costs can be an additional financial burden -on the losing party 
and this is particularly the case where the legal aid structure of a country is 
inadequate. In countries like New Zealand, legal aid may assist in defraying fees 
and costs and in rectifyir:g the imbalances between the applicant and the 
respondent in terms of their representation.26 In Great Britain the Tribunal 
Regulations provide that costs are only awarded if a part:y has acted frivolousjy, 
vexatiousjy, abttsivejy, disruptive!J or othenvise unreasonabjy (emphasis mine).27 This is a 
very high test. In South Africa, however, costs are only awarded in arbitration for 
,frivolous or vexatious behaviour but in the Labour Court and Court of Appeal, the 
courts have a broader discretion in awarding costs. Sections 162 and 179 of the 
SA LR.I\ are identical in their wording. Subsections (1), (2) and (3) provide that; 
(1)" The Labour Court may make an order for the payment of costs, according 
to the requirements of the law and fairness. 
(2) \,{/hen deciding whether or not to order the payment of costs, the Labour 
Court may take into account-
(a) whether the matter referred to the Court ought to have been referred to 
arbitration in terms of this Act and, if so, the extra costs incurred in referring 
the matter to the Court; and 
(b) the conduct of the parties-




(i) in proceeding with or defending the matter before the Court; and 
(ii) during the proceedings before the Court. 
(3) The Labour Court may order costs against a party to the dispute or against any 
person who represented that party in those proceedings before the Court. 28 
A similar approach has been adopted in Botswana. Each party is generally 
required to bear its own costs. Costs are only awarded in two instances; 
(a) where one party agrees to pay the other party's costs, e.g. wasted costs where 
one party seeks a postponement; and 
(b) in terms of the Industrial Court Rules and Trade Disputes Act. Rule 17 (2) 
(e)29 of the Industrial Court Rules gives a Judge a certain amount of 
discretion to "make such order as to the costs of the case as he deems fit, if 
such costs are permissible in terms of section 27 of the Act (emphasis 
mine). In addition sectlon 27 of the TDA pro;'ides that; 
"'No costs shall be awarded by the Court except against a party held by it to have 
acted frivolously or vexatiously, (emphasis mine) or with deliberate delay in the 
bringing or defending of a proceeding, but where costs are awarded the tariff of 
costs laid down from time to time under the rules of the High Court shall apply 
mutates mutandis in respect of costs awarded by the Court."30 
28 Section 162 (1), (2), (3) & Section 179 (1) (2) & (3),1995 SA LRA, op. cit. 
29 Section 17 (2) (e), Appendix C, Indllstria! COllrt Rides 
30 Section 27, Trade DisputesAct 
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The Court has awarded costs in very few cases. To date the Court has only 
awarded costs in a total of 15 cases.31 In Barclqy,f Bank ifBotS2vana Ltd. v Botswana 
Bank ifEmplqyees Union & Others 32, the Court was asked to deliberate on whether 
the Bank had been declared an essential service. The Court considered the action 
to be frivolous and vexatious in that 'a list of essential service providers had been 
gazetted by the Minister listing all banks as essential service providers.'33 
Consequently the Union was aware, at the time of making its application to the 
Court, that they had been included in the list of essential service providers. The 
Court therefore, elected to award costs against the Union because 'they knew they 
had no leg to stand on ..... and stubbornly and defiantly proceeded with their ill-
founded opposition right to the end,34 (de Villiers ]P, as he was then). 
2.3 Geographic accessibility 
An ideal dispute resolution system must be geographically accessible. In South 
Africa bargaining councils are usually located close to the industries which are 
represented on the council. The CCMA has nine offices, one in each province 
and its Commissioners often travel to the outlying areas.35 In .comparison, 
Botswana has offices of the department of labour situated throughout the 
country but the Industrial Court is only situated'in the capital city, Gaborone. 
Gaborone is situated in the southern part of Botswana. Consequently, it has been 
suggested that the Court only services (or is accessible to) those in the southern 
part of Botswana. In 1995, however, the Court started to go on Circuit Court to 
Francistown every three months to service tl1e northern part of the country. As 
31 Interview with Industrial Court Judge de Villiel's, July 16th , 2001, Gaborone, Botswana 





of April 2001 the Court has been going on Circuit every two months (6 X's a 
year). Currently the Court h<;ls not handled more tlun 30 cases a year on average . 
from the Northern region (see Table 1 below). At present, however, there are 
not enough cases to justify the establishment of a permanent Court in 
Francistown. Plans are however, being currently made to establish a permanent 
Labour Court in Francistown in the near future. 
TABLE1 36 
Cases before the Industrial Court of Botswana,1994-3rt July, 2001 
YEAR Total Cases Registered Circuit Court Cases 
1994 40 
1995 118 
1996 221 6 
1997 92 22 
1998 184 5 
1999 266 15 
2000 261 29 
2001 199 . 20 
36 Cases before the Industrial Court 1994- July 31 ", 2001, Industrial C01lrt Register, August, 5, 2001, Gaborone, 
Botswana. 
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2.4 Accessibility- Internal Procedures 
The accessibility of a dispute resolution system is also concerned with the ease of 
reporting or instituting a case of unfair dismissal. Users of the system must be 
able to use the system and internal efficiencies should be relatively simple and 
well organized. Procedures in ~ew Zealand have been criticized as being 
comparatively complex.37 The Tanzanian process has also been described as very 
litigious one.38 
Complex procedures are to be discouraged In that they act as barriers to 
employees who are neither well educated nor represented. In contrast, 
applications made in South Africa to the bargaining councils and CCMA are by 
way of simple form with the onus being placed on the employee to serve the 
employer with a copy. The Industrial Court has followed a similar approach to 
that of South Africa. The Trade Disputes Act was amended to provide for easier 
reporting at the district labour officer level. As previously stated, the requirement 
under section 5 (2) (a) of the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act that the report be 
made in writing was waived, leaving room for reports to be made verbally. 
Form and Content of Process- Industrial Court 
The form and content of process is set out in Rule 4 of the Industrial Court 
Rules.39 Essentially any party may register a case with the Industrial Court if he 
has; 
(a) complied with the provisions of section 5(6) of the 1992 Trade Disputes 
(Amendment) Act; and 
37 Corby S. & Newall 1., op. cit. at 5 
38 Christie S. & Madhuku L., op. cit. at 11 
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• 
(b) been issued with a section 7 certificate by the Commissioner of Labour 
An Applican t is then required to bring a letter of referra!40 along with the issued 
section 7 certificate4\ (where applicable), to the Court registry and this will be 
deemed to be a proper referral of such dispute to the Industrial Court case. The 
party may simultaneously with the delivery of such letter of referral (or 14 days 
thereafter), file with the Registrar, a statement of case, as near as may be in 
accordance with Appendix 142 to these Rules, and serve a copy thereof on the 
Respondent, which statement of case shall: 
(a) be signed by the party by whom it is delivered; 
(b) contain in full the title of the matter, tl1e names of the parties and where 
possible, the number assigned by the Registrar to the matter at the head of 
such statement; 
(c) contain clear and concise particulars relevant to the unresolved trade dispute 
and any further material facts on which the applicant relies for the relief 
sought; 
(d) be divided in paragraphs including subparagraphs, in respect of content, 
which paragraphs shall be consecutively numbered and which shall, as near 
as possible, each contain a distinct averment; 
(e) set out clearly the nature of relief sought; 
39 Rule 4, Appendic C Indust1ial Court Rules, op. cir., p 6 
40 See: Appendix D, Form Ie 1, Litter of referral, Rule 4(1) 1&-4 (2), Industrial COurt Rules 
41 Section 7 certificate from the Commissioner of Labour as per Section 7 of the Trade Disputes (Amendment) 
Act of 1992 
42 See:Appendix C, Industria! Court Rules, p 19 
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(~ contain an address at which the AppJicant will accept service of process in 
the proceedings; 
(g) contain a notice that if the other party (the Respondent): 
(i) intends opposing such application, he is required within 14 days 
after delivery of the said statement of case, to deliver a reply 
referred to in sub-rule (5); 
(ii) fails to deliver such reply, a determination, including an order as 
to costs, may be made in his absence; 
, . 
(h) contain a list of books and documents relevant to the application, which are 
in the Applicant's possession or under his contro1.43 
Rules 4 (5) and 4 (6) of the Industrial Court Rules contain the form and content 
of process as it relates to Respondehts.44 Rule 5 stipulates that a Respondent 
intending to oppose the application shall within the 14 day period, file with the 
Registrar, a statement of defence, as near as may be in accordance with Appendix 
245 to these Rules and serve a copy thereof on the Applicant, which statement of 
defence shall: 
(a) set out clearly and concisely the grounds of opposition and the material facts 
relied upon in support of such grounds; 
(b) comply with all the requirements set out in subrules (4) (a), (b), (d) and (t); 
43 Rule 4 (a) -(11), Appendix C I1idustrial Couti Rules, op, cit p 6 
44 See: Rule 4(5) & 4 (6), Appendix C, Industned COllrt Rules, p 6 
45 See Appendix C, Industrial Court &,Ies, p 22 
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(c) contain a list of books and documents relevant to his opposition and any 
relief he may seek which are in the Respondent's possession or under his 
controL46 
Rule 4 (6) further provides that a Respondent intending to counterclaim shall 
simultaneously with his statement of defence deliver a statement which shall: 
(a) contain clear and precise particulars relevant to his counterclaim and ant 
further material facts on which he relies for the relief sought; 
(b) comply with all the requirements set out in sub-rules (4) (a), (b), (d), (e), (f) 
and (g), which allow the Applicant 14 days within which to reply to the 
Respondent's counter claim statement.47 
Rule 4 (9) provides that, any late delivery of a statement of case or statement of 
defence, may be condoned by the Court on good cause shown in terms of Rule 
12 (1) (a).48 Rule 5 (1) sets out the manner of filing process with the Registrar. 
Such process may take place by hand, registered post, telefax or other 
electronically printed manner. 49 
At first glance the procedures of the Botswana Industrial Court may seem to be 
slightly complex. It is important, however, to bear in mind that the Court has 
already prepared and available standard forms relatil!g to the form and content of , . 
process. All that is required of the parties, therefore 'is to fill in their particulars on 
the supplied forms. 
46 See: Rule 5, Appendix C, Industrial COffrt Rllfes, op. cit p 7 
47 See: Rule 4(6), Appendix C, Industliat COllrt Rliles, op. cit. p 7 
48 See: Rules 4 (9) and 12 (1) (a), Appendix C, IndlfStrial Court wies, op. cit p 7 
49 See: Rule 5 (1), Appendix C, industrial COllrt Rlt1es, op. cit. p7 
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2.5 Accessibility- Time Limits 
The accessibility of a dispute resolution system is also determined by the time 
limits implemented in the system. In New Zealand a time limit of 90 days was 
established for the grievant to notify the employer and the employer was given 14 
days to respond. 50 If the time limit is observed, the grievant has. up to six years to 
apply to the tribunal.s1 The effect of this provision is that the employment 
Tribunal may be dealing with a matter that is several years. old. It is suggested that 
this method dose not fit in with the normal concept of justice (especially as it 
relates to labour disputes). In contrast, in Great Britain the Conservative 
Government established in the 1970's, a time limit of four weeks, and this was 
later extended under the Labour Government to three months.52 In South Africa 
there is a time limit of thirty days from the date of dismissal to the time of 
application unless the employee shows good cause for not having done SO.53 In 
Botswana there is a time limit of 14 days from the date of dismissal to the 
application made before the district labour officer.53 The new section 6 A (3) 
states that condonation for a late application, may be made where there is good 
cause by a labpur officer, the Commissioner of Labour or the Industrial Court.54 
3. SPEED 
An efficient dispute resolution system needs to aim to resolve disputes once 
properly notified. In Great Britain, conciliation under ACAS may take place from 
50 Corby S. & Newall I, op. cit., at 6 
51 Ibid at 6 
52 Ibid at 6 
53 Section 19(2),1995 SA IRA, op. cit. 
53 Section 6 A (3), Trade Dipsllfcs Act, op. cit 
54 Ibid 
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any time up until the tribunal hearing.55 The majority single cases (over 80%) 
were brought to a hearing within 6 months in 1997/8.56 
Section 135 of the SA LRA deals with the resolution of disputes through 
conciliation.57 Under section 135 (2) a Commissioner of the CCMA must 'attempt 
to resolve the dispute through conciliation within 30 days of the date the 
Commission received the referraL,s8 (This period may be extended with the 
consent of the parties).59 Studies recently conducted show that with arbitration, 
most provinces dispose of their cases within 3-4 months.GO Speed is a particularly 
crucial factor for the South African dispute resolution machinery since 
compensation for procedurally unfair dismissal is calculated from the time of 
dismissal to the date of the arbitration hearing.61 
In Botswana there are no provisions relating to the specific time within which a 
dispute must be settled. At the level of the Labour Department, section 7 of the 
Trade Disputes Act provides that a dispute be resolved within a reasonable time 
(emphasis mine) but does not specifically stipulate what is considered to be 
reasonable.62 The Act makes no reference to any time limitations in respect of the 
Court. The Court, does however, attempt to provide for speedy settlement. At 
present, the length of time .'between declaration the dispute to final 
disposition' by the Court, is on average 12 months. This compares favourably 
55 Corby S., & Newall I., op. cit at 6 
56 Employment Tribunals Service, 1998 
57 Section 135,1995 SA LRA op. cit 
53 Section 135 (2), 1995 SA LRA, op. cit. 
59 Ibid 
60 Theron J. & Godfrey S., The COilA cmd Small Busilless- the results of a pilat stu&' (2000) 21 ILJ 53 at 63 
61 Section 194 (1), 1995 SA LRA, op. cit 
62 Section 7, Trade Di.putes Act, op. cit. 
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with other courts in the region, which dispose of their cases in an average period 
of three years. 
During the years 1995-1997,63 the Court was inundated with cases and it handled 
the cases by requesting appointments of Acting Judges for short periods.~4 This 
way, the Court successfully managed to avoid any backlog of cases.65 Upon 
realizing that the cases coming before the Court were on the increase, the 
President of Botswana, in 1998, appointed a second Judge66 and later in 1999 a 
third Judge.67 At present, consideration is being given to appointing a fourth 
Judge. The Court has also made provision for the speedy determination of 
disputes in Rule 9 of the Industrial Court Rules. Rule 9 makes provision for a 
pre-hearing conference to be presided over by a Judge, the Registrar or a 
nominated member of the Court.68 Rule 9 (4) further provides that such presiding 
officer may also act as a mediator or conciliator.69 Rule 9 (1) requires that the 
request for a pre-hearing conference be made by the Court.70 Rule 9 (2) sets out 
the procedure for the pre-conference hearing and provides that; 
"At such conference, without prejudice to the rights of the parties, consideration 
may be given to the following matters: 
63 See: Table 2 & Table 3 which reflect the number of disputes before the Industrial Court. 
64 Interview with Industrial Court Judge D. de Villiers, July 16th, Industrial Court, Gaborone, Botswana 
65 Ibid 
66 Judge M.E Ebrahi-Cartens 
67 Judge EJ-W .. M. Legwaila 
68 Rule 9, Appendix C, Industrial Court Rules, op. cit. 
69 Rule 9 (4), Appendix C, Industrial COliri Rilles, op. cit. 
70 Rule 9 (1), Appendix C, Industrial Court Rules, op. cit. 
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(a) any means whereby the dispute may be settled, inclusive of such previous 
endeavours as have been made by the parties to settle the dispute by 
agreement or otherwise; 
(b) any agreement as to the nature and extent of the unresolved issues; 
(c) such facts as are common cause or are admitted by any party; 
(d) any steps which may shorten the hearing; 
(e) discovery or exchange of documents; 
(f) the manner in which documentary evidence is to be dealt with; 
(g) whether evidence on affidavit is to be admitted; 
01) which party shall begin; 
(i) the necessity or otherwise for an on-the-spot investigation; 
CD . securing the presence at court of any witness; and 
(k) any other matter or means whereby the proceedings may be shortened.71 
4. FO RMALITY 
Dispute resolution systems need to be specially adapted to be user friendly and 
relatively informal.72 Many of the Applicants/Users of the system often come 
from the more disadvantaged sectors of society and may be intimidated at the 
prospect of bringing a case to court. The need for informality was emphasized in 
71 Rule 9 (2) (a)- (k), Appendix C, bldllsbia/ C01l11 RJdes, op. cit 
72 Mischke M., A 1WV System of Dispute Reso/ution, op. cit p 20 
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the South African cases of Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) & Ano. vA. 
Mauchle (PM Uri trading as Predsion ToolP and Federated Trust Lt. V Botha74 where 
the Court stated; 
"The Court doeJ not encourage formalism in the application of the (Magistrate 'J Court) Rules. 
The ruleJ are not atl end in themselves to be observed for their oum sake. Thry are provided to 
secure the ine> .. pensive and expeditious completion of litigation bifore the Courts'~ 
It is for this same reason, that the South African government has repeatedly 
argued that informality is one of the benefits over court adjudication. The need 
for informality also explains the global trend towards Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) which tends to be less costly and less informal than 
adjudication. 
Mischke, in his article "(Re)Inventions- Reflections Upon Entering a new system 
of Dispute Resolution", advocates for informality but warns against dispute 
resolution institutions or resolvers ' throwing ..... all caution to the winds and 
proceeding in a rough and ready manner to do everything they perceive 
necessary to resolve the dispute,.75 Mischke further warns that, in as much as 
informality is the 'ideal of a perfect system of dispute resolution, it should never 
be seen as the justification for ignoring the parties, their needs and their rights.,76 
According to Mischke, informal proceedings, d9 not mean 'disorderly or 
unstructured proceedings, nor does an ideal of informality, efficiency or 
expeditiousness justify ignoring the interests, actual needs and rights of th,e parties 
13 IL] 1980, Vol. 1, Part 3, p 227 
14 1978 (3) SA 645 (A) 
75 Mischke M., op. cit. p 22 
76 Ibid P 21 
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to the dispute.m He draws attention to section 138 of the SA LRA which he 
maintains balances considerations of fairness and justice on one hand, and the countervailing 
considerations offairness and justice Otl the other hand. 78 Section 138 sets out the manner 
in which a CCMA Commissioner is expected to conduct an arbitration hearing. 
The section provides that; . 
«The commissioner mqy conduct the arbitration in a mamter that the commissioner considers 
appropriate if! order to determine the dispute fairfy and quickfy, but must deal with the 
substantial merits of the dispute JJJith the mitlimum of legal formalities. ,99 
It is suggested that in dealing with the subJtalltial merits of the case, parties must be 
given ample opportunity to state their case andto question any opposing version 
given. In general the degree of formality in an institution centers around five 
issues, namely; 
• whether the arbitrator/adjudicator is legally qualified;80 
• whether legal representation is allowed;81 
• whether the approach of the institution IS adversarial or 
. .. g" 
Investtgatlve; ~ 
• the amount of documentation involved;83 
77 Ibid at 21 
78 Ibid at 21 
79 Section 138, 1995, SA LRA, 0p. cit. 
80 Corby & Newall 1. op. cit at 6 
81 Ibid at 7 
82 Ibid at 7 
83 Ibid at 7 
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• whether there is an appea1.84 
Formality-
4.1 (i) Legal qualifications 
The question of legally qualified adjudicators is dealt with differently in different 
jurisdictions. Lord Wedderburn criticizes the use of legally qualified adjudicators 
as they tend to have 'common law habits, training and traditions' which may lead 
to a legal approach rather than an industrial relations approach.85 
Section 118 (1) (a) of the SA LRA requires the Director of the CCMA to be 
skilled and experienced in labour relations and dispute resolution. 86 Section 117 of 
the LRA, however, does not require CCMA arbitqltors, to be legally qualified.87 
Section 153 (2) of the LR.t\, however, requires that Labour Court Judges have 
knOJvledge, e>.perience and expertise itt Jabour Jaw 88(emphasis mine). Other 
jurisdictions have a similar approach and recognize the area of labour law. to be a 
specialist area of law requiring a specialist approach. In Great Britain, the tribunal 
Chairman must be legally qualified but may sit with lay members with industrial 
relations experience, one representing employer", and the other representing 
employees.89 This approach is representative of most jurisdictions in Africa, 
particularly those in the SADC region. In Botswana section 17 (3) provides that 
84 COl:by S. & Newall 1., op. cit at 7 
85 Wedderbum , ubollr UW: from here to atlto110l1'.Y, op. cit at 3 
86 Section 118 (1) (a), 1995, SA LR.4, op. cit 
87 Section 117, 1995, SA LRA, op cit. 
88 Section 153(2), SaA LR.4, op cit. 
89 Corby S. & Newall 1., op. cit at 6 
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Industrial Court judges are to be appointed from among persons possessing the 
qualifications to be puisne judges of the High Court as prescribed in section 96 (3) 
of the Constitution.90 Under section 96(3) of the Constitution a person shall only 
qualify to be a judge if they 'hold, or have held office, as a judge of a court .... " or 
alternatively if they have been 'qualified to practice as an advocate for not less 
than five years:91 In other words, a judge of the Botswana Industrial Court is not 
required to have any specialist knowledge of labour law. Like many of the other 
jurisdictions, the Botswana Industrial Court Judge is required to sit with Jay 
members (Assessors) who have industrial relations experience. 
4.2 (ii)I&gal Representation 
In some jurisdictions,(eg ~ew Zealand and Great Britain) legal representation is 
allowed at all stagesn . In South Africa sections 135 (4) and 140 of the LRA 
generally prohibit legal representation in dismissal cases for conciliation and 
arbitration. 93Legal representation is only allowed if; 
(a) the commissioner and all other parties consent (section 140 (1) (a); or 
(b) the commissioner concludes that it is unreasonable to expect a party to deal 
with the dispute without legal representation.94 
Factors which should assi;;;t a commissioner decide in determining the need for 
legal representation include, the nature of the questions of law raised by the 
dispute; the complexity of the dispute; the public 'interest and the comparative 
90 Section 17 (3), Trade Dispfltes Act as read with section 96 (3), Cotutitlltion if Botswana 
91 Section 96 (3), Constitution if Botswana, op.cit 
92 Corby S. & Newalll, 0p. cit at 7 
93 Section135(4) & 140, 1995 SA LRA, op. cit. 
94 Section 140 (1) (b) (i)-(iv), 1995 SA LRA, op. cit 
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ability of the opposing parties or their representatives to deal with the arbitration 
of the dispute,95 The primary rationale behind this approach is to decrease the 
number of technical arguments that come before the arbitrator/adjudicator. It is 
often argued that legal representatives tend to adopt legal procedures that are 
technical and complex in nature. 
The Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act of 1992 generally allows for an individual 
to be represented by a person of his/her own choice. Section 21 of the TDA 
provides that 'Any interested party in any proceedings under this Act may appear 
by advocate or be represented by any other person so authorized by such party.'96 
In drafting this section, it is evident that the legislature was attempting to balance 
the right of legal representation with a certain degree of informality suitable for a 
dispute resolution institution. 
4.3 Formality: Adversarial vs InvestigaivelInquisitorial approach 
The degree of formality of the dispute resolution system will also depend on 
whether the approach adopted in the system is an adversarial or 
investigative/inquisitorialone.97 
An adversarial system 'places the onus of collecting and presenting evidence on 
the parties who have to' prove or dispute facts upon which the claim is based.,98 
In the United Kingdom, much of the Industrial Tribunals failure to achieve its 
95 Ibid 
96 Section 21, Trade Displltes Act, op. cit. 
97 Cl ark Arbitration itl Dismissal Displltes in S ollth Africa and the UK, (1997) 18 IL J 609 
98 Corby S. & Newall I., op. cit. at 7 
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